<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<cvrfdoc xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/cvrf/1.1" xmlns:cvrf="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/cvrf/1.1">
	<DocumentTitle xml:lang="en">An update for kernel is now available for openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3</DocumentTitle>
	<DocumentType>Security Advisory</DocumentType>
	<DocumentPublisher Type="Vendor">
		<ContactDetails>openeuler-security@openeuler.org</ContactDetails>
		<IssuingAuthority>openEuler security committee</IssuingAuthority>
	</DocumentPublisher>
	<DocumentTracking>
		<Identification>
			<ID>openEuler-SA-2024-1894</ID>
		</Identification>
		<Status>Final</Status>
		<Version>1.0</Version>
		<RevisionHistory>
			<Revision>
				<Number>1.0</Number>
				<Date>2024-07-26</Date>
				<Description>Initial</Description>
			</Revision>
		</RevisionHistory>
		<InitialReleaseDate>2024-07-26</InitialReleaseDate>
		<CurrentReleaseDate>2024-07-26</CurrentReleaseDate>
		<Generator>
			<Engine>openEuler SA Tool V1.0</Engine>
			<Date>2024-07-26</Date>
		</Generator>
	</DocumentTracking>
	<DocumentNotes>
		<Note Title="Synopsis" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">kernel security update</Note>
		<Note Title="Summary" Type="General" Ordinal="2" xml:lang="en">An update for kernel is now available for openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3</Note>
		<Note Title="Description" Type="General" Ordinal="3" xml:lang="en">The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.

Security Fix(es):

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

lib/generic-radix-tree.c: Don&apos;t overflow in peek()

When we started spreading new inode numbers throughout most of the 64
bit inode space, that triggered some corner case bugs, in particular
some integer overflows related to the radix tree code. Oops.(CVE-2021-47432)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

scsi: ufs: Fix a deadlock in the error handler

The following deadlock has been observed on a test setup:

 - All tags allocated

 - The SCSI error handler calls ufshcd_eh_host_reset_handler()

 - ufshcd_eh_host_reset_handler() queues work that calls
   ufshcd_err_handler()

 - ufshcd_err_handler() locks up as follows:

Workqueue: ufs_eh_wq_0 ufshcd_err_handler.cfi_jt
Call trace:
 __switch_to+0x298/0x5d8
 __schedule+0x6cc/0xa94
 schedule+0x12c/0x298
 blk_mq_get_tag+0x210/0x480
 __blk_mq_alloc_request+0x1c8/0x284
 blk_get_request+0x74/0x134
 ufshcd_exec_dev_cmd+0x68/0x640
 ufshcd_verify_dev_init+0x68/0x35c
 ufshcd_probe_hba+0x12c/0x1cb8
 ufshcd_host_reset_and_restore+0x88/0x254
 ufshcd_reset_and_restore+0xd0/0x354
 ufshcd_err_handler+0x408/0xc58
 process_one_work+0x24c/0x66c
 worker_thread+0x3e8/0xa4c
 kthread+0x150/0x1b4
 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x30

Fix this lockup by making ufshcd_exec_dev_cmd() allocate a reserved
request.(CVE-2021-47622)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: dsa: seville: register the mdiobus under devres

As explained in commits:
74b6d7d13307 (&quot;net: dsa: realtek: register the MDIO bus under devres&quot;)
5135e96a3dd2 (&quot;net: dsa: don&apos;t allocate the slave_mii_bus using devres&quot;)

mdiobus_free() will panic when called from devm_mdiobus_free() &lt;-
devres_release_all() &lt;- __device_release_driver(), and that mdiobus was
not previously unregistered.

The Seville VSC9959 switch is a platform device, so the initial set of
constraints that I thought would cause this (I2C or SPI buses which call
-&gt;remove on -&gt;shutdown) do not apply. But there is one more which
applies here.

If the DSA master itself is on a bus that calls -&gt;remove from -&gt;shutdown
(like dpaa2-eth, which is on the fsl-mc bus), there is a device link
between the switch and the DSA master, and device_links_unbind_consumers()
will unbind the seville switch driver on shutdown.

So the same treatment must be applied to all DSA switch drivers, which
is: either use devres for both the mdiobus allocation and registration,
or don&apos;t use devres at all.

The seville driver has a code structure that could accommodate both the
mdiobus_unregister and mdiobus_free calls, but it has an external
dependency upon mscc_miim_setup() from mdio-mscc-miim.c, which calls
devm_mdiobus_alloc_size() on its behalf. So rather than restructuring
that, and exporting yet one more symbol mscc_miim_teardown(), let&apos;s work
with devres and replace of_mdiobus_register with the devres variant.
When we use all-devres, we can ensure that devres doesn&apos;t free a
still-registered bus (it either runs both callbacks, or none).(CVE-2022-48814)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

SUNRPC: lock against -&gt;sock changing during sysfs read

-&gt;sock can be set to NULL asynchronously unless -&gt;recv_mutex is held.
So it is important to hold that mutex.  Otherwise a sysfs read can
trigger an oops.
Commit 17f09d3f619a (&quot;SUNRPC: Check if the xprt is connected before
handling sysfs reads&quot;) appears to attempt to fix this problem, but it
only narrows the race window.(CVE-2022-48816)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: hci_core: Fix leaking sent_cmd skb

sent_cmd memory is not freed before freeing hci_dev causing it to leak
it contents.(CVE-2022-48844)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

smb: client: fix potential deadlock when releasing mids

All release_mid() callers seem to hold a reference of @mid so there is
no need to call kref_put(&amp;mid-&gt;refcount, __release_mid) under
@server-&gt;mid_lock spinlock.  If they don&apos;t, then an use-after-free bug
would have occurred anyways.

By getting rid of such spinlock also fixes a potential deadlock as
shown below

CPU 0                                CPU 1
------------------------------------------------------------------
cifs_demultiplex_thread()            cifs_debug_data_proc_show()
 release_mid()
  spin_lock(&amp;server-&gt;mid_lock);
                                     spin_lock(&amp;cifs_tcp_ses_lock)
				      spin_lock(&amp;server-&gt;mid_lock)
  __release_mid()
   smb2_find_smb_tcon()
    spin_lock(&amp;cifs_tcp_ses_lock) *deadlock*(CVE-2023-52757)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

usb: config: fix iteration issue in &apos;usb_get_bos_descriptor()&apos;

The BOS descriptor defines a root descriptor and is the base descriptor for
accessing a family of related descriptors.

Function &apos;usb_get_bos_descriptor()&apos; encounters an iteration issue when
skipping the &apos;USB_DT_DEVICE_CAPABILITY&apos; descriptor type. This results in
the same descriptor being read repeatedly.

To address this issue, a &apos;goto&apos; statement is introduced to ensure that the
pointer and the amount read is updated correctly. This ensures that the
function iterates to the next descriptor instead of reading the same
descriptor repeatedly.(CVE-2023-52781)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

keys: Fix overwrite of key expiration on instantiation

The expiry time of a key is unconditionally overwritten during
instantiation, defaulting to turn it permanent. This causes a problem
for DNS resolution as the expiration set by user-space is overwritten to
TIME64_MAX, disabling further DNS updates. Fix this by restoring the
condition that key_set_expiry is only called when the pre-parser sets a
specific expiry.(CVE-2024-36031)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nfs: Handle error of rpc_proc_register() in nfs_net_init().

syzkaller reported a warning [0] triggered while destroying immature
netns.

rpc_proc_register() was called in init_nfs_fs(), but its error
has been ignored since at least the initial commit 1da177e4c3f4
(&quot;Linux-2.6.12-rc2&quot;).

Recently, commit d47151b79e32 (&quot;nfs: expose /proc/net/sunrpc/nfs
in net namespaces&quot;) converted the procfs to per-netns and made
the problem more visible.

Even when rpc_proc_register() fails, nfs_net_init() could succeed,
and thus nfs_net_exit() will be called while destroying the netns.

Then, remove_proc_entry() will be called for non-existing proc
directory and trigger the warning below.

Let&apos;s handle the error of rpc_proc_register() properly in nfs_net_init().

[0]:
name &apos;nfs&apos;
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1710 at fs/proc/generic.c:711 remove_proc_entry+0x1bb/0x2d0 fs/proc/generic.c:711
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 1710 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.8.0-12822-gcd51db110a7e #12
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:remove_proc_entry+0x1bb/0x2d0 fs/proc/generic.c:711
Code: 41 5d 41 5e c3 e8 85 09 b5 ff 48 c7 c7 88 58 64 86 e8 09 0e 71 02 e8 74 09 b5 ff 4c 89 e6 48 c7 c7 de 1b 80 84 e8 c5 ad 97 ff &lt;0f&gt; 0b eb b1 e8 5c 09 b5 ff 48 c7 c7 88 58 64 86 e8 e0 0d 71 02 eb
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000c6d7ce0 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8880422b8b00 RCX: ffffffff8110503c
RDX: ffff888030652f00 RSI: ffffffff81105045 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffffff81bb62cb R12: ffffffff84807ffc
R13: ffff88804ad6fcc0 R14: ffffffff84807ffc R15: ffffffff85741ff8
FS:  00007f30cfba8640(0000) GS:ffff88807dd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007ff51afe8000 CR3: 000000005a60a005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 rpc_proc_unregister+0x64/0x70 net/sunrpc/stats.c:310
 nfs_net_exit+0x1c/0x30 fs/nfs/inode.c:2438
 ops_exit_list+0x62/0xb0 net/core/net_namespace.c:170
 setup_net+0x46c/0x660 net/core/net_namespace.c:372
 copy_net_ns+0x244/0x590 net/core/net_namespace.c:505
 create_new_namespaces+0x2ed/0x770 kernel/nsproxy.c:110
 unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xae/0x160 kernel/nsproxy.c:228
 ksys_unshare+0x342/0x760 kernel/fork.c:3322
 __do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3393 [inline]
 __se_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3391 [inline]
 __x64_sys_unshare+0x1f/0x30 kernel/fork.c:3391
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x4f/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e
RIP: 0033:0x7f30d0febe5d
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 &lt;48&gt; 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 73 9f 1b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f30cfba7cc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000110
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004bbf80 RCX: 00007f30d0febe5d
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 000000006c020600
RBP: 00000000004bbf80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000002
R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007f30d104c530 R15: 0000000000000000
 &lt;/TASK&gt;(CVE-2024-36939)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

scsi: qedf: Ensure the copied buf is NUL terminated

Currently, we allocate a count-sized kernel buffer and copy count from
userspace to that buffer. Later, we use kstrtouint on this buffer but we
don&apos;t ensure that the string is terminated inside the buffer, this can
lead to OOB read when using kstrtouint. Fix this issue by using
memdup_user_nul instead of memdup_user.(CVE-2024-38559)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drivers/perf: hisi: hns3: Fix out-of-bound access when valid event group

The perf tool allows users to create event groups through following
cmd [1], but the driver does not check whether the array index is out
of bounds when writing data to the event_group array. If the number of
events in an event_group is greater than HNS3_PMU_MAX_HW_EVENTS, the
memory write overflow of event_group array occurs.

Add array index check to fix the possible array out of bounds violation,
and return directly when write new events are written to array bounds.

There are 9 different events in an event_group.
[1] perf stat -e &apos;{pmu/event1/, ... ,pmu/event9/}(CVE-2024-38568)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ecryptfs: Fix buffer size for tag 66 packet

The &apos;TAG 66 Packet Format&apos; description is missing the cipher code and
checksum fields that are packed into the message packet. As a result,
the buffer allocated for the packet is 3 bytes too small and
write_tag_66_packet() will write up to 3 bytes past the end of the
buffer.

Fix this by increasing the size of the allocation so the whole packet
will always fit in the buffer.

This fixes the below kasan slab-out-of-bounds bug:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x7d6/0xde0
  Write of size 1 at addr ffff88800afbb2a5 by task touch/181

  CPU: 0 PID: 181 Comm: touch Not tainted 6.6.13-gnu #1 4c9534092be820851bb687b82d1f92a426598dc6
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2/GNU Guix 04/01/2014
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   dump_stack_lvl+0x4c/0x70
   print_report+0xc5/0x610
   ? ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x7d6/0xde0
   ? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x44/0x210
   ? ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x7d6/0xde0
   kasan_report+0xc2/0x110
   ? ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x7d6/0xde0
   __asan_store1+0x62/0x80
   ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x7d6/0xde0
   ? __pfx_ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x10/0x10
   ? __alloc_pages+0x2e2/0x540
   ? __pfx_ovl_open+0x10/0x10 [overlay 30837f11141636a8e1793533a02e6e2e885dad1d]
   ? dentry_open+0x8f/0xd0
   ecryptfs_write_metadata+0x30a/0x550
   ? __pfx_ecryptfs_write_metadata+0x10/0x10
   ? ecryptfs_get_lower_file+0x6b/0x190
   ecryptfs_initialize_file+0x77/0x150
   ecryptfs_create+0x1c2/0x2f0
   path_openat+0x17cf/0x1ba0
   ? __pfx_path_openat+0x10/0x10
   do_filp_open+0x15e/0x290
   ? __pfx_do_filp_open+0x10/0x10
   ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x30
   ? _raw_spin_lock+0x86/0xf0
   ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
   ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x30
   ? alloc_fd+0xf4/0x330
   do_sys_openat2+0x122/0x160
   ? __pfx_do_sys_openat2+0x10/0x10
   __x64_sys_openat+0xef/0x170
   ? __pfx___x64_sys_openat+0x10/0x10
   do_syscall_64+0x60/0xd0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8
  RIP: 0033:0x7f00a703fd67
  Code: 25 00 00 41 00 3d 00 00 41 00 74 37 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 5b 44 89 e2 48 89 ee bf 9c ff ff ff b8 01 01 00 00 0f 05 &lt;48&gt; 3d 00 f0 ff ff 0f 87 85 00 00 00 48 83 c4 68 5d 41 5c c3 0f 1f
  RSP: 002b:00007ffc088e30b0 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101
  RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc088e3368 RCX: 00007f00a703fd67
  RDX: 0000000000000941 RSI: 00007ffc088e48d7 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c
  RBP: 00007ffc088e48d7 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
  R10: 00000000000001b6 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000941
  R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffc088e48d7 R15: 00007f00a7180040
   &lt;/TASK&gt;

  Allocated by task 181:
   kasan_save_stack+0x2f/0x60
   kasan_set_track+0x29/0x40
   kasan_save_alloc_info+0x25/0x40
   __kasan_kmalloc+0xc5/0xd0
   __kmalloc+0x66/0x160
   ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x6d2/0xde0
   ecryptfs_write_metadata+0x30a/0x550
   ecryptfs_initialize_file+0x77/0x150
   ecryptfs_create+0x1c2/0x2f0
   path_openat+0x17cf/0x1ba0
   do_filp_open+0x15e/0x290
   do_sys_openat2+0x122/0x160
   __x64_sys_openat+0xef/0x170
   do_syscall_64+0x60/0xd0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8(CVE-2024-38578)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

netrom: fix possible dead-lock in nr_rt_ioctl()

syzbot loves netrom, and found a possible deadlock in nr_rt_ioctl [1]

Make sure we always acquire nr_node_list_lock before nr_node_lock(nr_node)

[1]
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.9.0-rc7-syzkaller-02147-g654de42f3fc6 #0 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz-executor350/5129 is trying to acquire lock:
 ffff8880186e2070 (&amp;nr_node-&gt;node_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline]
 ffff8880186e2070 (&amp;nr_node-&gt;node_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_node_lock include/net/netrom.h:152 [inline]
 ffff8880186e2070 (&amp;nr_node-&gt;node_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:464 [inline]
 ffff8880186e2070 (&amp;nr_node-&gt;node_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_rt_ioctl+0x1bb/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:697

but task is already holding lock:
 ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline]
 ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:462 [inline]
 ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_rt_ioctl+0x10a/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:697

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-&gt; #1 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}:
        lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
        __raw_spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:126 [inline]
        _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x35/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:178
        spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline]
        nr_remove_node net/netrom/nr_route.c:299 [inline]
        nr_del_node+0x4b4/0x820 net/netrom/nr_route.c:355
        nr_rt_ioctl+0xa95/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:683
        sock_do_ioctl+0x158/0x460 net/socket.c:1222
        sock_ioctl+0x629/0x8e0 net/socket.c:1341
        vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
        __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:904 [inline]
        __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:890
        do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
        do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

-&gt; #0 (&amp;nr_node-&gt;node_lock){+...}-{2:2}:
        check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline]
        check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline]
        validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869
        __lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137
        lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
        __raw_spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:126 [inline]
        _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x35/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:178
        spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline]
        nr_node_lock include/net/netrom.h:152 [inline]
        nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:464 [inline]
        nr_rt_ioctl+0x1bb/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:697
        sock_do_ioctl+0x158/0x460 net/socket.c:1222
        sock_ioctl+0x629/0x8e0 net/socket.c:1341
        vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
        __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:904 [inline]
        __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:890
        do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
        do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

other info that might help us debug this:

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(nr_node_list_lock);
                               lock(&amp;nr_node-&gt;node_lock);
                               lock(nr_node_list_lock);
  lock(&amp;nr_node-&gt;node_lock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

1 lock held by syz-executor350/5129:
  #0: ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline]
  #0: ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:462 [inline]
  #0: ffffffff8f70
---truncated---(CVE-2024-38589)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ALSA: timer: Set lower bound of start tick time

Currently ALSA timer doesn&apos;t have the lower limit of the start tick
time, and it allows a very small size, e.g. 1 tick with 1ns resolution
for hrtimer.  Such a situation may lead to an unexpected RCU stall,
where  the callback repeatedly queuing the expire update, as reported
by fuzzer.

This patch introduces a sanity check of the timer start tick time, so
that the system returns an error when a too small start size is set.
As of this patch, the lower limit is hard-coded to 100us, which is
small enough but can still work somehow.(CVE-2024-38618)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

usb-storage: alauda: Check whether the media is initialized

The member &quot;uzonesize&quot; of struct alauda_info will remain 0
if alauda_init_media() fails, potentially causing divide errors
in alauda_read_data() and alauda_write_lba().
- Add a member &quot;media_initialized&quot; to struct alauda_info.
- Change a condition in alauda_check_media() to ensure the
  first initialization.
- Add an error check for the return value of alauda_init_media().(CVE-2024-38619)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nilfs2: fix nilfs_empty_dir() misjudgment and long loop on I/O errors

The error handling in nilfs_empty_dir() when a directory folio/page read
fails is incorrect, as in the old ext2 implementation, and if the
folio/page cannot be read or nilfs_check_folio() fails, it will falsely
determine the directory as empty and corrupt the file system.

In addition, since nilfs_empty_dir() does not immediately return on a
failed folio/page read, but continues to loop, this can cause a long loop
with I/O if i_size of the directory&apos;s inode is also corrupted, causing the
log writer thread to wait and hang, as reported by syzbot.

Fix these issues by making nilfs_empty_dir() immediately return a false
value (0) if it fails to get a directory folio/page.(CVE-2024-39469)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

xfs: fix log recovery buffer allocation for the legacy h_size fixup

Commit a70f9fe52daa (&quot;xfs: detect and handle invalid iclog size set by
mkfs&quot;) added a fixup for incorrect h_size values used for the initial
umount record in old xfsprogs versions.  Later commit 0c771b99d6c9
(&quot;xfs: clean up calculation of LR header blocks&quot;) cleaned up the log
reover buffer calculation, but stoped using the fixed up h_size value
to size the log recovery buffer, which can lead to an out of bounds
access when the incorrect h_size does not come from the old mkfs
tool, but a fuzzer.

Fix this by open coding xlog_logrec_hblks and taking the fixed h_size
into account for this calculation.(CVE-2024-39472)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ima: Fix use-after-free on a dentry&apos;s dname.name

-&gt;d_name.name can change on rename and the earlier value can be freed;
there are conditions sufficient to stabilize it (-&gt;d_lock on dentry,
-&gt;d_lock on its parent, -&gt;i_rwsem exclusive on the parent&apos;s inode,
rename_lock), but none of those are met at any of the sites. Take a stable
snapshot of the name instead.(CVE-2024-39494)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

vmci: prevent speculation leaks by sanitizing event in event_deliver()

Coverity spotted that event_msg is controlled by user-space,
event_msg-&gt;event_data.event is passed to event_deliver() and used
as an index without sanitization.

This change ensures that the event index is sanitized to mitigate any
possibility of speculative information leaks.

This bug was discovered and resolved using Coverity Static Analysis
Security Testing (SAST) by Synopsys, Inc.

Only compile tested, no access to HW.(CVE-2024-39499)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/komeda: check for error-valued pointer

komeda_pipeline_get_state() may return an error-valued pointer, thus
check the pointer for negative or null value before dereferencing.(CVE-2024-39505)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

USB: class: cdc-wdm: Fix CPU lockup caused by excessive log messages

The syzbot fuzzer found that the interrupt-URB completion callback in
the cdc-wdm driver was taking too long, and the driver&apos;s immediate
resubmission of interrupt URBs with -EPROTO status combined with the
dummy-hcd emulation to cause a CPU lockup:

cdc_wdm 1-1:1.0: nonzero urb status received: -71
cdc_wdm 1-1:1.0: wdm_int_callback - 0 bytes
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 26s! [syz-executor782:6625]
CPU#0 Utilization every 4s during lockup:
	#1:  98% system,	  0% softirq,	  3% hardirq,	  0% idle
	#2:  98% system,	  0% softirq,	  3% hardirq,	  0% idle
	#3:  98% system,	  0% softirq,	  3% hardirq,	  0% idle
	#4:  98% system,	  0% softirq,	  3% hardirq,	  0% idle
	#5:  98% system,	  1% softirq,	  3% hardirq,	  0% idle
Modules linked in:
irq event stamp: 73096
hardirqs last  enabled at (73095): [&lt;ffff80008037bc00&gt;] console_emit_next_record kernel/printk/printk.c:2935 [inline]
hardirqs last  enabled at (73095): [&lt;ffff80008037bc00&gt;] console_flush_all+0x650/0xb74 kernel/printk/printk.c:2994
hardirqs last disabled at (73096): [&lt;ffff80008af10b00&gt;] __el1_irq arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:533 [inline]
hardirqs last disabled at (73096): [&lt;ffff80008af10b00&gt;] el1_interrupt+0x24/0x68 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:551
softirqs last  enabled at (73048): [&lt;ffff8000801ea530&gt;] softirq_handle_end kernel/softirq.c:400 [inline]
softirqs last  enabled at (73048): [&lt;ffff8000801ea530&gt;] handle_softirqs+0xa60/0xc34 kernel/softirq.c:582
softirqs last disabled at (73043): [&lt;ffff800080020de8&gt;] __do_softirq+0x14/0x20 kernel/softirq.c:588
CPU: 0 PID: 6625 Comm: syz-executor782 Tainted: G        W          6.10.0-rc2-syzkaller-g8867bbd4a056 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024

Testing showed that the problem did not occur if the two error
messages -- the first two lines above -- were removed; apparently adding
material to the kernel log takes a surprisingly large amount of time.

In any case, the best approach for preventing these lockups and to
avoid spamming the log with thousands of error messages per second is
to ratelimit the two dev_err() calls.  Therefore we replace them with
dev_err_ratelimited().(CVE-2024-40904)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ipv6: fix possible race in __fib6_drop_pcpu_from()

syzbot found a race in __fib6_drop_pcpu_from() [1]

If compiler reads more than once (*ppcpu_rt),
second read could read NULL, if another cpu clears
the value in rt6_get_pcpu_route().

Add a READ_ONCE() to prevent this race.

Also add rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock() because
we rely on RCU protection while dereferencing pcpu_rt.

[1]

Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000012: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000090-0x0000000000000097]
CPU: 0 PID: 7543 Comm: kworker/u8:17 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc1-syzkaller-00013-g2bfcfd584ff5 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024
Workqueue: netns cleanup_net
 RIP: 0010:__fib6_drop_pcpu_from.part.0+0x10a/0x370 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:984
Code: f8 48 c1 e8 03 80 3c 28 00 0f 85 16 02 00 00 4d 8b 3f 4d 85 ff 74 31 e8 74 a7 fa f7 49 8d bf 90 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 &lt;80&gt; 3c 28 00 0f 85 1e 02 00 00 49 8b 87 90 00 00 00 48 8b 0c 24 48
RSP: 0018:ffffc900040df070 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 0000000000000012 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffffffff89932e16
RDX: ffff888049dd1e00 RSI: ffffffff89932d7c RDI: 0000000000000091
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000007
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000006 R12: ffff88807fa080b8
R13: fffffbfff1a9a07d R14: ffffed100ff41022 R15: 0000000000000001
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000001b32c26000 CR3: 000000005d56e000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
  __fib6_drop_pcpu_from net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:966 [inline]
  fib6_drop_pcpu_from net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1027 [inline]
  fib6_purge_rt+0x7f2/0x9f0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1038
  fib6_del_route net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1998 [inline]
  fib6_del+0xa70/0x17b0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2043
  fib6_clean_node+0x426/0x5b0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2205
  fib6_walk_continue+0x44f/0x8d0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2127
  fib6_walk+0x182/0x370 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2175
  fib6_clean_tree+0xd7/0x120 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2255
  __fib6_clean_all+0x100/0x2d0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2271
  rt6_sync_down_dev net/ipv6/route.c:4906 [inline]
  rt6_disable_ip+0x7ed/0xa00 net/ipv6/route.c:4911
  addrconf_ifdown.isra.0+0x117/0x1b40 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3855
  addrconf_notify+0x223/0x19e0 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3778
  notifier_call_chain+0xb9/0x410 kernel/notifier.c:93
  call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0xbe/0x140 net/core/dev.c:1992
  call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2030 [inline]
  call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2044 [inline]
  dev_close_many+0x333/0x6a0 net/core/dev.c:1585
  unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x46d/0x19f0 net/core/dev.c:11193
  unregister_netdevice_many net/core/dev.c:11276 [inline]
  default_device_exit_batch+0x85b/0xae0 net/core/dev.c:11759
  ops_exit_list+0x128/0x180 net/core/net_namespace.c:178
  cleanup_net+0x5b7/0xbf0 net/core/net_namespace.c:640
  process_one_work+0x9fb/0x1b60 kernel/workqueue.c:3231
  process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3312 [inline]
  worker_thread+0x6c8/0xf70 kernel/workqueue.c:3393
  kthread+0x2c1/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:389
  ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244(CVE-2024-40905)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

wifi: mac80211: Fix deadlock in ieee80211_sta_ps_deliver_wakeup()

The ieee80211_sta_ps_deliver_wakeup() function takes sta-&gt;ps_lock to
synchronizes with ieee80211_tx_h_unicast_ps_buf() which is called from
softirq context. However using only spin_lock() to get sta-&gt;ps_lock in
ieee80211_sta_ps_deliver_wakeup() does not prevent softirq to execute
on this same CPU, to run ieee80211_tx_h_unicast_ps_buf() and try to
take this same lock ending in deadlock. Below is an example of rcu stall
that arises in such situation.

 rcu: INFO: rcu_sched self-detected stall on CPU
 rcu:    2-....: (42413413 ticks this GP) idle=b154/1/0x4000000000000000 softirq=1763/1765 fqs=21206996
 rcu:    (t=42586894 jiffies g=2057 q=362405 ncpus=4)
 CPU: 2 PID: 719 Comm: wpa_supplicant Tainted: G        W          6.4.0-02158-g1b062f552873 #742
 Hardware name: RPT (r1) (DT)
 pstate: 00000005 (nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
 pc : queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x58/0x2d0
 lr : invoke_tx_handlers_early+0x5b4/0x5c0
 sp : ffff00001ef64660
 x29: ffff00001ef64660 x28: ffff000009bc1070 x27: ffff000009bc0ad8
 x26: ffff000009bc0900 x25: ffff00001ef647a8 x24: 0000000000000000
 x23: ffff000009bc0900 x22: ffff000009bc0900 x21: ffff00000ac0e000
 x20: ffff00000a279e00 x19: ffff00001ef646e8 x18: 0000000000000000
 x17: ffff800016468000 x16: ffff00001ef608c0 x15: 0010533c93f64f80
 x14: 0010395c9faa3946 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 00000000fa83b2da
 x11: 000000012edeceea x10: ffff0000010fbe00 x9 : 0000000000895440
 x8 : 000000000010533c x7 : ffff00000ad8b740 x6 : ffff00000c350880
 x5 : 0000000000000007 x4 : 0000000000000001 x3 : 0000000000000000
 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000001 x0 : ffff00000ac0e0e8
 Call trace:
  queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x58/0x2d0
  ieee80211_tx+0x80/0x12c
  ieee80211_tx_pending+0x110/0x278
  tasklet_action_common.constprop.0+0x10c/0x144
  tasklet_action+0x20/0x28
  _stext+0x11c/0x284
  ____do_softirq+0xc/0x14
  call_on_irq_stack+0x24/0x34
  do_softirq_own_stack+0x18/0x20
  do_softirq+0x74/0x7c
  __local_bh_enable_ip+0xa0/0xa4
  _ieee80211_wake_txqs+0x3b0/0x4b8
  __ieee80211_wake_queue+0x12c/0x168
  ieee80211_add_pending_skbs+0xec/0x138
  ieee80211_sta_ps_deliver_wakeup+0x2a4/0x480
  ieee80211_mps_sta_status_update.part.0+0xd8/0x11c
  ieee80211_mps_sta_status_update+0x18/0x24
  sta_apply_parameters+0x3bc/0x4c0
  ieee80211_change_station+0x1b8/0x2dc
  nl80211_set_station+0x444/0x49c
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.0+0xa4/0xfc
  genl_rcv_msg+0x1b0/0x244
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x38/0x10c
  genl_rcv+0x34/0x48
  netlink_unicast+0x254/0x2bc
  netlink_sendmsg+0x190/0x3b4
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x1e8/0x218
  ___sys_sendmsg+0x68/0x8c
  __sys_sendmsg+0x44/0x84
  __arm64_sys_sendmsg+0x20/0x28
  do_el0_svc+0x6c/0xe8
  el0_svc+0x14/0x48
  el0t_64_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb4
  el0t_64_sync+0x14c/0x150

Using spin_lock_bh()/spin_unlock_bh() instead prevents softirq to raise
on the same CPU that is holding the lock.(CVE-2024-40912)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: check n_ssids before accessing the ssids

In some versions of cfg80211, the ssids poinet might be a valid one even
though n_ssids is 0. Accessing the pointer in this case will cuase an
out-of-bound access. Fix this by checking n_ssids first.(CVE-2024-40929)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/exynos/vidi: fix memory leak in .get_modes()

The duplicated EDID is never freed. Fix it.(CVE-2024-40932)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: don&apos;t read past the mfuart notifcation

In case the firmware sends a notification that claims it has more data
than it has, we will read past that was allocated for the notification.
Remove the print of the buffer, we won&apos;t see it by default. If needed,
we can see the content with tracing.

This was reported by KFENCE.(CVE-2024-40941)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ocfs2: fix races between hole punching and AIO+DIO

After commit &quot;ocfs2: return real error code in ocfs2_dio_wr_get_block&quot;,
fstests/generic/300 become from always failed to sometimes failed:

========================================================================
[  473.293420 ] run fstests generic/300

[  475.296983 ] JBD2: Ignoring recovery information on journal
[  475.302473 ] ocfs2: Mounting device (253,1) on (node local, slot 0) with ordered data mode.
[  494.290998 ] OCFS2: ERROR (device dm-1): ocfs2_change_extent_flag: Owner 5668 has an extent at cpos 78723 which can no longer be found
[  494.291609 ] On-disk corruption discovered. Please run fsck.ocfs2 once the filesystem is unmounted.
[  494.292018 ] OCFS2: File system is now read-only.
[  494.292224 ] (kworker/19:11,2628,19):ocfs2_mark_extent_written:5272 ERROR: status = -30
[  494.292602 ] (kworker/19:11,2628,19):ocfs2_dio_end_io_write:2374 ERROR: status = -3
fio: io_u error on file /mnt/scratch/racer: Read-only file system: write offset=460849152, buflen=131072
=========================================================================

In __blockdev_direct_IO, ocfs2_dio_wr_get_block is called to add unwritten
extents to a list.  extents are also inserted into extent tree in
ocfs2_write_begin_nolock.  Then another thread call fallocate to puch a
hole at one of the unwritten extent.  The extent at cpos was removed by
ocfs2_remove_extent().  At end io worker thread, ocfs2_search_extent_list
found there is no such extent at the cpos.

    T1                        T2                T3
                              inode lock
                                ...
                                insert extents
                                ...
                              inode unlock
ocfs2_fallocate
 __ocfs2_change_file_space
  inode lock
  lock ip_alloc_sem
  ocfs2_remove_inode_range inode
   ocfs2_remove_btree_range
    ocfs2_remove_extent
    ^---remove the extent at cpos 78723
  ...
  unlock ip_alloc_sem
  inode unlock
                                       ocfs2_dio_end_io
                                        ocfs2_dio_end_io_write
                                         lock ip_alloc_sem
                                         ocfs2_mark_extent_written
                                          ocfs2_change_extent_flag
                                           ocfs2_search_extent_list
                                           ^---failed to find extent
                                          ...
                                          unlock ip_alloc_sem

In most filesystems, fallocate is not compatible with racing with AIO+DIO,
so fix it by adding to wait for all dio before fallocate/punch_hole like
ext4.(CVE-2024-40943)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

MIPS: Octeon: Add PCIe link status check

The standard PCIe configuration read-write interface is used to
access the configuration space of the peripheral PCIe devices
of the mips processor after the PCIe link surprise down, it can
generate kernel panic caused by &quot;Data bus error&quot;. So it is
necessary to add PCIe link status check for system protection.
When the PCIe link is down or in training, assigning a value
of 0 to the configuration address can prevent read-write behavior
to the configuration space of peripheral PCIe devices, thereby
preventing kernel panic.(CVE-2024-40968)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

powerpc/pseries: Enforce hcall result buffer validity and size

plpar_hcall(), plpar_hcall9(), and related functions expect callers to
provide valid result buffers of certain minimum size. Currently this
is communicated only through comments in the code and the compiler has
no idea.

For example, if I write a bug like this:

  long retbuf[PLPAR_HCALL_BUFSIZE]; // should be PLPAR_HCALL9_BUFSIZE
  plpar_hcall9(H_ALLOCATE_VAS_WINDOW, retbuf, ...);

This compiles with no diagnostics emitted, but likely results in stack
corruption at runtime when plpar_hcall9() stores results past the end
of the array. (To be clear this is a contrived example and I have not
found a real instance yet.)

To make this class of error less likely, we can use explicitly-sized
array parameters instead of pointers in the declarations for the hcall
APIs. When compiled with -Warray-bounds[1], the code above now
provokes a diagnostic like this:

error: array argument is too small;
is of size 32, callee requires at least 72 [-Werror,-Warray-bounds]
   60 |                 plpar_hcall9(H_ALLOCATE_VAS_WINDOW, retbuf,
      |                 ^                                   ~~~~~~

[1] Enabled for LLVM builds but not GCC for now. See commit
    0da6e5fd6c37 (&quot;gcc: disable &apos;-Warray-bounds&apos; for gcc-13 too&quot;) and
    related changes.(CVE-2024-40974)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tipc: force a dst refcount before doing decryption

As it says in commit 3bc07321ccc2 (&quot;xfrm: Force a dst refcount before
entering the xfrm type handlers&quot;):

&quot;Crypto requests might return asynchronous. In this case we leave the
 rcu protected region, so force a refcount on the skb&apos;s destination
 entry before we enter the xfrm type input/output handlers.&quot;

On TIPC decryption path it has the same problem, and skb_dst_force()
should be called before doing decryption to avoid a possible crash.

Shuang reported this issue when this warning is triggered:

  [] WARNING: include/net/dst.h:337 tipc_sk_rcv+0x1055/0x1ea0 [tipc]
  [] Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W --------- - - 4.18.0-496.el8.x86_64+debug
  [] Workqueue: crypto cryptd_queue_worker
  [] RIP: 0010:tipc_sk_rcv+0x1055/0x1ea0 [tipc]
  [] Call Trace:
  [] tipc_sk_mcast_rcv+0x548/0xea0 [tipc]
  [] tipc_rcv+0xcf5/0x1060 [tipc]
  [] tipc_aead_decrypt_done+0x215/0x2e0 [tipc]
  [] cryptd_aead_crypt+0xdb/0x190
  [] cryptd_queue_worker+0xed/0x190
  [] process_one_work+0x93d/0x17e0(CVE-2024-40983)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ACPICA: Revert &quot;ACPICA: avoid Info: mapping multiple BARs. Your kernel is fine.&quot;

Undo the modifications made in commit d410ee5109a1 (&quot;ACPICA: avoid
&quot;Info: mapping multiple BARs. Your kernel is fine.&quot;&quot;). The initial
purpose of this commit was to stop memory mappings for operation
regions from overlapping page boundaries, as it can trigger warnings
if different page attributes are present.

However, it was found that when this situation arises, mapping
continues until the boundary&apos;s end, but there is still an attempt to
read/write the entire length of the map, leading to a NULL pointer
deference. For example, if a four-byte mapping request is made but
only one byte is mapped because it hits the current page boundary&apos;s
end, a four-byte read/write attempt is still made, resulting in a NULL
pointer deference.

Instead, map the entire length, as the ACPI specification does not
mandate that it must be within the same page boundary. It is
permissible for it to be mapped across different regions.(CVE-2024-40984)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/amdgpu: fix UBSAN warning in kv_dpm.c

Adds bounds check for sumo_vid_mapping_entry.(CVE-2024-40987)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tracing: Build event generation tests only as modules

The kprobes and synth event generation test modules add events and lock
(get a reference) those event file reference in module init function,
and unlock and delete it in module exit function. This is because those
are designed for playing as modules.

If we make those modules as built-in, those events are left locked in the
kernel, and never be removed. This causes kprobe event self-test failure
as below.

[   97.349708] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[   97.353453] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1 at kernel/trace/trace_kprobe.c:2133 kprobe_trace_self_tests_init+0x3f1/0x480
[   97.357106] Modules linked in:
[   97.358488] CPU: 3 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.9.0-g699646734ab5-dirty #14
[   97.361556] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
[   97.363880] RIP: 0010:kprobe_trace_self_tests_init+0x3f1/0x480
[   97.365538] Code: a8 24 08 82 e9 ae fd ff ff 90 0f 0b 90 48 c7 c7 e5 aa 0b 82 e9 ee fc ff ff 90 0f 0b 90 48 c7 c7 2d 61 06 82 e9 8e fd ff ff 90 &lt;0f&gt; 0b 90 48 c7 c7 33 0b 0c 82 89 c6 e8 6e 03 1f ff 41 ff c7 e9 90
[   97.370429] RSP: 0000:ffffc90000013b50 EFLAGS: 00010286
[   97.371852] RAX: 00000000fffffff0 RBX: ffff888005919c00 RCX: 0000000000000000
[   97.373829] RDX: ffff888003f40000 RSI: ffffffff8236a598 RDI: ffff888003f40a68
[   97.375715] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
[   97.377675] R10: ffffffff811c9ae5 R11: ffffffff8120c4e0 R12: 0000000000000000
[   97.379591] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000015 R15: 0000000000000000
[   97.381536] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88807dcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   97.383813] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   97.385449] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000002244000 CR4: 00000000000006b0
[   97.387347] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[   97.389277] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[   97.391196] Call Trace:
[   97.391967]  &lt;TASK&gt;
[   97.392647]  ? __warn+0xcc/0x180
[   97.393640]  ? kprobe_trace_self_tests_init+0x3f1/0x480
[   97.395181]  ? report_bug+0xbd/0x150
[   97.396234]  ? handle_bug+0x3e/0x60
[   97.397311]  ? exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x50
[   97.398434]  ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
[   97.399652]  ? trace_kprobe_is_busy+0x20/0x20
[   97.400904]  ? tracing_reset_all_online_cpus+0x15/0x90
[   97.402304]  ? kprobe_trace_self_tests_init+0x3f1/0x480
[   97.403773]  ? init_kprobe_trace+0x50/0x50
[   97.404972]  do_one_initcall+0x112/0x240
[   97.406113]  do_initcall_level+0x95/0xb0
[   97.407286]  ? kernel_init+0x1a/0x1a0
[   97.408401]  do_initcalls+0x3f/0x70
[   97.409452]  kernel_init_freeable+0x16f/0x1e0
[   97.410662]  ? rest_init+0x1f0/0x1f0
[   97.411738]  kernel_init+0x1a/0x1a0
[   97.412788]  ret_from_fork+0x39/0x50
[   97.413817]  ? rest_init+0x1f0/0x1f0
[   97.414844]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
[   97.416285]  &lt;/TASK&gt;
[   97.417134] irq event stamp: 13437323
[   97.418376] hardirqs last  enabled at (13437337): [&lt;ffffffff8110bc0c&gt;] console_unlock+0x11c/0x150
[   97.421285] hardirqs last disabled at (13437370): [&lt;ffffffff8110bbf1&gt;] console_unlock+0x101/0x150
[   97.423838] softirqs last  enabled at (13437366): [&lt;ffffffff8108e17f&gt;] handle_softirqs+0x23f/0x2a0
[   97.426450] softirqs last disabled at (13437393): [&lt;ffffffff8108e346&gt;] __irq_exit_rcu+0x66/0xd0
[   97.428850] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

And also, since we can not cleanup dynamic_event file, ftracetest are
failed too.

To avoid these issues, build these tests only as modules.(CVE-2024-41004)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

netpoll: Fix race condition in netpoll_owner_active

KCSAN detected a race condition in netpoll:

	BUG: KCSAN: data-race in net_rx_action / netpoll_send_skb
	write (marked) to 0xffff8881164168b0 of 4 bytes by interrupt on cpu 10:
	net_rx_action (./include/linux/netpoll.h:90 net/core/dev.c:6712 net/core/dev.c:6822)
&lt;snip&gt;
	read to 0xffff8881164168b0 of 4 bytes by task 1 on cpu 2:
	netpoll_send_skb (net/core/netpoll.c:319 net/core/netpoll.c:345 net/core/netpoll.c:393)
	netpoll_send_udp (net/core/netpoll.c:?)
&lt;snip&gt;
	value changed: 0x0000000a -&gt; 0xffffffff

This happens because netpoll_owner_active() needs to check if the
current CPU is the owner of the lock, touching napi-&gt;poll_owner
non atomically. The -&gt;poll_owner field contains the current CPU holding
the lock.

Use an atomic read to check if the poll owner is the current CPU.(CVE-2024-41005)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tcp: avoid too many retransmit packets

If a TCP socket is using TCP_USER_TIMEOUT, and the other peer
retracted its window to zero, tcp_retransmit_timer() can
retransmit a packet every two jiffies (2 ms for HZ=1000),
for about 4 minutes after TCP_USER_TIMEOUT has &apos;expired&apos;.

The fix is to make sure tcp_rtx_probe0_timed_out() takes
icsk-&gt;icsk_user_timeout into account.

Before blamed commit, the socket would not timeout after
icsk-&gt;icsk_user_timeout, but would use standard exponential
backoff for the retransmits.

Also worth noting that before commit e89688e3e978 (&quot;net: tcp:
fix unexcepted socket die when snd_wnd is 0&quot;), the issue
would last 2 minutes instead of 4.(CVE-2024-41007)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf: Fix overrunning reservations in ringbuf

The BPF ring buffer internally is implemented as a power-of-2 sized circular
buffer, with two logical and ever-increasing counters: consumer_pos is the
consumer counter to show which logical position the consumer consumed the
data, and producer_pos which is the producer counter denoting the amount of
data reserved by all producers.

Each time a record is reserved, the producer that &quot;owns&quot; the record will
successfully advance producer counter. In user space each time a record is
read, the consumer of the data advanced the consumer counter once it finished
processing. Both counters are stored in separate pages so that from user
space, the producer counter is read-only and the consumer counter is read-write.

One aspect that simplifies and thus speeds up the implementation of both
producers and consumers is how the data area is mapped twice contiguously
back-to-back in the virtual memory, allowing to not take any special measures
for samples that have to wrap around at the end of the circular buffer data
area, because the next page after the last data page would be first data page
again, and thus the sample will still appear completely contiguous in virtual
memory.

Each record has a struct bpf_ringbuf_hdr { u32 len; u32 pg_off; } header for
book-keeping the length and offset, and is inaccessible to the BPF program.
Helpers like bpf_ringbuf_reserve() return `(void *)hdr + BPF_RINGBUF_HDR_SZ`
for the BPF program to use. Bing-Jhong and Muhammad reported that it is however
possible to make a second allocated memory chunk overlapping with the first
chunk and as a result, the BPF program is now able to edit first chunk&apos;s
header.

For example, consider the creation of a BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF map with size
of 0x4000. Next, the consumer_pos is modified to 0x3000 /before/ a call to
bpf_ringbuf_reserve() is made. This will allocate a chunk A, which is in
[0x0,0x3008], and the BPF program is able to edit [0x8,0x3008]. Now, lets
allocate a chunk B with size 0x3000. This will succeed because consumer_pos
was edited ahead of time to pass the `new_prod_pos - cons_pos &gt; rb-&gt;mask`
check. Chunk B will be in range [0x3008,0x6010], and the BPF program is able
to edit [0x3010,0x6010]. Due to the ring buffer memory layout mentioned
earlier, the ranges [0x0,0x4000] and [0x4000,0x8000] point to the same data
pages. This means that chunk B at [0x4000,0x4008] is chunk A&apos;s header.
bpf_ringbuf_submit() / bpf_ringbuf_discard() use the header&apos;s pg_off to then
locate the bpf_ringbuf itself via bpf_ringbuf_restore_from_rec(). Once chunk
B modified chunk A&apos;s header, then bpf_ringbuf_commit() refers to the wrong
page and could cause a crash.

Fix it by calculating the oldest pending_pos and check whether the range
from the oldest outstanding record to the newest would span beyond the ring
buffer size. If that is the case, then reject the request. We&apos;ve tested with
the ring buffer benchmark in BPF selftests (./benchs/run_bench_ringbufs.sh)
before/after the fix and while it seems a bit slower on some benchmarks, it
is still not significantly enough to matter.(CVE-2024-41009)</Note>
		<Note Title="Topic" Type="General" Ordinal="4" xml:lang="en">An update for kernel is now available for openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3.

openEuler Security has rated this update as having a security impact of critical. A Common Vunlnerability Scoring System(CVSS)base score,which gives a detailed severity rating, is available for each vulnerability from the CVElink(s) in the References section.</Note>
		<Note Title="Severity" Type="General" Ordinal="5" xml:lang="en">Critical</Note>
		<Note Title="Affected Component" Type="General" Ordinal="6" xml:lang="en">kernel</Note>
	</DocumentNotes>
	<DocumentReferences>
		<Reference Type="Self">
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1894</URL>
		</Reference>
		<Reference Type="openEuler CVE">
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2021-47432</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2021-47622</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2022-48814</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2022-48816</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2022-48844</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2023-52757</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2023-52781</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2024-36031</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2024-36939</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2024-38559</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2024-38568</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2024-38578</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2024-38589</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2024-38618</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2024-38619</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2024-39469</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2024-39472</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2024-39494</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2024-39499</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2024-39505</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2024-40904</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2024-40905</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2024-40912</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2024-40929</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2024-40932</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2024-40941</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2024-40943</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2024-40968</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2024-40974</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2024-40983</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2024-40984</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2024-40987</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2024-41004</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2024-41005</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2024-41007</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2024-41009</URL>
		</Reference>
		<Reference Type="Other">
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-47432</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-47622</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-48814</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-48816</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-48844</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-52757</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-52781</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-36031</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-36939</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38559</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38568</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38578</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38589</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38618</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38619</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39469</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39472</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39494</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39499</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39505</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40904</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40905</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40912</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40929</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40932</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40941</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40943</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40968</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40974</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40983</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40984</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40987</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-41004</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-41005</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-41007</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-41009</URL>
		</Reference>
	</DocumentReferences>
	<ProductTree xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/prod/1.1">
		<Branch Type="Product Name" Name="openEuler">
			<FullProductName ProductID="openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP3">openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3</FullProductName>
		</Branch>
		<Branch Type="Package Arch" Name="aarch64">
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-5.10.0-220.0.0.123" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP3">kernel-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-debuginfo-5.10.0-220.0.0.123" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP3">kernel-debuginfo-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-debugsource-5.10.0-220.0.0.123" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP3">kernel-debugsource-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-devel-5.10.0-220.0.0.123" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP3">kernel-devel-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-headers-5.10.0-220.0.0.123" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP3">kernel-headers-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-source-5.10.0-220.0.0.123" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP3">kernel-source-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-tools-5.10.0-220.0.0.123" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP3">kernel-tools-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-tools-debuginfo-5.10.0-220.0.0.123" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP3">kernel-tools-debuginfo-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-tools-devel-5.10.0-220.0.0.123" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP3">kernel-tools-devel-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="perf-5.10.0-220.0.0.123" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP3">perf-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-220.0.0.123" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP3">perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="python3-perf-5.10.0-220.0.0.123" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP3">python3-perf-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="python3-perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-220.0.0.123" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP3">python3-perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
		</Branch>
		<Branch Type="Package Arch" Name="src">
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-5.10.0-220.0.0.123" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP3">kernel-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.src.rpm</FullProductName>
		</Branch>
		<Branch Type="Package Arch" Name="x86_64">
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-5.10.0-220.0.0.123" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP3">kernel-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-debuginfo-5.10.0-220.0.0.123" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP3">kernel-debuginfo-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-debugsource-5.10.0-220.0.0.123" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP3">kernel-debugsource-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-devel-5.10.0-220.0.0.123" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP3">kernel-devel-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-headers-5.10.0-220.0.0.123" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP3">kernel-headers-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-source-5.10.0-220.0.0.123" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP3">kernel-source-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-tools-5.10.0-220.0.0.123" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP3">kernel-tools-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-tools-debuginfo-5.10.0-220.0.0.123" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP3">kernel-tools-debuginfo-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-tools-devel-5.10.0-220.0.0.123" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP3">kernel-tools-devel-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="perf-5.10.0-220.0.0.123" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP3">perf-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-220.0.0.123" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP3">perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="python3-perf-5.10.0-220.0.0.123" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP3">python3-perf-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="python3-perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-220.0.0.123" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP3">python3-perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-220.0.0.123.oe2203sp3.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
		</Branch>
	</ProductTree>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="1" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

lib/generic-radix-tree.c: Don&apos;t overflow in peek()

When we started spreading new inode numbers throughout most of the 64
bit inode space, that triggered some corner case bugs, in particular
some integer overflows related to the radix tree code. Oops.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2024-07-26</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2021-47432</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2024-07-26</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1894</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="2" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

scsi: ufs: Fix a deadlock in the error handler

The following deadlock has been observed on a test setup:

 - All tags allocated

 - The SCSI error handler calls ufshcd_eh_host_reset_handler()

 - ufshcd_eh_host_reset_handler() queues work that calls
   ufshcd_err_handler()

 - ufshcd_err_handler() locks up as follows:

Workqueue: ufs_eh_wq_0 ufshcd_err_handler.cfi_jt
Call trace:
 __switch_to+0x298/0x5d8
 __schedule+0x6cc/0xa94
 schedule+0x12c/0x298
 blk_mq_get_tag+0x210/0x480
 __blk_mq_alloc_request+0x1c8/0x284
 blk_get_request+0x74/0x134
 ufshcd_exec_dev_cmd+0x68/0x640
 ufshcd_verify_dev_init+0x68/0x35c
 ufshcd_probe_hba+0x12c/0x1cb8
 ufshcd_host_reset_and_restore+0x88/0x254
 ufshcd_reset_and_restore+0xd0/0x354
 ufshcd_err_handler+0x408/0xc58
 process_one_work+0x24c/0x66c
 worker_thread+0x3e8/0xa4c
 kthread+0x150/0x1b4
 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x30

Fix this lockup by making ufshcd_exec_dev_cmd() allocate a reserved
request.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2024-07-26</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2021-47622</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>4.7</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2024-07-26</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1894</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="3" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: dsa: seville: register the mdiobus under devres

As explained in commits:
74b6d7d13307 (&quot;net: dsa: realtek: register the MDIO bus under devres&quot;)
5135e96a3dd2 (&quot;net: dsa: don&apos;t allocate the slave_mii_bus using devres&quot;)

mdiobus_free() will panic when called from devm_mdiobus_free() &lt;-
devres_release_all() &lt;- __device_release_driver(), and that mdiobus was
not previously unregistered.

The Seville VSC9959 switch is a platform device, so the initial set of
constraints that I thought would cause this (I2C or SPI buses which call
-&gt;remove on -&gt;shutdown) do not apply. But there is one more which
applies here.

If the DSA master itself is on a bus that calls -&gt;remove from -&gt;shutdown
(like dpaa2-eth, which is on the fsl-mc bus), there is a device link
between the switch and the DSA master, and device_links_unbind_consumers()
will unbind the seville switch driver on shutdown.

So the same treatment must be applied to all DSA switch drivers, which
is: either use devres for both the mdiobus allocation and registration,
or don&apos;t use devres at all.

The seville driver has a code structure that could accommodate both the
mdiobus_unregister and mdiobus_free calls, but it has an external
dependency upon mscc_miim_setup() from mdio-mscc-miim.c, which calls
devm_mdiobus_alloc_size() on its behalf. So rather than restructuring
that, and exporting yet one more symbol mscc_miim_teardown(), let&apos;s work
with devres and replace of_mdiobus_register with the devres variant.
When we use all-devres, we can ensure that devres doesn&apos;t free a
still-registered bus (it either runs both callbacks, or none).</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2024-07-26</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2022-48814</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2024-07-26</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1894</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="4" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

SUNRPC: lock against -&gt;sock changing during sysfs read

-&gt;sock can be set to NULL asynchronously unless -&gt;recv_mutex is held.
So it is important to hold that mutex.  Otherwise a sysfs read can
trigger an oops.
Commit 17f09d3f619a (&quot;SUNRPC: Check if the xprt is connected before
handling sysfs reads&quot;) appears to attempt to fix this problem, but it
only narrows the race window.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2024-07-26</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2022-48816</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>4.7</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2024-07-26</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1894</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="5" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: hci_core: Fix leaking sent_cmd skb

sent_cmd memory is not freed before freeing hci_dev causing it to leak
it contents.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2024-07-26</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2022-48844</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Low</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>3.3</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2024-07-26</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1894</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="6" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

smb: client: fix potential deadlock when releasing mids

All release_mid() callers seem to hold a reference of @mid so there is
no need to call kref_put(&amp;mid-&gt;refcount, __release_mid) under
@server-&gt;mid_lock spinlock.  If they don&apos;t, then an use-after-free bug
would have occurred anyways.

By getting rid of such spinlock also fixes a potential deadlock as
shown below

CPU 0                                CPU 1
------------------------------------------------------------------
cifs_demultiplex_thread()            cifs_debug_data_proc_show()
 release_mid()
  spin_lock(&amp;server-&gt;mid_lock);
                                     spin_lock(&amp;cifs_tcp_ses_lock)
				      spin_lock(&amp;server-&gt;mid_lock)
  __release_mid()
   smb2_find_smb_tcon()
    spin_lock(&amp;cifs_tcp_ses_lock) *deadlock*</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2024-07-26</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2023-52757</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2024-07-26</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1894</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="7" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

usb: config: fix iteration issue in &apos;usb_get_bos_descriptor()&apos;

The BOS descriptor defines a root descriptor and is the base descriptor for
accessing a family of related descriptors.

Function &apos;usb_get_bos_descriptor()&apos; encounters an iteration issue when
skipping the &apos;USB_DT_DEVICE_CAPABILITY&apos; descriptor type. This results in
the same descriptor being read repeatedly.

To address this issue, a &apos;goto&apos; statement is introduced to ensure that the
pointer and the amount read is updated correctly. This ensures that the
function iterates to the next descriptor instead of reading the same
descriptor repeatedly.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2024-07-26</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2023-52781</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>4.3</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:P/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2024-07-26</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1894</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="8" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:keys: Fix overwrite of key expiration on instantiationThe expiry time of a key is unconditionally overwritten duringinstantiation, defaulting to turn it permanent. This causes a problemfor DNS resolution as the expiration set by user-space is overwritten toTIME64_MAX, disabling further DNS updates. Fix this by restoring thecondition that key_set_expiry is only called when the pre-parser sets aspecific expiry.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2024-07-26</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2024-36031</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Critical</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>9.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2024-07-26</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1894</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="9" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nfs: Handle error of rpc_proc_register() in nfs_net_init().

syzkaller reported a warning [0] triggered while destroying immature
netns.

rpc_proc_register() was called in init_nfs_fs(), but its error
has been ignored since at least the initial commit 1da177e4c3f4
(&quot;Linux-2.6.12-rc2&quot;).

Recently, commit d47151b79e32 (&quot;nfs: expose /proc/net/sunrpc/nfs
in net namespaces&quot;) converted the procfs to per-netns and made
the problem more visible.

Even when rpc_proc_register() fails, nfs_net_init() could succeed,
and thus nfs_net_exit() will be called while destroying the netns.

Then, remove_proc_entry() will be called for non-existing proc
directory and trigger the warning below.

Let&apos;s handle the error of rpc_proc_register() properly in nfs_net_init().

[0]:
name &apos;nfs&apos;
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1710 at fs/proc/generic.c:711 remove_proc_entry+0x1bb/0x2d0 fs/proc/generic.c:711
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 1710 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.8.0-12822-gcd51db110a7e #12
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:remove_proc_entry+0x1bb/0x2d0 fs/proc/generic.c:711
Code: 41 5d 41 5e c3 e8 85 09 b5 ff 48 c7 c7 88 58 64 86 e8 09 0e 71 02 e8 74 09 b5 ff 4c 89 e6 48 c7 c7 de 1b 80 84 e8 c5 ad 97 ff &lt;0f&gt; 0b eb b1 e8 5c 09 b5 ff 48 c7 c7 88 58 64 86 e8 e0 0d 71 02 eb
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000c6d7ce0 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8880422b8b00 RCX: ffffffff8110503c
RDX: ffff888030652f00 RSI: ffffffff81105045 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffffff81bb62cb R12: ffffffff84807ffc
R13: ffff88804ad6fcc0 R14: ffffffff84807ffc R15: ffffffff85741ff8
FS:  00007f30cfba8640(0000) GS:ffff88807dd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007ff51afe8000 CR3: 000000005a60a005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 rpc_proc_unregister+0x64/0x70 net/sunrpc/stats.c:310
 nfs_net_exit+0x1c/0x30 fs/nfs/inode.c:2438
 ops_exit_list+0x62/0xb0 net/core/net_namespace.c:170
 setup_net+0x46c/0x660 net/core/net_namespace.c:372
 copy_net_ns+0x244/0x590 net/core/net_namespace.c:505
 create_new_namespaces+0x2ed/0x770 kernel/nsproxy.c:110
 unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xae/0x160 kernel/nsproxy.c:228
 ksys_unshare+0x342/0x760 kernel/fork.c:3322
 __do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3393 [inline]
 __se_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3391 [inline]
 __x64_sys_unshare+0x1f/0x30 kernel/fork.c:3391
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x4f/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e
RIP: 0033:0x7f30d0febe5d
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 &lt;48&gt; 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 73 9f 1b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f30cfba7cc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000110
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004bbf80 RCX: 00007f30d0febe5d
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 000000006c020600
RBP: 00000000004bbf80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000002
R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007f30d104c530 R15: 0000000000000000
 &lt;/TASK&gt;</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2024-07-26</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2024-36939</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>4.6</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:A/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2024-07-26</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1894</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="10" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

scsi: qedf: Ensure the copied buf is NUL terminated

Currently, we allocate a count-sized kernel buffer and copy count from
userspace to that buffer. Later, we use kstrtouint on this buffer but we
don&apos;t ensure that the string is terminated inside the buffer, this can
lead to OOB read when using kstrtouint. Fix this issue by using
memdup_user_nul instead of memdup_user.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2024-07-26</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2024-38559</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2024-07-26</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1894</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="11" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drivers/perf: hisi: hns3: Fix out-of-bound access when valid event group

The perf tool allows users to create event groups through following
cmd [1], but the driver does not check whether the array index is out
of bounds when writing data to the event_group array. If the number of
events in an event_group is greater than HNS3_PMU_MAX_HW_EVENTS, the
memory write overflow of event_group array occurs.

Add array index check to fix the possible array out of bounds violation,
and return directly when write new events are written to array bounds.

There are 9 different events in an event_group.
[1] perf stat -e &apos;{pmu/event1/, ... ,pmu/event9/}</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2024-07-26</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2024-38568</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>6.1</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2024-07-26</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1894</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="12" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ecryptfs: Fix buffer size for tag 66 packet

The &apos;TAG 66 Packet Format&apos; description is missing the cipher code and
checksum fields that are packed into the message packet. As a result,
the buffer allocated for the packet is 3 bytes too small and
write_tag_66_packet() will write up to 3 bytes past the end of the
buffer.

Fix this by increasing the size of the allocation so the whole packet
will always fit in the buffer.

This fixes the below kasan slab-out-of-bounds bug:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x7d6/0xde0
  Write of size 1 at addr ffff88800afbb2a5 by task touch/181

  CPU: 0 PID: 181 Comm: touch Not tainted 6.6.13-gnu #1 4c9534092be820851bb687b82d1f92a426598dc6
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2/GNU Guix 04/01/2014
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   dump_stack_lvl+0x4c/0x70
   print_report+0xc5/0x610
   ? ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x7d6/0xde0
   ? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x44/0x210
   ? ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x7d6/0xde0
   kasan_report+0xc2/0x110
   ? ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x7d6/0xde0
   __asan_store1+0x62/0x80
   ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x7d6/0xde0
   ? __pfx_ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x10/0x10
   ? __alloc_pages+0x2e2/0x540
   ? __pfx_ovl_open+0x10/0x10 [overlay 30837f11141636a8e1793533a02e6e2e885dad1d]
   ? dentry_open+0x8f/0xd0
   ecryptfs_write_metadata+0x30a/0x550
   ? __pfx_ecryptfs_write_metadata+0x10/0x10
   ? ecryptfs_get_lower_file+0x6b/0x190
   ecryptfs_initialize_file+0x77/0x150
   ecryptfs_create+0x1c2/0x2f0
   path_openat+0x17cf/0x1ba0
   ? __pfx_path_openat+0x10/0x10
   do_filp_open+0x15e/0x290
   ? __pfx_do_filp_open+0x10/0x10
   ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x30
   ? _raw_spin_lock+0x86/0xf0
   ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
   ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x30
   ? alloc_fd+0xf4/0x330
   do_sys_openat2+0x122/0x160
   ? __pfx_do_sys_openat2+0x10/0x10
   __x64_sys_openat+0xef/0x170
   ? __pfx___x64_sys_openat+0x10/0x10
   do_syscall_64+0x60/0xd0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8
  RIP: 0033:0x7f00a703fd67
  Code: 25 00 00 41 00 3d 00 00 41 00 74 37 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 5b 44 89 e2 48 89 ee bf 9c ff ff ff b8 01 01 00 00 0f 05 &lt;48&gt; 3d 00 f0 ff ff 0f 87 85 00 00 00 48 83 c4 68 5d 41 5c c3 0f 1f
  RSP: 002b:00007ffc088e30b0 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101
  RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc088e3368 RCX: 00007f00a703fd67
  RDX: 0000000000000941 RSI: 00007ffc088e48d7 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c
  RBP: 00007ffc088e48d7 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
  R10: 00000000000001b6 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000941
  R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffc088e48d7 R15: 00007f00a7180040
   &lt;/TASK&gt;

  Allocated by task 181:
   kasan_save_stack+0x2f/0x60
   kasan_set_track+0x29/0x40
   kasan_save_alloc_info+0x25/0x40
   __kasan_kmalloc+0xc5/0xd0
   __kmalloc+0x66/0x160
   ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x6d2/0xde0
   ecryptfs_write_metadata+0x30a/0x550
   ecryptfs_initialize_file+0x77/0x150
   ecryptfs_create+0x1c2/0x2f0
   path_openat+0x17cf/0x1ba0
   do_filp_open+0x15e/0x290
   do_sys_openat2+0x122/0x160
   __x64_sys_openat+0xef/0x170
   do_syscall_64+0x60/0xd0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2024-07-26</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2024-38578</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Low</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>3.9</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2024-07-26</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1894</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="13" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

netrom: fix possible dead-lock in nr_rt_ioctl()

syzbot loves netrom, and found a possible deadlock in nr_rt_ioctl [1]

Make sure we always acquire nr_node_list_lock before nr_node_lock(nr_node)

[1]
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.9.0-rc7-syzkaller-02147-g654de42f3fc6 #0 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz-executor350/5129 is trying to acquire lock:
 ffff8880186e2070 (&amp;nr_node-&gt;node_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline]
 ffff8880186e2070 (&amp;nr_node-&gt;node_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_node_lock include/net/netrom.h:152 [inline]
 ffff8880186e2070 (&amp;nr_node-&gt;node_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:464 [inline]
 ffff8880186e2070 (&amp;nr_node-&gt;node_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_rt_ioctl+0x1bb/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:697

but task is already holding lock:
 ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline]
 ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:462 [inline]
 ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_rt_ioctl+0x10a/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:697

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-&gt; #1 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}:
        lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
        __raw_spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:126 [inline]
        _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x35/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:178
        spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline]
        nr_remove_node net/netrom/nr_route.c:299 [inline]
        nr_del_node+0x4b4/0x820 net/netrom/nr_route.c:355
        nr_rt_ioctl+0xa95/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:683
        sock_do_ioctl+0x158/0x460 net/socket.c:1222
        sock_ioctl+0x629/0x8e0 net/socket.c:1341
        vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
        __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:904 [inline]
        __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:890
        do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
        do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

-&gt; #0 (&amp;nr_node-&gt;node_lock){+...}-{2:2}:
        check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline]
        check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline]
        validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869
        __lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137
        lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
        __raw_spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:126 [inline]
        _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x35/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:178
        spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline]
        nr_node_lock include/net/netrom.h:152 [inline]
        nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:464 [inline]
        nr_rt_ioctl+0x1bb/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:697
        sock_do_ioctl+0x158/0x460 net/socket.c:1222
        sock_ioctl+0x629/0x8e0 net/socket.c:1341
        vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
        __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:904 [inline]
        __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:890
        do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
        do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

other info that might help us debug this:

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(nr_node_list_lock);
                               lock(&amp;nr_node-&gt;node_lock);
                               lock(nr_node_list_lock);
  lock(&amp;nr_node-&gt;node_lock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

1 lock held by syz-executor350/5129:
  #0: ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline]
  #0: ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:462 [inline]
  #0: ffffffff8f70
---truncated---</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2024-07-26</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2024-38589</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2024-07-26</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1894</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="14" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ALSA: timer: Set lower bound of start tick time

Currently ALSA timer doesn&apos;t have the lower limit of the start tick
time, and it allows a very small size, e.g. 1 tick with 1ns resolution
for hrtimer.  Such a situation may lead to an unexpected RCU stall,
where  the callback repeatedly queuing the expire update, as reported
by fuzzer.

This patch introduces a sanity check of the timer start tick time, so
that the system returns an error when a too small start size is set.
As of this patch, the lower limit is hard-coded to 100us, which is
small enough but can still work somehow.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2024-07-26</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2024-38618</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>4.7</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2024-07-26</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1894</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="15" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

usb-storage: alauda: Check whether the media is initialized

The member &quot;uzonesize&quot; of struct alauda_info will remain 0
if alauda_init_media() fails, potentially causing divide errors
in alauda_read_data() and alauda_write_lba().
- Add a member &quot;media_initialized&quot; to struct alauda_info.
- Change a condition in alauda_check_media() to ensure the
  first initialization.
- Add an error check for the return value of alauda_init_media().</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2024-07-26</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2024-38619</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2024-07-26</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1894</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="16" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nilfs2: fix nilfs_empty_dir() misjudgment and long loop on I/O errors

The error handling in nilfs_empty_dir() when a directory folio/page read
fails is incorrect, as in the old ext2 implementation, and if the
folio/page cannot be read or nilfs_check_folio() fails, it will falsely
determine the directory as empty and corrupt the file system.

In addition, since nilfs_empty_dir() does not immediately return on a
failed folio/page read, but continues to loop, this can cause a long loop
with I/O if i_size of the directory&apos;s inode is also corrupted, causing the
log writer thread to wait and hang, as reported by syzbot.

Fix these issues by making nilfs_empty_dir() immediately return a false
value (0) if it fails to get a directory folio/page.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2024-07-26</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2024-39469</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>4.7</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2024-07-26</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1894</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="17" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:xfs: fix log recovery buffer allocation for the legacy h_size fixupCommit a70f9fe52daa ( xfs: detect and handle invalid iclog size set bymkfs ) added a fixup for incorrect h_size values used for the initialumount record in old xfsprogs versions.  Later commit 0c771b99d6c9( xfs: clean up calculation of LR header blocks ) cleaned up the logreover buffer calculation, but stoped using the fixed up h_size valueto size the log recovery buffer, which can lead to an out of boundsaccess when the incorrect h_size does not come from the old mkfstool, but a fuzzer.Fix this by open coding xlog_logrec_hblks and taking the fixed h_sizeinto account for this calculation.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2024-07-26</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2024-39472</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2024-07-26</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1894</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="18" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ima: Fix use-after-free on a dentry&apos;s dname.name

-&gt;d_name.name can change on rename and the earlier value can be freed;
there are conditions sufficient to stabilize it (-&gt;d_lock on dentry,
-&gt;d_lock on its parent, -&gt;i_rwsem exclusive on the parent&apos;s inode,
rename_lock), but none of those are met at any of the sites. Take a stable
snapshot of the name instead.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2024-07-26</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2024-39494</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2024-07-26</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1894</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="19" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

vmci: prevent speculation leaks by sanitizing event in event_deliver()

Coverity spotted that event_msg is controlled by user-space,
event_msg-&gt;event_data.event is passed to event_deliver() and used
as an index without sanitization.

This change ensures that the event index is sanitized to mitigate any
possibility of speculative information leaks.

This bug was discovered and resolved using Coverity Static Analysis
Security Testing (SAST) by Synopsys, Inc.

Only compile tested, no access to HW.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2024-07-26</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2024-39499</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2024-07-26</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1894</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="20" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/komeda: check for error-valued pointer

komeda_pipeline_get_state() may return an error-valued pointer, thus
check the pointer for negative or null value before dereferencing.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2024-07-26</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2024-39505</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2024-07-26</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1894</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="21" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

USB: class: cdc-wdm: Fix CPU lockup caused by excessive log messages

The syzbot fuzzer found that the interrupt-URB completion callback in
the cdc-wdm driver was taking too long, and the driver&apos;s immediate
resubmission of interrupt URBs with -EPROTO status combined with the
dummy-hcd emulation to cause a CPU lockup:

cdc_wdm 1-1:1.0: nonzero urb status received: -71
cdc_wdm 1-1:1.0: wdm_int_callback - 0 bytes
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 26s! [syz-executor782:6625]
CPU#0 Utilization every 4s during lockup:
	#1:  98% system,	  0% softirq,	  3% hardirq,	  0% idle
	#2:  98% system,	  0% softirq,	  3% hardirq,	  0% idle
	#3:  98% system,	  0% softirq,	  3% hardirq,	  0% idle
	#4:  98% system,	  0% softirq,	  3% hardirq,	  0% idle
	#5:  98% system,	  1% softirq,	  3% hardirq,	  0% idle
Modules linked in:
irq event stamp: 73096
hardirqs last  enabled at (73095): [&lt;ffff80008037bc00&gt;] console_emit_next_record kernel/printk/printk.c:2935 [inline]
hardirqs last  enabled at (73095): [&lt;ffff80008037bc00&gt;] console_flush_all+0x650/0xb74 kernel/printk/printk.c:2994
hardirqs last disabled at (73096): [&lt;ffff80008af10b00&gt;] __el1_irq arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:533 [inline]
hardirqs last disabled at (73096): [&lt;ffff80008af10b00&gt;] el1_interrupt+0x24/0x68 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:551
softirqs last  enabled at (73048): [&lt;ffff8000801ea530&gt;] softirq_handle_end kernel/softirq.c:400 [inline]
softirqs last  enabled at (73048): [&lt;ffff8000801ea530&gt;] handle_softirqs+0xa60/0xc34 kernel/softirq.c:582
softirqs last disabled at (73043): [&lt;ffff800080020de8&gt;] __do_softirq+0x14/0x20 kernel/softirq.c:588
CPU: 0 PID: 6625 Comm: syz-executor782 Tainted: G        W          6.10.0-rc2-syzkaller-g8867bbd4a056 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024

Testing showed that the problem did not occur if the two error
messages -- the first two lines above -- were removed; apparently adding
material to the kernel log takes a surprisingly large amount of time.

In any case, the best approach for preventing these lockups and to
avoid spamming the log with thousands of error messages per second is
to ratelimit the two dev_err() calls.  Therefore we replace them with
dev_err_ratelimited().</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2024-07-26</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2024-40904</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2024-07-26</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1894</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="22" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ipv6: fix possible race in __fib6_drop_pcpu_from()

syzbot found a race in __fib6_drop_pcpu_from() [1]

If compiler reads more than once (*ppcpu_rt),
second read could read NULL, if another cpu clears
the value in rt6_get_pcpu_route().

Add a READ_ONCE() to prevent this race.

Also add rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock() because
we rely on RCU protection while dereferencing pcpu_rt.

[1]

Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000012: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000090-0x0000000000000097]
CPU: 0 PID: 7543 Comm: kworker/u8:17 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc1-syzkaller-00013-g2bfcfd584ff5 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024
Workqueue: netns cleanup_net
 RIP: 0010:__fib6_drop_pcpu_from.part.0+0x10a/0x370 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:984
Code: f8 48 c1 e8 03 80 3c 28 00 0f 85 16 02 00 00 4d 8b 3f 4d 85 ff 74 31 e8 74 a7 fa f7 49 8d bf 90 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 &lt;80&gt; 3c 28 00 0f 85 1e 02 00 00 49 8b 87 90 00 00 00 48 8b 0c 24 48
RSP: 0018:ffffc900040df070 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 0000000000000012 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffffffff89932e16
RDX: ffff888049dd1e00 RSI: ffffffff89932d7c RDI: 0000000000000091
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000007
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000006 R12: ffff88807fa080b8
R13: fffffbfff1a9a07d R14: ffffed100ff41022 R15: 0000000000000001
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000001b32c26000 CR3: 000000005d56e000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
  __fib6_drop_pcpu_from net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:966 [inline]
  fib6_drop_pcpu_from net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1027 [inline]
  fib6_purge_rt+0x7f2/0x9f0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1038
  fib6_del_route net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1998 [inline]
  fib6_del+0xa70/0x17b0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2043
  fib6_clean_node+0x426/0x5b0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2205
  fib6_walk_continue+0x44f/0x8d0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2127
  fib6_walk+0x182/0x370 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2175
  fib6_clean_tree+0xd7/0x120 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2255
  __fib6_clean_all+0x100/0x2d0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2271
  rt6_sync_down_dev net/ipv6/route.c:4906 [inline]
  rt6_disable_ip+0x7ed/0xa00 net/ipv6/route.c:4911
  addrconf_ifdown.isra.0+0x117/0x1b40 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3855
  addrconf_notify+0x223/0x19e0 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3778
  notifier_call_chain+0xb9/0x410 kernel/notifier.c:93
  call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0xbe/0x140 net/core/dev.c:1992
  call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2030 [inline]
  call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2044 [inline]
  dev_close_many+0x333/0x6a0 net/core/dev.c:1585
  unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x46d/0x19f0 net/core/dev.c:11193
  unregister_netdevice_many net/core/dev.c:11276 [inline]
  default_device_exit_batch+0x85b/0xae0 net/core/dev.c:11759
  ops_exit_list+0x128/0x180 net/core/net_namespace.c:178
  cleanup_net+0x5b7/0xbf0 net/core/net_namespace.c:640
  process_one_work+0x9fb/0x1b60 kernel/workqueue.c:3231
  process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3312 [inline]
  worker_thread+0x6c8/0xf70 kernel/workqueue.c:3393
  kthread+0x2c1/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:389
  ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2024-07-26</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2024-40905</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>None</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2024-07-26</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1894</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="23" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

wifi: mac80211: Fix deadlock in ieee80211_sta_ps_deliver_wakeup()

The ieee80211_sta_ps_deliver_wakeup() function takes sta-&gt;ps_lock to
synchronizes with ieee80211_tx_h_unicast_ps_buf() which is called from
softirq context. However using only spin_lock() to get sta-&gt;ps_lock in
ieee80211_sta_ps_deliver_wakeup() does not prevent softirq to execute
on this same CPU, to run ieee80211_tx_h_unicast_ps_buf() and try to
take this same lock ending in deadlock. Below is an example of rcu stall
that arises in such situation.

 rcu: INFO: rcu_sched self-detected stall on CPU
 rcu:    2-....: (42413413 ticks this GP) idle=b154/1/0x4000000000000000 softirq=1763/1765 fqs=21206996
 rcu:    (t=42586894 jiffies g=2057 q=362405 ncpus=4)
 CPU: 2 PID: 719 Comm: wpa_supplicant Tainted: G        W          6.4.0-02158-g1b062f552873 #742
 Hardware name: RPT (r1) (DT)
 pstate: 00000005 (nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
 pc : queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x58/0x2d0
 lr : invoke_tx_handlers_early+0x5b4/0x5c0
 sp : ffff00001ef64660
 x29: ffff00001ef64660 x28: ffff000009bc1070 x27: ffff000009bc0ad8
 x26: ffff000009bc0900 x25: ffff00001ef647a8 x24: 0000000000000000
 x23: ffff000009bc0900 x22: ffff000009bc0900 x21: ffff00000ac0e000
 x20: ffff00000a279e00 x19: ffff00001ef646e8 x18: 0000000000000000
 x17: ffff800016468000 x16: ffff00001ef608c0 x15: 0010533c93f64f80
 x14: 0010395c9faa3946 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 00000000fa83b2da
 x11: 000000012edeceea x10: ffff0000010fbe00 x9 : 0000000000895440
 x8 : 000000000010533c x7 : ffff00000ad8b740 x6 : ffff00000c350880
 x5 : 0000000000000007 x4 : 0000000000000001 x3 : 0000000000000000
 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000001 x0 : ffff00000ac0e0e8
 Call trace:
  queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x58/0x2d0
  ieee80211_tx+0x80/0x12c
  ieee80211_tx_pending+0x110/0x278
  tasklet_action_common.constprop.0+0x10c/0x144
  tasklet_action+0x20/0x28
  _stext+0x11c/0x284
  ____do_softirq+0xc/0x14
  call_on_irq_stack+0x24/0x34
  do_softirq_own_stack+0x18/0x20
  do_softirq+0x74/0x7c
  __local_bh_enable_ip+0xa0/0xa4
  _ieee80211_wake_txqs+0x3b0/0x4b8
  __ieee80211_wake_queue+0x12c/0x168
  ieee80211_add_pending_skbs+0xec/0x138
  ieee80211_sta_ps_deliver_wakeup+0x2a4/0x480
  ieee80211_mps_sta_status_update.part.0+0xd8/0x11c
  ieee80211_mps_sta_status_update+0x18/0x24
  sta_apply_parameters+0x3bc/0x4c0
  ieee80211_change_station+0x1b8/0x2dc
  nl80211_set_station+0x444/0x49c
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.0+0xa4/0xfc
  genl_rcv_msg+0x1b0/0x244
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x38/0x10c
  genl_rcv+0x34/0x48
  netlink_unicast+0x254/0x2bc
  netlink_sendmsg+0x190/0x3b4
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x1e8/0x218
  ___sys_sendmsg+0x68/0x8c
  __sys_sendmsg+0x44/0x84
  __arm64_sys_sendmsg+0x20/0x28
  do_el0_svc+0x6c/0xe8
  el0_svc+0x14/0x48
  el0t_64_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb4
  el0t_64_sync+0x14c/0x150

Using spin_lock_bh()/spin_unlock_bh() instead prevents softirq to raise
on the same CPU that is holding the lock.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2024-07-26</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2024-40912</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2024-07-26</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1894</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="24" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: check n_ssids before accessing the ssids

In some versions of cfg80211, the ssids poinet might be a valid one even
though n_ssids is 0. Accessing the pointer in this case will cuase an
out-of-bound access. Fix this by checking n_ssids first.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2024-07-26</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2024-40929</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2024-07-26</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1894</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="25" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/exynos/vidi: fix memory leak in .get_modes()

The duplicated EDID is never freed. Fix it.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2024-07-26</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2024-40932</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Low</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>3.9</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2024-07-26</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1894</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="26" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: don&apos;t read past the mfuart notifcation

In case the firmware sends a notification that claims it has more data
than it has, we will read past that was allocated for the notification.
Remove the print of the buffer, we won&apos;t see it by default. If needed,
we can see the content with tracing.

This was reported by KFENCE.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2024-07-26</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2024-40941</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2024-07-26</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1894</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="27" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ocfs2: fix races between hole punching and AIO+DIO

After commit &quot;ocfs2: return real error code in ocfs2_dio_wr_get_block&quot;,
fstests/generic/300 become from always failed to sometimes failed:

========================================================================
[  473.293420 ] run fstests generic/300

[  475.296983 ] JBD2: Ignoring recovery information on journal
[  475.302473 ] ocfs2: Mounting device (253,1) on (node local, slot 0) with ordered data mode.
[  494.290998 ] OCFS2: ERROR (device dm-1): ocfs2_change_extent_flag: Owner 5668 has an extent at cpos 78723 which can no longer be found
[  494.291609 ] On-disk corruption discovered. Please run fsck.ocfs2 once the filesystem is unmounted.
[  494.292018 ] OCFS2: File system is now read-only.
[  494.292224 ] (kworker/19:11,2628,19):ocfs2_mark_extent_written:5272 ERROR: status = -30
[  494.292602 ] (kworker/19:11,2628,19):ocfs2_dio_end_io_write:2374 ERROR: status = -3
fio: io_u error on file /mnt/scratch/racer: Read-only file system: write offset=460849152, buflen=131072
=========================================================================

In __blockdev_direct_IO, ocfs2_dio_wr_get_block is called to add unwritten
extents to a list.  extents are also inserted into extent tree in
ocfs2_write_begin_nolock.  Then another thread call fallocate to puch a
hole at one of the unwritten extent.  The extent at cpos was removed by
ocfs2_remove_extent().  At end io worker thread, ocfs2_search_extent_list
found there is no such extent at the cpos.

    T1                        T2                T3
                              inode lock
                                ...
                                insert extents
                                ...
                              inode unlock
ocfs2_fallocate
 __ocfs2_change_file_space
  inode lock
  lock ip_alloc_sem
  ocfs2_remove_inode_range inode
   ocfs2_remove_btree_range
    ocfs2_remove_extent
    ^---remove the extent at cpos 78723
  ...
  unlock ip_alloc_sem
  inode unlock
                                       ocfs2_dio_end_io
                                        ocfs2_dio_end_io_write
                                         lock ip_alloc_sem
                                         ocfs2_mark_extent_written
                                          ocfs2_change_extent_flag
                                           ocfs2_search_extent_list
                                           ^---failed to find extent
                                          ...
                                          unlock ip_alloc_sem

In most filesystems, fallocate is not compatible with racing with AIO+DIO,
so fix it by adding to wait for all dio before fallocate/punch_hole like
ext4.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2024-07-26</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2024-40943</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2024-07-26</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1894</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="28" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

MIPS: Octeon: Add PCIe link status check

The standard PCIe configuration read-write interface is used to
access the configuration space of the peripheral PCIe devices
of the mips processor after the PCIe link surprise down, it can
generate kernel panic caused by &quot;Data bus error&quot;. So it is
necessary to add PCIe link status check for system protection.
When the PCIe link is down or in training, assigning a value
of 0 to the configuration address can prevent read-write behavior
to the configuration space of peripheral PCIe devices, thereby
preventing kernel panic.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2024-07-26</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2024-40968</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2024-07-26</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1894</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="29" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

powerpc/pseries: Enforce hcall result buffer validity and size

plpar_hcall(), plpar_hcall9(), and related functions expect callers to
provide valid result buffers of certain minimum size. Currently this
is communicated only through comments in the code and the compiler has
no idea.

For example, if I write a bug like this:

  long retbuf[PLPAR_HCALL_BUFSIZE]; // should be PLPAR_HCALL9_BUFSIZE
  plpar_hcall9(H_ALLOCATE_VAS_WINDOW, retbuf, ...);

This compiles with no diagnostics emitted, but likely results in stack
corruption at runtime when plpar_hcall9() stores results past the end
of the array. (To be clear this is a contrived example and I have not
found a real instance yet.)

To make this class of error less likely, we can use explicitly-sized
array parameters instead of pointers in the declarations for the hcall
APIs. When compiled with -Warray-bounds[1], the code above now
provokes a diagnostic like this:

error: array argument is too small;
is of size 32, callee requires at least 72 [-Werror,-Warray-bounds]
   60 |                 plpar_hcall9(H_ALLOCATE_VAS_WINDOW, retbuf,
      |                 ^                                   ~~~~~~

[1] Enabled for LLVM builds but not GCC for now. See commit
    0da6e5fd6c37 (&quot;gcc: disable &apos;-Warray-bounds&apos; for gcc-13 too&quot;) and
    related changes.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2024-07-26</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2024-40974</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2024-07-26</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1894</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="30" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tipc: force a dst refcount before doing decryption

As it says in commit 3bc07321ccc2 (&quot;xfrm: Force a dst refcount before
entering the xfrm type handlers&quot;):

&quot;Crypto requests might return asynchronous. In this case we leave the
 rcu protected region, so force a refcount on the skb&apos;s destination
 entry before we enter the xfrm type input/output handlers.&quot;

On TIPC decryption path it has the same problem, and skb_dst_force()
should be called before doing decryption to avoid a possible crash.

Shuang reported this issue when this warning is triggered:

  [] WARNING: include/net/dst.h:337 tipc_sk_rcv+0x1055/0x1ea0 [tipc]
  [] Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W --------- - - 4.18.0-496.el8.x86_64+debug
  [] Workqueue: crypto cryptd_queue_worker
  [] RIP: 0010:tipc_sk_rcv+0x1055/0x1ea0 [tipc]
  [] Call Trace:
  [] tipc_sk_mcast_rcv+0x548/0xea0 [tipc]
  [] tipc_rcv+0xcf5/0x1060 [tipc]
  [] tipc_aead_decrypt_done+0x215/0x2e0 [tipc]
  [] cryptd_aead_crypt+0xdb/0x190
  [] cryptd_queue_worker+0xed/0x190
  [] process_one_work+0x93d/0x17e0</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2024-07-26</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2024-40983</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2024-07-26</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1894</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="31" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ACPICA: Revert &quot;ACPICA: avoid Info: mapping multiple BARs. Your kernel is fine.&quot;

Undo the modifications made in commit d410ee5109a1 (&quot;ACPICA: avoid
&quot;Info: mapping multiple BARs. Your kernel is fine.&quot;&quot;). The initial
purpose of this commit was to stop memory mappings for operation
regions from overlapping page boundaries, as it can trigger warnings
if different page attributes are present.

However, it was found that when this situation arises, mapping
continues until the boundary&apos;s end, but there is still an attempt to
read/write the entire length of the map, leading to a NULL pointer
deference. For example, if a four-byte mapping request is made but
only one byte is mapped because it hits the current page boundary&apos;s
end, a four-byte read/write attempt is still made, resulting in a NULL
pointer deference.

Instead, map the entire length, as the ACPI specification does not
mandate that it must be within the same page boundary. It is
permissible for it to be mapped across different regions.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2024-07-26</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2024-40984</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2024-07-26</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1894</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="32" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/amdgpu: fix UBSAN warning in kv_dpm.c

Adds bounds check for sumo_vid_mapping_entry.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2024-07-26</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2024-40987</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2024-07-26</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1894</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="33" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tracing: Build event generation tests only as modules

The kprobes and synth event generation test modules add events and lock
(get a reference) those event file reference in module init function,
and unlock and delete it in module exit function. This is because those
are designed for playing as modules.

If we make those modules as built-in, those events are left locked in the
kernel, and never be removed. This causes kprobe event self-test failure
as below.

[   97.349708] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[   97.353453] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1 at kernel/trace/trace_kprobe.c:2133 kprobe_trace_self_tests_init+0x3f1/0x480
[   97.357106] Modules linked in:
[   97.358488] CPU: 3 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.9.0-g699646734ab5-dirty #14
[   97.361556] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
[   97.363880] RIP: 0010:kprobe_trace_self_tests_init+0x3f1/0x480
[   97.365538] Code: a8 24 08 82 e9 ae fd ff ff 90 0f 0b 90 48 c7 c7 e5 aa 0b 82 e9 ee fc ff ff 90 0f 0b 90 48 c7 c7 2d 61 06 82 e9 8e fd ff ff 90 &lt;0f&gt; 0b 90 48 c7 c7 33 0b 0c 82 89 c6 e8 6e 03 1f ff 41 ff c7 e9 90
[   97.370429] RSP: 0000:ffffc90000013b50 EFLAGS: 00010286
[   97.371852] RAX: 00000000fffffff0 RBX: ffff888005919c00 RCX: 0000000000000000
[   97.373829] RDX: ffff888003f40000 RSI: ffffffff8236a598 RDI: ffff888003f40a68
[   97.375715] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
[   97.377675] R10: ffffffff811c9ae5 R11: ffffffff8120c4e0 R12: 0000000000000000
[   97.379591] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000015 R15: 0000000000000000
[   97.381536] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88807dcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   97.383813] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   97.385449] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000002244000 CR4: 00000000000006b0
[   97.387347] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[   97.389277] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[   97.391196] Call Trace:
[   97.391967]  &lt;TASK&gt;
[   97.392647]  ? __warn+0xcc/0x180
[   97.393640]  ? kprobe_trace_self_tests_init+0x3f1/0x480
[   97.395181]  ? report_bug+0xbd/0x150
[   97.396234]  ? handle_bug+0x3e/0x60
[   97.397311]  ? exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x50
[   97.398434]  ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
[   97.399652]  ? trace_kprobe_is_busy+0x20/0x20
[   97.400904]  ? tracing_reset_all_online_cpus+0x15/0x90
[   97.402304]  ? kprobe_trace_self_tests_init+0x3f1/0x480
[   97.403773]  ? init_kprobe_trace+0x50/0x50
[   97.404972]  do_one_initcall+0x112/0x240
[   97.406113]  do_initcall_level+0x95/0xb0
[   97.407286]  ? kernel_init+0x1a/0x1a0
[   97.408401]  do_initcalls+0x3f/0x70
[   97.409452]  kernel_init_freeable+0x16f/0x1e0
[   97.410662]  ? rest_init+0x1f0/0x1f0
[   97.411738]  kernel_init+0x1a/0x1a0
[   97.412788]  ret_from_fork+0x39/0x50
[   97.413817]  ? rest_init+0x1f0/0x1f0
[   97.414844]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
[   97.416285]  &lt;/TASK&gt;
[   97.417134] irq event stamp: 13437323
[   97.418376] hardirqs last  enabled at (13437337): [&lt;ffffffff8110bc0c&gt;] console_unlock+0x11c/0x150
[   97.421285] hardirqs last disabled at (13437370): [&lt;ffffffff8110bbf1&gt;] console_unlock+0x101/0x150
[   97.423838] softirqs last  enabled at (13437366): [&lt;ffffffff8108e17f&gt;] handle_softirqs+0x23f/0x2a0
[   97.426450] softirqs last disabled at (13437393): [&lt;ffffffff8108e346&gt;] __irq_exit_rcu+0x66/0xd0
[   97.428850] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

And also, since we can not cleanup dynamic_event file, ftracetest are
failed too.

To avoid these issues, build these tests only as modules.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2024-07-26</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2024-41004</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2024-07-26</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1894</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="34" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

netpoll: Fix race condition in netpoll_owner_active

KCSAN detected a race condition in netpoll:

	BUG: KCSAN: data-race in net_rx_action / netpoll_send_skb
	write (marked) to 0xffff8881164168b0 of 4 bytes by interrupt on cpu 10:
	net_rx_action (./include/linux/netpoll.h:90 net/core/dev.c:6712 net/core/dev.c:6822)
&lt;snip&gt;
	read to 0xffff8881164168b0 of 4 bytes by task 1 on cpu 2:
	netpoll_send_skb (net/core/netpoll.c:319 net/core/netpoll.c:345 net/core/netpoll.c:393)
	netpoll_send_udp (net/core/netpoll.c:?)
&lt;snip&gt;
	value changed: 0x0000000a -&gt; 0xffffffff

This happens because netpoll_owner_active() needs to check if the
current CPU is the owner of the lock, touching napi-&gt;poll_owner
non atomically. The -&gt;poll_owner field contains the current CPU holding
the lock.

Use an atomic read to check if the poll owner is the current CPU.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2024-07-26</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2024-41005</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2024-07-26</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1894</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="35" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tcp: avoid too many retransmit packets

If a TCP socket is using TCP_USER_TIMEOUT, and the other peer
retracted its window to zero, tcp_retransmit_timer() can
retransmit a packet every two jiffies (2 ms for HZ=1000),
for about 4 minutes after TCP_USER_TIMEOUT has &apos;expired&apos;.

The fix is to make sure tcp_rtx_probe0_timed_out() takes
icsk-&gt;icsk_user_timeout into account.

Before blamed commit, the socket would not timeout after
icsk-&gt;icsk_user_timeout, but would use standard exponential
backoff for the retransmits.

Also worth noting that before commit e89688e3e978 (&quot;net: tcp:
fix unexcepted socket die when snd_wnd is 0&quot;), the issue
would last 2 minutes instead of 4.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2024-07-26</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2024-41007</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Low</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>3.3</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2024-07-26</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1894</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="36" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:bpf: Fix overrunning reservations in ringbufThe BPF ring buffer internally is implemented as a power-of-2 sized circularbuffer, with two logical and ever-increasing counters: consumer_pos is theconsumer counter to show which logical position the consumer consumed thedata, and producer_pos which is the producer counter denoting the amount ofdata reserved by all producers.Each time a record is reserved, the producer that  owns  the record willsuccessfully advance producer counter. In user space each time a record isread, the consumer of the data advanced the consumer counter once it finishedprocessing. Both counters are stored in separate pages so that from userspace, the producer counter is read-only and the consumer counter is read-write.One aspect that simplifies and thus speeds up the implementation of bothproducers and consumers is how the data area is mapped twice contiguouslyback-to-back in the virtual memory, allowing to not take any special measuresfor samples that have to wrap around at the end of the circular buffer dataarea, because the next page after the last data page would be first data pageagain, and thus the sample will still appear completely contiguous in virtualmemory.Each record has a struct bpf_ringbuf_hdr { u32 len; u32 pg_off; } header forbook-keeping the length and offset, and is inaccessible to the BPF program.Helpers like bpf_ringbuf_reserve() return `(void *)hdr + BPF_RINGBUF_HDR_SZ`for the BPF program to use. Bing-Jhong and Muhammad reported that it is howeverpossible to make a second allocated memory chunk overlapping with the firstchunk and as a result, the BPF program is now able to edit first chunk sheader.For example, consider the creation of a BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF map with sizeof 0x4000. Next, the consumer_pos is modified to 0x3000 /before/ a call tobpf_ringbuf_reserve() is made. This will allocate a chunk A, which is in[0x0,0x3008], and the BPF program is able to edit [0x8,0x3008]. Now, letsallocate a chunk B with size 0x3000. This will succeed because consumer_poswas edited ahead of time to pass the `new_prod_pos - cons_pos &gt; rb-&gt;mask`check. Chunk B will be in range [0x3008,0x6010], and the BPF program is ableto edit [0x3010,0x6010]. Due to the ring buffer memory layout mentionedearlier, the ranges [0x0,0x4000] and [0x4000,0x8000] point to the same datapages. This means that chunk B at [0x4000,0x4008] is chunk A s header.bpf_ringbuf_submit() / bpf_ringbuf_discard() use the header s pg_off to thenlocate the bpf_ringbuf itself via bpf_ringbuf_restore_from_rec(). Once chunkB modified chunk A s header, then bpf_ringbuf_commit() refers to the wrongpage and could cause a crash.Fix it by calculating the oldest pending_pos and check whether the rangefrom the oldest outstanding record to the newest would span beyond the ringbuffer size. If that is the case, then reject the request. We ve tested withthe ring buffer benchmark in BPF selftests (./benchs/run_bench_ringbufs.sh)before/after the fix and while it seems a bit slower on some benchmarks, itis still not significantly enough to matter.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2024-07-26</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2024-41009</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2024-07-26</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1894</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
</cvrfdoc>