{
  "id": "openEuler-SA-2024-1490",
  "url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1490",
  "title": "An update for flatpak is now available for openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP1,openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4,openEuler-22.03-LTS,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1,openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2 and openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3",
  "severity": "High",
  "description": "flatpak is a system for building, distributing and running sandboxed desktop applications on Linux. See https://wiki.gnome.org/Projects/SandboxedApps for more information.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\r\n\r\nFlatpak is a system for building, distributing, and running sandboxed desktop applications on Linux. in versions before 1.10.9, 1.12.9, 1.14.6, and 1.15.8, a malicious or compromised Flatpak app could execute arbitrary code outside its sandbox. Normally, the `--command` argument of `flatpak run` expects to be given a command to run in the specified Flatpak app, optionally along with some arguments. However it is possible to instead pass `bwrap` arguments to `--command=`, such as `--bind`. It's possible to pass an arbitrary `commandline` to the portal interface `org.freedesktop.portal.Background.RequestBackground` from within a Flatpak app. When this is converted into a `--command` and arguments, it achieves the same effect of passing arguments directly to `bwrap`, and thus can be used for a sandbox escape. The solution is to pass the `--` argument to `bwrap`, which makes it stop processing options. This has been supported since bubblewrap 0.3.0. All supported versions of Flatpak require at least that version of bubblewrap. xdg-desktop-portal version 1.18.4 will mitigate this vulnerability by only allowing Flatpak apps to create .desktop files for commands that do not start with --. The vulnerability is patched in 1.15.8, 1.10.9, 1.12.9, and 1.14.6.(CVE-2024-32462)",
  "cves": [
    {
      "id": "CVE-2024-32462",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32462",
      "severity": "High"
    }
  ]
}