cvrf2cusa/cusa/k/kernel/kernel-5.10.0-60.138.0.165_openEuler-SA-2024-1647.json

{
  "id": "openEuler-SA-2024-1647",
  "url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1647",
  "title": "An update for kernel is now available for openEuler-22.03-LTS",
  "severity": "High",
  "description": "The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ni2c: mlxbf: prevent stack overflow in mlxbf_i2c_smbus_start_transaction()\r\n\r\nmemcpy() is called in a loop while 'operation->length' upper bound\nis not checked and 'data_idx' also increments.(CVE-2022-48632)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nmm/slub: fix to return errno if kmalloc() fails\r\n\r\nIn create_unique_id(), kmalloc(, GFP_KERNEL) can fail due to\nout-of-memory, if it fails, return errno correctly rather than\ntriggering panic via BUG_ON();\r\n\r\nkernel BUG at mm/slub.c:5893!\nInternal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP\r\n\r\nCall trace:\n sysfs_slab_add+0x258/0x260 mm/slub.c:5973\n __kmem_cache_create+0x60/0x118 mm/slub.c:4899\n create_cache mm/slab_common.c:229 [inline]\n kmem_cache_create_usercopy+0x19c/0x31c mm/slab_common.c:335\n kmem_cache_create+0x1c/0x28 mm/slab_common.c:390\n f2fs_kmem_cache_create fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2766 [inline]\n f2fs_init_xattr_caches+0x78/0xb4 fs/f2fs/xattr.c:808\n f2fs_fill_super+0x1050/0x1e0c fs/f2fs/super.c:4149\n mount_bdev+0x1b8/0x210 fs/super.c:1400\n f2fs_mount+0x44/0x58 fs/f2fs/super.c:4512\n legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x74 fs/fs_context.c:610\n vfs_get_tree+0x40/0x140 fs/super.c:1530\n do_new_mount+0x1dc/0x4e4 fs/namespace.c:3040\n path_mount+0x358/0x914 fs/namespace.c:3370\n do_mount fs/namespace.c:3383 [inline]\n __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3591 [inline]\n __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3568 [inline]\n __arm64_sys_mount+0x2f8/0x408 fs/namespace.c:3568(CVE-2022-48659)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ngpiolib: cdev: Set lineevent_state::irq after IRQ register successfully\r\n\r\nWhen running gpio test on nxp-ls1028 platform with below command\ngpiomon --num-events=3 --rising-edge gpiochip1 25\nThere will be a warning trace as below:\nCall trace:\nfree_irq+0x204/0x360\nlineevent_free+0x64/0x70\ngpio_ioctl+0x598/0x6a0\n__arm64_sys_ioctl+0xb4/0x100\ninvoke_syscall+0x5c/0x130\n......\nel0t_64_sync+0x1a0/0x1a4\nThe reason of this issue is that calling request_threaded_irq()\nfunction failed, and then lineevent_free() is invoked to release\nthe resource. Since the lineevent_state::irq was already set, so\nthe subsequent invocation of free_irq() would trigger the above\nwarning call trace. To fix this issue, set the lineevent_state::irq\nafter the IRQ register successfully.(CVE-2022-48660)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nbinder: fix race between mmput() and do_exit()\r\n\r\nTask A calls binder_update_page_range() to allocate and insert pages on\na remote address space from Task B. For this, Task A pins the remote mm\nvia mmget_not_zero() first. This can race with Task B do_exit() and the\nfinal mmput() refcount decrement will come from Task A.\r\n\r\n  Task A            | Task B\n  ------------------+------------------\n  mmget_not_zero()  |\n                    |  do_exit()\n                    |    exit_mm()\n                    |      mmput()\n  mmput()           |\n    exit_mmap()     |\n      remove_vma()  |\n        fput()      |\r\n\r\nIn this case, the work of ____fput() from Task B is queued up in Task A\nas TWA_RESUME. So in theory, Task A returns to userspace and the cleanup\nwork gets executed. However, Task A instead sleep, waiting for a reply\nfrom Task B that never comes (it's dead).\r\n\r\nThis means the binder_deferred_release() is blocked until an unrelated\nbinder event forces Task A to go back to userspace. All the associated\ndeath notifications will also be delayed until then.\r\n\r\nIn order to fix this use mmput_async() that will schedule the work in\nthe corresponding mm->async_put_work WQ instead of Task A.(CVE-2023-52609)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nhwrng: core - Fix page fault dead lock on mmap-ed hwrng\r\n\r\nThere is a dead-lock in the hwrng device read path.  This triggers\nwhen the user reads from /dev/hwrng into memory also mmap-ed from\n/dev/hwrng.  The resulting page fault triggers a recursive read\nwhich then dead-locks.\r\n\r\nFix this by using a stack buffer when calling copy_to_user.(CVE-2023-52615)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ncrypto: lib/mpi - Fix unexpected pointer access in mpi_ec_init\r\n\r\nWhen the mpi_ec_ctx structure is initialized, some fields are not\ncleared, causing a crash when referencing the field when the\nstructure was released. Initially, this issue was ignored because\nmemory for mpi_ec_ctx is allocated with the __GFP_ZERO flag.\nFor example, this error will be triggered when calculating the\nZa value for SM2 separately.(CVE-2023-52616)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nblock/rnbd-srv: Check for unlikely string overflow\r\n\r\nSince \"dev_search_path\" can technically be as large as PATH_MAX,\nthere was a risk of truncation when copying it and a second string\ninto \"full_path\" since it was also PATH_MAX sized. The W=1 builds were\nreporting this warning:\r\n\r\ndrivers/block/rnbd/rnbd-srv.c: In function 'process_msg_open.isra':\ndrivers/block/rnbd/rnbd-srv.c:616:51: warning: '%s' directive output may be truncated writing up to 254 bytes into a region of size between 0 and 4095 [-Wformat-truncation=]\n  616 |                 snprintf(full_path, PATH_MAX, \"%s/%s\",\n      |                                                   ^~\nIn function 'rnbd_srv_get_full_path',\n    inlined from 'process_msg_open.isra' at drivers/block/rnbd/rnbd-srv.c:721:14: drivers/block/rnbd/rnbd-srv.c:616:17: note: 'snprintf' output between 2 and 4351 bytes into a destination of size 4096\n  616 |                 snprintf(full_path, PATH_MAX, \"%s/%s\",\n      |                 ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n  617 |                          dev_search_path, dev_name);\n      |                          ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\r\n\r\nTo fix this, unconditionally check for truncation (as was already done\nfor the case where \"%SESSNAME%\" was present).(CVE-2023-52618)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnetfilter: nf_tables: disallow timeout for anonymous sets\r\n\r\nNever used from userspace, disallow these parameters.(CVE-2023-52620)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nbpf: Check rcu_read_lock_trace_held() before calling bpf map helpers\r\n\r\nThese three bpf_map_{lookup,update,delete}_elem() helpers are also\navailable for sleepable bpf program, so add the corresponding lock\nassertion for sleepable bpf program, otherwise the following warning\nwill be reported when a sleepable bpf program manipulates bpf map under\ninterpreter mode (aka bpf_jit_enable=0):\r\n\r\n  WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 4985 at kernel/bpf/helpers.c:40 ......\n  CPU: 3 PID: 4985 Comm: test_progs Not tainted 6.6.0+ #2\n  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996) ......\n  RIP: 0010:bpf_map_lookup_elem+0x54/0x60\n  ......\n  Call Trace:\n   <TASK>\n   ? __warn+0xa5/0x240\n   ? bpf_map_lookup_elem+0x54/0x60\n   ? report_bug+0x1ba/0x1f0\n   ? handle_bug+0x40/0x80\n   ? exc_invalid_op+0x18/0x50\n   ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20\n   ? __pfx_bpf_map_lookup_elem+0x10/0x10\n   ? rcu_lockdep_current_cpu_online+0x65/0xb0\n   ? rcu_is_watching+0x23/0x50\n   ? bpf_map_lookup_elem+0x54/0x60\n   ? __pfx_bpf_map_lookup_elem+0x10/0x10\n   ___bpf_prog_run+0x513/0x3b70\n   __bpf_prog_run32+0x9d/0xd0\n   ? __bpf_prog_enter_sleepable_recur+0xad/0x120\n   ? __bpf_prog_enter_sleepable_recur+0x3e/0x120\n   bpf_trampoline_6442580665+0x4d/0x1000\n   __x64_sys_getpgid+0x5/0x30\n   ? do_syscall_64+0x36/0xb0\n   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76\n   </TASK>(CVE-2023-52621)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nSUNRPC: Fix a suspicious RCU usage warning\r\n\r\nI received the following warning while running cthon against an ontap\nserver running pNFS:\r\n\r\n[   57.202521] =============================\n[   57.202522] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage\n[   57.202523] 6.7.0-rc3-g2cc14f52aeb7 #41492 Not tainted\n[   57.202525] -----------------------------\n[   57.202525] net/sunrpc/xprtmultipath.c:349 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!\n[   57.202527]\n               other info that might help us debug this:\r\n\r\n[   57.202528]\n               rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1\n[   57.202529] no locks held by test5/3567.\n[   57.202530]\n               stack backtrace:\n[   57.202532] CPU: 0 PID: 3567 Comm: test5 Not tainted 6.7.0-rc3-g2cc14f52aeb7 #41492 5b09971b4965c0aceba19f3eea324a4a806e227e\n[   57.202534] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS unknown 2/2/2022\n[   57.202536] Call Trace:\n[   57.202537]  <TASK>\n[   57.202540]  dump_stack_lvl+0x77/0xb0\n[   57.202551]  lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x154/0x1a0\n[   57.202556]  rpc_xprt_switch_has_addr+0x17c/0x190 [sunrpc ebe02571b9a8ceebf7d98e71675af20c19bdb1f6]\n[   57.202596]  rpc_clnt_setup_test_and_add_xprt+0x50/0x180 [sunrpc ebe02571b9a8ceebf7d98e71675af20c19bdb1f6]\n[   57.202621]  ? rpc_clnt_add_xprt+0x254/0x300 [sunrpc ebe02571b9a8ceebf7d98e71675af20c19bdb1f6]\n[   57.202646]  rpc_clnt_add_xprt+0x27a/0x300 [sunrpc ebe02571b9a8ceebf7d98e71675af20c19bdb1f6]\n[   57.202671]  ? __pfx_rpc_clnt_setup_test_and_add_xprt+0x10/0x10 [sunrpc ebe02571b9a8ceebf7d98e71675af20c19bdb1f6]\n[   57.202696]  nfs4_pnfs_ds_connect+0x345/0x760 [nfsv4 c716d88496ded0ea6d289bbea684fa996f9b57a9]\n[   57.202728]  ? __pfx_nfs4_test_session_trunk+0x10/0x10 [nfsv4 c716d88496ded0ea6d289bbea684fa996f9b57a9]\n[   57.202754]  nfs4_fl_prepare_ds+0x75/0xc0 [nfs_layout_nfsv41_files e3a4187f18ae8a27b630f9feae6831b584a9360a]\n[   57.202760]  filelayout_write_pagelist+0x4a/0x200 [nfs_layout_nfsv41_files e3a4187f18ae8a27b630f9feae6831b584a9360a]\n[   57.202765]  pnfs_generic_pg_writepages+0xbe/0x230 [nfsv4 c716d88496ded0ea6d289bbea684fa996f9b57a9]\n[   57.202788]  __nfs_pageio_add_request+0x3fd/0x520 [nfs 6c976fa593a7c2976f5a0aeb4965514a828e6902]\n[   57.202813]  nfs_pageio_add_request+0x18b/0x390 [nfs 6c976fa593a7c2976f5a0aeb4965514a828e6902]\n[   57.202831]  nfs_do_writepage+0x116/0x1e0 [nfs 6c976fa593a7c2976f5a0aeb4965514a828e6902]\n[   57.202849]  nfs_writepages_callback+0x13/0x30 [nfs 6c976fa593a7c2976f5a0aeb4965514a828e6902]\n[   57.202866]  write_cache_pages+0x265/0x450\n[   57.202870]  ? __pfx_nfs_writepages_callback+0x10/0x10 [nfs 6c976fa593a7c2976f5a0aeb4965514a828e6902]\n[   57.202891]  nfs_writepages+0x141/0x230 [nfs 6c976fa593a7c2976f5a0aeb4965514a828e6902]\n[   57.202913]  do_writepages+0xd2/0x230\n[   57.202917]  ? filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x5c/0x80\n[   57.202921]  filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x67/0x80\n[   57.202924]  filemap_write_and_wait_range+0xd9/0x170\n[   57.202930]  nfs_wb_all+0x49/0x180 [nfs 6c976fa593a7c2976f5a0aeb4965514a828e6902]\n[   57.202947]  nfs4_file_flush+0x72/0xb0 [nfsv4 c716d88496ded0ea6d289bbea684fa996f9b57a9]\n[   57.202969]  __se_sys_close+0x46/0xd0\n[   57.202972]  do_syscall_64+0x68/0x100\n[   57.202975]  ? do_syscall_64+0x77/0x100\n[   57.202976]  ? do_syscall_64+0x77/0x100\n[   57.202979]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76\n[   57.202982] RIP: 0033:0x7fe2b12e4a94\n[   57.202985] Code: 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d d5 18 0e 00 00 74 13 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 44 c3 0f 1f 00 48 83 ec 18 89 7c 24 0c e8 c3\n[   57.202987] RSP: 002b:00007ffe857ddb38 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003\n[   57.202989] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffe857dfd68 RCX: 00007fe2b12e4a94\n[   57.202991] RDX: 0000000000002000 RSI: 00007ffe857ddc40 RDI: 0000000000000003\n[   57.202992] RBP: 00007ffe857dfc50 R08: 7fffffffffffffff R09: 0000000065650f49\n[   57.202993] R10: 00007f\n---truncated---(CVE-2023-52623)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nsh: push-switch: Reorder cleanup operations to avoid use-after-free bug\r\n\r\nThe original code puts flush_work() before timer_shutdown_sync()\nin switch_drv_remove(). Although we use flush_work() to stop\nthe worker, it could be rescheduled in switch_timer(). As a result,\na use-after-free bug can occur. The details are shown below:\r\n\r\n      (cpu 0)                    |      (cpu 1)\nswitch_drv_remove()              |\n flush_work()                    |\n  ...                            |  switch_timer // timer\n                                 |   schedule_work(&psw->work)\n timer_shutdown_sync()           |\n ...                             |  switch_work_handler // worker\n kfree(psw) // free              |\n                                 |   psw->state = 0 // use\r\n\r\nThis patch puts timer_shutdown_sync() before flush_work() to\nmitigate the bugs. As a result, the worker and timer will be\nstopped safely before the deallocate operations.(CVE-2023-52629)\r\n\r\nRejected reason: This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority.(CVE-2023-52630)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\num: time-travel: fix time corruption\r\n\r\nIn 'basic' time-travel mode (without =inf-cpu or =ext), we\nstill get timer interrupts. These can happen at arbitrary\npoints in time, i.e. while in timer_read(), which pushes\ntime forward just a little bit. Then, if we happen to get\nthe interrupt after calculating the new time to push to,\nbut before actually finishing that, the interrupt will set\nthe time to a value that's incompatible with the forward,\nand we'll crash because time goes backwards when we do the\nforwarding.\r\n\r\nFix this by reading the time_travel_time, calculating the\nadjustment, and doing the adjustment all with interrupts\ndisabled.(CVE-2023-52633)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nPM / devfreq: Synchronize devfreq_monitor_[start/stop]\r\n\r\nThere is a chance if a frequent switch of the governor\ndone in a loop result in timer list corruption where\ntimer cancel being done from two place one from\ncancel_delayed_work_sync() and followed by expire_timers()\ncan be seen from the traces[1].\r\n\r\nwhile true\ndo\n        echo \"simple_ondemand\" > /sys/class/devfreq/1d84000.ufshc/governor\n        echo \"performance\" > /sys/class/devfreq/1d84000.ufshc/governor\ndone\r\n\r\nIt looks to be issue with devfreq driver where\ndevice_monitor_[start/stop] need to synchronized so that\ndelayed work should get corrupted while it is either\nbeing queued or running or being cancelled.\r\n\r\nLet's use polling flag and devfreq lock to synchronize the\nqueueing the timer instance twice and work data being\ncorrupted.\r\n\r\n[1]\n...\n..\n<idle>-0    [003]   9436.209662:  timer_cancel   timer=0xffffff80444f0428\n<idle>-0    [003]   9436.209664:  timer_expire_entry   timer=0xffffff80444f0428  now=0x10022da1c  function=__typeid__ZTSFvP10timer_listE_global_addr  baseclk=0x10022da1c\n<idle>-0    [003]   9436.209718:  timer_expire_exit   timer=0xffffff80444f0428\nkworker/u16:6-14217    [003]   9436.209863:  timer_start   timer=0xffffff80444f0428  function=__typeid__ZTSFvP10timer_listE_global_addr  expires=0x10022da2b  now=0x10022da1c  flags=182452227\nvendor.xxxyyy.ha-1593    [004]   9436.209888:  timer_cancel   timer=0xffffff80444f0428\nvendor.xxxyyy.ha-1593    [004]   9436.216390:  timer_init   timer=0xffffff80444f0428\nvendor.xxxyyy.ha-1593    [004]   9436.216392:  timer_start   timer=0xffffff80444f0428  function=__typeid__ZTSFvP10timer_listE_global_addr  expires=0x10022da2c  now=0x10022da1d  flags=186646532\nvendor.xxxyyy.ha-1593    [005]   9436.220992:  timer_cancel   timer=0xffffff80444f0428\nxxxyyyTraceManag-7795    [004]   9436.261641:  timer_cancel   timer=0xffffff80444f0428\r\n\r\n[2]\r\n\r\n 9436.261653][    C4] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address dead00000000012a\n[ 9436.261664][    C4] Mem abort info:\n[ 9436.261666][    C4]   ESR = 0x96000044\n[ 9436.261669][    C4]   EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits\n[ 9436.261671][    C4]   SET = 0, FnV = 0\n[ 9436.261673][    C4]   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0\n[ 9436.261675][    C4] Data abort info:\n[ 9436.261677][    C4]   ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000044\n[ 9436.261680][    C4]   CM = 0, WnR = 1\n[ 9436.261682][    C4] [dead00000000012a] address between user and kernel address ranges\n[ 9436.261685][    C4] Internal error: Oops: 96000044 [#1] PREEMPT SMP\n[ 9436.261701][    C4] Skip md ftrace buffer dump for: 0x3a982d0\n...\r\n\r\n[ 9436.262138][    C4] CPU: 4 PID: 7795 Comm: TraceManag Tainted: G S      W  O      5.10.149-android12-9-o-g17f915d29d0c #1\n[ 9436.262141][    C4] Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc.  (DT)\n[ 9436.262144][    C4] pstate: 22400085 (nzCv daIf +PAN -UAO +TCO BTYPE=--)\n[ 9436.262161][    C4] pc : expire_timers+0x9c/0x438\n[ 9436.262164][    C4] lr : expire_timers+0x2a4/0x438\n[ 9436.262168][    C4] sp : ffffffc010023dd0\n[ 9436.262171][    C4] x29: ffffffc010023df0 x28: ffffffd0636fdc18\n[ 9436.262178][    C4] x27: ffffffd063569dd0 x26: ffffffd063536008\n[ 9436.262182][    C4] x25: 0000000000000001 x24: ffffff88f7c69280\n[ 9436.262185][    C4] x23: 00000000000000e0 x22: dead000000000122\n[ 9436.262188][    C4] x21: 000000010022da29 x20: ffffff8af72b4e80\n[ 9436.262191][    C4] x19: ffffffc010023e50 x18: ffffffc010025038\n[ 9436.262195][    C4] x17: 0000000000000240 x16: 0000000000000201\n[ 9436.262199][    C4] x15: ffffffffffffffff x14: ffffff889f3c3100\n[ 9436.262203][    C4] x13: ffffff889f3c3100 x12: 00000000049f56b8\n[ 9436.262207][    C4] x11: 00000000049f56b8 x10: 00000000ffffffff\n[ 9436.262212][    C4] x9 : ffffffc010023e50 x8 : dead000000000122\n[ 9436.262216][    C4] x7 : ffffffffffffffff x6 : ffffffc0100239d8\n[ 9436.262220][    C4] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000101\n[ 9436.262223][    C4] x3 : 0000000000000080 x2 : ffffff8\n---truncated---(CVE-2023-52635)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ncan: j1939: Fix UAF in j1939_sk_match_filter during setsockopt(SO_J1939_FILTER)\r\n\r\nLock jsk->sk to prevent UAF when setsockopt(..., SO_J1939_FILTER, ...)\nmodifies jsk->filters while receiving packets.\r\n\r\nFollowing trace was seen on affected system:\n ==================================================================\n BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939]\n Read of size 4 at addr ffff888012144014 by task j1939/350\r\n\r\n CPU: 0 PID: 350 Comm: j1939 Tainted: G        W  OE      6.5.0-rc5 #1\n Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014\n Call Trace:\n  print_report+0xd3/0x620\n  ? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x7d/0x200\n  ? j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939]\n  kasan_report+0xc2/0x100\n  ? j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939]\n  __asan_load4+0x84/0xb0\n  j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939]\n  j1939_sk_recv+0x20b/0x320 [can_j1939]\n  ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x20\n  ? __pfx_j1939_sk_recv+0x10/0x10 [can_j1939]\n  ? j1939_simple_recv+0x69/0x280 [can_j1939]\n  ? j1939_ac_recv+0x5e/0x310 [can_j1939]\n  j1939_can_recv+0x43f/0x580 [can_j1939]\n  ? __pfx_j1939_can_recv+0x10/0x10 [can_j1939]\n  ? raw_rcv+0x42/0x3c0 [can_raw]\n  ? __pfx_j1939_can_recv+0x10/0x10 [can_j1939]\n  can_rcv_filter+0x11f/0x350 [can]\n  can_receive+0x12f/0x190 [can]\n  ? __pfx_can_rcv+0x10/0x10 [can]\n  can_rcv+0xdd/0x130 [can]\n  ? __pfx_can_rcv+0x10/0x10 [can]\n  __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x13d/0x150\n  ? __pfx___netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x10/0x10\n  ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x20\n  ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x8c/0xe0\n  __netif_receive_skb+0x23/0xb0\n  process_backlog+0x107/0x260\n  __napi_poll+0x69/0x310\n  net_rx_action+0x2a1/0x580\n  ? __pfx_net_rx_action+0x10/0x10\n  ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10\n  ? handle_irq_event+0x7d/0xa0\n  __do_softirq+0xf3/0x3f8\n  do_softirq+0x53/0x80\n  </IRQ>\n  <TASK>\n  __local_bh_enable_ip+0x6e/0x70\n  netif_rx+0x16b/0x180\n  can_send+0x32b/0x520 [can]\n  ? __pfx_can_send+0x10/0x10 [can]\n  ? __check_object_size+0x299/0x410\n  raw_sendmsg+0x572/0x6d0 [can_raw]\n  ? __pfx_raw_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 [can_raw]\n  ? apparmor_socket_sendmsg+0x2f/0x40\n  ? __pfx_raw_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 [can_raw]\n  sock_sendmsg+0xef/0x100\n  sock_write_iter+0x162/0x220\n  ? __pfx_sock_write_iter+0x10/0x10\n  ? __rtnl_unlock+0x47/0x80\n  ? security_file_permission+0x54/0x320\n  vfs_write+0x6ba/0x750\n  ? __pfx_vfs_write+0x10/0x10\n  ? __fget_light+0x1ca/0x1f0\n  ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x5b/0x280\n  ksys_write+0x143/0x170\n  ? __pfx_ksys_write+0x10/0x10\n  ? __kasan_check_read+0x15/0x20\n  ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x62/0x70\n  __x64_sys_write+0x47/0x60\n  do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90\n  ? do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x90\n  ? irqentry_exit+0x3f/0x50\n  ? exc_page_fault+0x79/0xf0\n  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8\r\n\r\n Allocated by task 348:\n  kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x50\n  kasan_set_track+0x29/0x40\n  kasan_save_alloc_info+0x1f/0x30\n  __kasan_kmalloc+0xb5/0xc0\n  __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x67/0x160\n  j1939_sk_setsockopt+0x284/0x450 [can_j1939]\n  __sys_setsockopt+0x15c/0x2f0\n  __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x6b/0x80\n  do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90\n  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8\r\n\r\n Freed by task 349:\n  kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x50\n  kasan_set_track+0x29/0x40\n  kasan_save_free_info+0x2f/0x50\n  __kasan_slab_free+0x12e/0x1c0\n  __kmem_cache_free+0x1b9/0x380\n  kfree+0x7a/0x120\n  j1939_sk_setsockopt+0x3b2/0x450 [can_j1939]\n  __sys_setsockopt+0x15c/0x2f0\n  __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x6b/0x80\n  do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90\n  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8(CVE-2023-52637)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nKVM: s390: vsie: fix race during shadow creation\r\n\r\nRight now it is possible to see gmap->private being zero in\nkvm_s390_vsie_gmap_notifier resulting in a crash.  This is due to the\nfact that we add gmap->private == kvm after creation:\r\n\r\nstatic int acquire_gmap_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,\n                               struct vsie_page *vsie_page)\n{\n[...]\n        gmap = gmap_shadow(vcpu->arch.gmap, asce, edat);\n        if (IS_ERR(gmap))\n                return PTR_ERR(gmap);\n        gmap->private = vcpu->kvm;\r\n\r\nLet children inherit the private field of the parent.(CVE-2023-52639)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nwifi: b43: Stop/wake correct queue in DMA Tx path when QoS is disabled\r\n\r\nWhen QoS is disabled, the queue priority value will not map to the correct\nieee80211 queue since there is only one queue. Stop/wake queue 0 when QoS\nis disabled to prevent trying to stop/wake a non-existent queue and failing\nto stop/wake the actual queue instantiated.\r\n\r\nLog of issue before change (with kernel parameter qos=0):\n    [  +5.112651] ------------[ cut here ]------------\n    [  +0.000005] WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 25513 at net/mac80211/util.c:449 __ieee80211_wake_queue+0xd5/0x180 [mac80211]\n    [  +0.000067] Modules linked in: b43(O) snd_seq_dummy snd_hrtimer snd_seq snd_seq_device nft_chain_nat xt_MASQUERADE nf_nat xfrm_user xfrm_algo xt_addrtype overlay ccm af_packet amdgpu snd_hda_codec_cirrus snd_hda_codec_generic ledtrig_audio drm_exec amdxcp gpu_sched xt_conntrack nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip6t_rpfilter ipt_rpfilter xt_pkttype xt_LOG nf_log_syslog xt_tcpudp nft_compat nf_tables nfnetlink sch_fq_codel btusb uinput iTCO_wdt ctr btrtl intel_pmc_bxt i915 intel_rapl_msr mei_hdcp mei_pxp joydev at24 watchdog btintel atkbd libps2 serio radeon btbcm vivaldi_fmap btmtk intel_rapl_common snd_hda_codec_hdmi bluetooth uvcvideo nls_iso8859_1 applesmc nls_cp437 x86_pkg_temp_thermal snd_hda_intel intel_powerclamp vfat videobuf2_vmalloc coretemp fat snd_intel_dspcfg crc32_pclmul uvc polyval_clmulni snd_intel_sdw_acpi loop videobuf2_memops snd_hda_codec tun drm_suballoc_helper polyval_generic drm_ttm_helper drm_buddy tap ecdh_generic videobuf2_v4l2 gf128mul macvlan ttm ghash_clmulni_intel ecc tg3\n    [  +0.000044]  videodev bridge snd_hda_core rapl crc16 drm_display_helper cec mousedev snd_hwdep evdev intel_cstate bcm5974 hid_appleir videobuf2_common stp mac_hid libphy snd_pcm drm_kms_helper acpi_als mei_me intel_uncore llc mc snd_timer intel_gtt industrialio_triggered_buffer apple_mfi_fastcharge i2c_i801 mei snd lpc_ich agpgart ptp i2c_smbus thunderbolt apple_gmux i2c_algo_bit kfifo_buf video industrialio soundcore pps_core wmi tiny_power_button sbs sbshc button ac cordic bcma mac80211 cfg80211 ssb rfkill libarc4 kvm_intel kvm drm irqbypass fuse backlight firmware_class efi_pstore configfs efivarfs dmi_sysfs ip_tables x_tables autofs4 dm_crypt cbc encrypted_keys trusted asn1_encoder tee tpm rng_core input_leds hid_apple led_class hid_generic usbhid hid sd_mod t10_pi crc64_rocksoft crc64 crc_t10dif crct10dif_generic ahci libahci libata uhci_hcd ehci_pci ehci_hcd crct10dif_pclmul crct10dif_common sha512_ssse3 sha512_generic sha256_ssse3 sha1_ssse3 aesni_intel usbcore scsi_mod libaes crypto_simd cryptd scsi_common\n    [  +0.000055]  usb_common rtc_cmos btrfs blake2b_generic libcrc32c crc32c_generic crc32c_intel xor raid6_pq dm_snapshot dm_bufio dm_mod dax [last unloaded: b43(O)]\n    [  +0.000009] CPU: 7 PID: 25513 Comm: irq/17-b43 Tainted: G        W  O       6.6.7 #1-NixOS\n    [  +0.000003] Hardware name: Apple Inc. MacBookPro8,3/Mac-942459F5819B171B, BIOS 87.0.0.0.0 06/13/2019\n    [  +0.000001] RIP: 0010:__ieee80211_wake_queue+0xd5/0x180 [mac80211]\n    [  +0.000046] Code: 00 45 85 e4 0f 85 9b 00 00 00 48 8d bd 40 09 00 00 f0 48 0f ba ad 48 09 00 00 00 72 0f 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e e9 cb 6d 3c d0 <0f> 0b 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e c3 cc cc cc cc 48 8d b4 16 94 00 00\n    [  +0.000002] RSP: 0018:ffffc90003c77d60 EFLAGS: 00010097\n    [  +0.000001] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 0000000000000000\n    [  +0.000001] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: ffff88820b924900\n    [  +0.000002] RBP: ffff88820b924900 R08: ffffc90003c77d90 R09: 000000000003bfd0\n    [  +0.000001] R10: ffff88820b924900 R11: ffffc90003c77c68 R12: 0000000000000000\n    [  +0.000001] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffc90003c77d90 R15: ffffffffc0fa6f40\n    [  +0.000001] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88846fb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\n    [  +0.000001] CS:  0010 DS: 0\n---truncated---(CVE-2023-52644)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nusb: aqc111: check packet for fixup for true limit\r\n\r\nIf a device sends a packet that is inbetween 0\nand sizeof(u64) the value passed to skb_trim()\nas length will wrap around ending up as some very\nlarge value.\r\n\r\nThe driver will then proceed to parse the header\nlocated at that position, which will either oops or\nprocess some random value.\r\n\r\nThe fix is to check against sizeof(u64) rather than\n0, which the driver currently does. The issue exists\nsince the introduction of the driver.(CVE-2023-52655)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\npowerpc/imc-pmu: Add a null pointer check in update_events_in_group()\r\n\r\nkasprintf() returns a pointer to dynamically allocated memory\nwhich can be NULL upon failure.(CVE-2023-52675)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nbpf: Guard stack limits against 32bit overflow\r\n\r\nThis patch promotes the arithmetic around checking stack bounds to be\ndone in the 64-bit domain, instead of the current 32bit. The arithmetic\nimplies adding together a 64-bit register with a int offset. The\nregister was checked to be below 1<<29 when it was variable, but not\nwhen it was fixed. The offset either comes from an instruction (in which\ncase it is 16 bit), from another register (in which case the caller\nchecked it to be below 1<<29 [1]), or from the size of an argument to a\nkfunc (in which case it can be a u32 [2]). Between the register being\ninconsistently checked to be below 1<<29, and the offset being up to an\nu32, it appears that we were open to overflowing the `int`s which were\ncurrently used for arithmetic.\r\n\r\n[1] https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/815fb87b753055df2d9e50f6cd80eb10235fe3e9/kernel/bpf/verifier.c#L7494-L7498\n[2] https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/815fb87b753055df2d9e50f6cd80eb10235fe3e9/kernel/bpf/verifier.c#L11904(CVE-2023-52676)\r\n\r\n\r\nA race condition was found in the Linux kernel's bluetooth device driver in {min,max}_key_size_set() function. This can result in a null pointer dereference issue, possibly leading to a kernel panic or denial of service issue.\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\n(CVE-2024-24860)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nwifi: iwlwifi: fix a memory corruption\r\n\r\niwl_fw_ini_trigger_tlv::data is a pointer to a __le32, which means that\nif we copy to iwl_fw_ini_trigger_tlv::data + offset while offset is in\nbytes, we'll write past the buffer.(CVE-2024-26610)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nip6_tunnel: fix NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT handling in ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim()\r\n\r\nsyzbot pointed out [1] that NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT handling is broken.\r\n\r\nReading frag_off can only be done if we pulled enough bytes\nto skb->head. Currently we might access garbage.\r\n\r\n[1]\nBUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim+0x94f/0xbb0\nip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim+0x94f/0xbb0\nipxip6_tnl_xmit net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:1326 [inline]\nip6_tnl_start_xmit+0xab2/0x1a70 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:1432\n__netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4940 [inline]\nnetdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4954 [inline]\nxmit_one net/core/dev.c:3548 [inline]\ndev_hard_start_xmit+0x247/0xa10 net/core/dev.c:3564\n__dev_queue_xmit+0x33b8/0x5130 net/core/dev.c:4349\ndev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3134 [inline]\nneigh_connected_output+0x569/0x660 net/core/neighbour.c:1592\nneigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:542 [inline]\nip6_finish_output2+0x23a9/0x2b30 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:137\nip6_finish_output+0x855/0x12b0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:222\nNF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:303 [inline]\nip6_output+0x323/0x610 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:243\ndst_output include/net/dst.h:451 [inline]\nip6_local_out+0xe9/0x140 net/ipv6/output_core.c:155\nip6_send_skb net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1952 [inline]\nip6_push_pending_frames+0x1f9/0x560 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1972\nrawv6_push_pending_frames+0xbe8/0xdf0 net/ipv6/raw.c:582\nrawv6_sendmsg+0x2b66/0x2e70 net/ipv6/raw.c:920\ninet_sendmsg+0x105/0x190 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:847\nsock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]\n__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]\n____sys_sendmsg+0x9c2/0xd60 net/socket.c:2584\n___sys_sendmsg+0x28d/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2638\n__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2667 [inline]\n__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2676 [inline]\n__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline]\n__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x490 net/socket.c:2674\ndo_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]\ndo_syscall_64+0x44/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83\nentry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b\r\n\r\nUninit was created at:\nslab_post_alloc_hook+0x129/0xa70 mm/slab.h:768\nslab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3478 [inline]\n__kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x5c9/0x970 mm/slub.c:3517\n__do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:1006 [inline]\n__kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x118/0x3c0 mm/slab_common.c:1027\nkmalloc_reserve+0x249/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:582\npskb_expand_head+0x226/0x1a00 net/core/skbuff.c:2098\n__pskb_pull_tail+0x13b/0x2310 net/core/skbuff.c:2655\npskb_may_pull_reason include/linux/skbuff.h:2673 [inline]\npskb_may_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2681 [inline]\nip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim+0x901/0xbb0 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:408\nipxip6_tnl_xmit net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:1326 [inline]\nip6_tnl_start_xmit+0xab2/0x1a70 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:1432\n__netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4940 [inline]\nnetdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4954 [inline]\nxmit_one net/core/dev.c:3548 [inline]\ndev_hard_start_xmit+0x247/0xa10 net/core/dev.c:3564\n__dev_queue_xmit+0x33b8/0x5130 net/core/dev.c:4349\ndev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3134 [inline]\nneigh_connected_output+0x569/0x660 net/core/neighbour.c:1592\nneigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:542 [inline]\nip6_finish_output2+0x23a9/0x2b30 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:137\nip6_finish_output+0x855/0x12b0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:222\nNF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:303 [inline]\nip6_output+0x323/0x610 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:243\ndst_output include/net/dst.h:451 [inline]\nip6_local_out+0xe9/0x140 net/ipv6/output_core.c:155\nip6_send_skb net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1952 [inline]\nip6_push_pending_frames+0x1f9/0x560 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1972\nrawv6_push_pending_frames+0xbe8/0xdf0 net/ipv6/raw.c:582\nrawv6_sendmsg+0x2b66/0x2e70 net/ipv6/raw.c:920\ninet_sendmsg+0x105/0x190 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:847\nsock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]\n__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]\n____sys_sendmsg+0x9c2/0xd60 net/socket.c:2584\n___sys_sendmsg+0x28d/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2638\n__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2667 [inline]\n__do_sys_sendms\n---truncated---(CVE-2024-26633)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nllc: Drop support for ETH_P_TR_802_2.\r\n\r\nsyzbot reported an uninit-value bug below. [0]\r\n\r\nllc supports ETH_P_802_2 (0x0004) and used to support ETH_P_TR_802_2\n(0x0011), and syzbot abused the latter to trigger the bug.\r\n\r\n  write$tun(r0, &(0x7f0000000040)={@val={0x0, 0x11}, @val, @mpls={[], @llc={@snap={0xaa, 0x1, ')', \"90e5dd\"}}}}, 0x16)\r\n\r\nllc_conn_handler() initialises local variables {saddr,daddr}.mac\nbased on skb in llc_pdu_decode_sa()/llc_pdu_decode_da() and passes\nthem to __llc_lookup().\r\n\r\nHowever, the initialisation is done only when skb->protocol is\nhtons(ETH_P_802_2), otherwise, __llc_lookup_established() and\n__llc_lookup_listener() will read garbage.\r\n\r\nThe missing initialisation existed prior to commit 211ed865108e\n(\"net: delete all instances of special processing for token ring\").\r\n\r\nIt removed the part to kick out the token ring stuff but forgot to\nclose the door allowing ETH_P_TR_802_2 packets to sneak into llc_rcv().\r\n\r\nLet's remove llc_tr_packet_type and complete the deprecation.\r\n\r\n[0]:\nBUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __llc_lookup_established+0xe9d/0xf90\n __llc_lookup_established+0xe9d/0xf90\n __llc_lookup net/llc/llc_conn.c:611 [inline]\n llc_conn_handler+0x4bd/0x1360 net/llc/llc_conn.c:791\n llc_rcv+0xfbb/0x14a0 net/llc/llc_input.c:206\n __netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5527 [inline]\n __netif_receive_skb+0x1a6/0x5a0 net/core/dev.c:5641\n netif_receive_skb_internal net/core/dev.c:5727 [inline]\n netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x660 net/core/dev.c:5786\n tun_rx_batched+0x3ee/0x980 drivers/net/tun.c:1555\n tun_get_user+0x53af/0x66d0 drivers/net/tun.c:2002\n tun_chr_write_iter+0x3af/0x5d0 drivers/net/tun.c:2048\n call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2020 [inline]\n new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:491 [inline]\n vfs_write+0x8ef/0x1490 fs/read_write.c:584\n ksys_write+0x20f/0x4c0 fs/read_write.c:637\n __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:649 [inline]\n __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:646 [inline]\n __x64_sys_write+0x93/0xd0 fs/read_write.c:646\n do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]\n do_syscall_64+0x44/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b\r\n\r\nLocal variable daddr created at:\n llc_conn_handler+0x53/0x1360 net/llc/llc_conn.c:783\n llc_rcv+0xfbb/0x14a0 net/llc/llc_input.c:206\r\n\r\nCPU: 1 PID: 5004 Comm: syz-executor994 Not tainted 6.6.0-syzkaller-14500-g1c41041124bd #0\nHardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/09/2023(CVE-2024-26635)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nllc: make llc_ui_sendmsg() more robust against bonding changes\r\n\r\nsyzbot was able to trick llc_ui_sendmsg(), allocating an skb with no\nheadroom, but subsequently trying to push 14 bytes of Ethernet header [1]\r\n\r\nLike some others, llc_ui_sendmsg() releases the socket lock before\ncalling sock_alloc_send_skb().\nThen it acquires it again, but does not redo all the sanity checks\nthat were performed.\r\n\r\nThis fix:\r\n\r\n- Uses LL_RESERVED_SPACE() to reserve space.\n- Check all conditions again after socket lock is held again.\n- Do not account Ethernet header for mtu limitation.\r\n\r\n[1]\r\n\r\nskbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffff800088baa334 len:1514 put:14 head:ffff0000c9c37000 data:ffff0000c9c36ff2 tail:0x5dc end:0x6c0 dev:bond0\r\n\r\n kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:193 !\nInternal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP\nModules linked in:\nCPU: 0 PID: 6875 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.7.0-rc8-syzkaller-00101-g0802e17d9aca-dirty #0\nHardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/17/2023\npstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)\n pc : skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:189 [inline]\n pc : skb_under_panic+0x13c/0x140 net/core/skbuff.c:203\n lr : skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:189 [inline]\n lr : skb_under_panic+0x13c/0x140 net/core/skbuff.c:203\nsp : ffff800096f97000\nx29: ffff800096f97010 x28: ffff80008cc8d668 x27: dfff800000000000\nx26: ffff0000cb970c90 x25: 00000000000005dc x24: ffff0000c9c36ff2\nx23: ffff0000c9c37000 x22: 00000000000005ea x21: 00000000000006c0\nx20: 000000000000000e x19: ffff800088baa334 x18: 1fffe000368261ce\nx17: ffff80008e4ed000 x16: ffff80008a8310f8 x15: 0000000000000001\nx14: 1ffff00012df2d58 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000\nx11: 0000000000000001 x10: 0000000000ff0100 x9 : e28a51f1087e8400\nx8 : e28a51f1087e8400 x7 : ffff80008028f8d0 x6 : 0000000000000000\nx5 : 0000000000000001 x4 : 0000000000000001 x3 : ffff800082b78714\nx2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 0000000100000000 x0 : 0000000000000089\nCall trace:\n  skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:189 [inline]\n  skb_under_panic+0x13c/0x140 net/core/skbuff.c:203\n  skb_push+0xf0/0x108 net/core/skbuff.c:2451\n  eth_header+0x44/0x1f8 net/ethernet/eth.c:83\n  dev_hard_header include/linux/netdevice.h:3188 [inline]\n  llc_mac_hdr_init+0x110/0x17c net/llc/llc_output.c:33\n  llc_sap_action_send_xid_c+0x170/0x344 net/llc/llc_s_ac.c:85\n  llc_exec_sap_trans_actions net/llc/llc_sap.c:153 [inline]\n  llc_sap_next_state net/llc/llc_sap.c:182 [inline]\n  llc_sap_state_process+0x1ec/0x774 net/llc/llc_sap.c:209\n  llc_build_and_send_xid_pkt+0x12c/0x1c0 net/llc/llc_sap.c:270\n  llc_ui_sendmsg+0x7bc/0xb1c net/llc/af_llc.c:997\n  sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]\n  __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]\n  sock_sendmsg+0x194/0x274 net/socket.c:767\n  splice_to_socket+0x7cc/0xd58 fs/splice.c:881\n  do_splice_from fs/splice.c:933 [inline]\n  direct_splice_actor+0xe4/0x1c0 fs/splice.c:1142\n  splice_direct_to_actor+0x2a0/0x7e4 fs/splice.c:1088\n  do_splice_direct+0x20c/0x348 fs/splice.c:1194\n  do_sendfile+0x4bc/0xc70 fs/read_write.c:1254\n  __do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1322 [inline]\n  __se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1308 [inline]\n  __arm64_sys_sendfile64+0x160/0x3b4 fs/read_write.c:1308\n  __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:37 [inline]\n  invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2b8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:51\n  el0_svc_common+0x130/0x23c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:136\n  do_el0_svc+0x48/0x58 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:155\n  el0_svc+0x54/0x158 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:678\n  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:696\n  el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:595\nCode: aa1803e6 aa1903e7 a90023f5 94792f6a (d4210000)(CVE-2024-26636)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ntcp: add sanity checks to rx zerocopy\r\n\r\nTCP rx zerocopy intent is to map pages initially allocated\nfrom NIC drivers, not pages owned by a fs.\r\n\r\nThis patch adds to can_map_frag() these additional checks:\r\n\r\n- Page must not be a compound one.\n- page->mapping must be NULL.\r\n\r\nThis fixes the panic reported by ZhangPeng.\r\n\r\nsyzbot was able to loopback packets built with sendfile(),\nmapping pages owned by an ext4 file to TCP rx zerocopy.\r\n\r\nr3 = socket$inet_tcp(0x2, 0x1, 0x0)\nmmap(&(0x7f0000ff9000/0x4000)=nil, 0x4000, 0x0, 0x12, r3, 0x0)\nr4 = socket$inet_tcp(0x2, 0x1, 0x0)\nbind$inet(r4, &(0x7f0000000000)={0x2, 0x4e24, @multicast1}, 0x10)\nconnect$inet(r4, &(0x7f00000006c0)={0x2, 0x4e24, @empty}, 0x10)\nr5 = openat$dir(0xffffffffffffff9c, &(0x7f00000000c0)='./file0\\x00',\n    0x181e42, 0x0)\nfallocate(r5, 0x0, 0x0, 0x85b8)\nsendfile(r4, r5, 0x0, 0x8ba0)\ngetsockopt$inet_tcp_TCP_ZEROCOPY_RECEIVE(r4, 0x6, 0x23,\n    &(0x7f00000001c0)={&(0x7f0000ffb000/0x3000)=nil, 0x3000, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0,\n    0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0}, &(0x7f0000000440)=0x40)\nr6 = openat$dir(0xffffffffffffff9c, &(0x7f00000000c0)='./file0\\x00',\n    0x181e42, 0x0)(CVE-2024-26640)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nip6_tunnel: make sure to pull inner header in __ip6_tnl_rcv()\r\n\r\nsyzbot found __ip6_tnl_rcv() could access unitiliazed data [1].\r\n\r\nCall pskb_inet_may_pull() to fix this, and initialize ipv6h\nvariable after this call as it can change skb->head.\r\n\r\n[1]\n BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __INET_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:253 [inline]\n BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in INET_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:275 [inline]\n BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in IP6_ECN_decapsulate+0x7df/0x1e50 include/net/inet_ecn.h:321\n  __INET_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:253 [inline]\n  INET_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:275 [inline]\n  IP6_ECN_decapsulate+0x7df/0x1e50 include/net/inet_ecn.h:321\n  ip6ip6_dscp_ecn_decapsulate+0x178/0x1b0 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:727\n  __ip6_tnl_rcv+0xd4e/0x1590 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:845\n  ip6_tnl_rcv+0xce/0x100 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:888\n gre_rcv+0x143f/0x1870\n  ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0xda6/0x2a60 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:438\n  ip6_input_finish net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:483 [inline]\n  NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline]\n  ip6_input+0x15d/0x430 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:492\n  ip6_mc_input+0xa7e/0xc80 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:586\n  dst_input include/net/dst.h:461 [inline]\n  ip6_rcv_finish+0x5db/0x870 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:79\n  NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline]\n  ipv6_rcv+0xda/0x390 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:310\n  __netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5532 [inline]\n  __netif_receive_skb+0x1a6/0x5a0 net/core/dev.c:5646\n  netif_receive_skb_internal net/core/dev.c:5732 [inline]\n  netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x660 net/core/dev.c:5791\n  tun_rx_batched+0x3ee/0x980 drivers/net/tun.c:1555\n  tun_get_user+0x53af/0x66d0 drivers/net/tun.c:2002\n  tun_chr_write_iter+0x3af/0x5d0 drivers/net/tun.c:2048\n  call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2084 [inline]\n  new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:497 [inline]\n  vfs_write+0x786/0x1200 fs/read_write.c:590\n  ksys_write+0x20f/0x4c0 fs/read_write.c:643\n  __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:655 [inline]\n  __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:652 [inline]\n  __x64_sys_write+0x93/0xd0 fs/read_write.c:652\n  do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]\n  do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b\r\n\r\nUninit was created at:\n  slab_post_alloc_hook+0x129/0xa70 mm/slab.h:768\n  slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3478 [inline]\n  kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x5e9/0xb10 mm/slub.c:3523\n  kmalloc_reserve+0x13d/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:560\n  __alloc_skb+0x318/0x740 net/core/skbuff.c:651\n  alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1286 [inline]\n  alloc_skb_with_frags+0xc8/0xbd0 net/core/skbuff.c:6334\n  sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xa80/0xbf0 net/core/sock.c:2787\n  tun_alloc_skb drivers/net/tun.c:1531 [inline]\n  tun_get_user+0x1e8a/0x66d0 drivers/net/tun.c:1846\n  tun_chr_write_iter+0x3af/0x5d0 drivers/net/tun.c:2048\n  call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2084 [inline]\n  new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:497 [inline]\n  vfs_write+0x786/0x1200 fs/read_write.c:590\n  ksys_write+0x20f/0x4c0 fs/read_write.c:643\n  __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:655 [inline]\n  __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:652 [inline]\n  __x64_sys_write+0x93/0xd0 fs/read_write.c:652\n  do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]\n  do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b\r\n\r\nCPU: 0 PID: 5034 Comm: syz-executor331 Not tainted 6.7.0-syzkaller-00562-g9f8413c4a66f #0\nHardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/17/2023(CVE-2024-26641)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnetfilter: nf_tables: disallow anonymous set with timeout flag\r\n\r\nAnonymous sets are never used with timeout from userspace, reject this.\nException to this rule is NFT_SET_EVAL to ensure legacy meters still work.(CVE-2024-26642)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ntracing: Ensure visibility when inserting an element into tracing_map\r\n\r\nRunning the following two commands in parallel on a multi-processor\nAArch64 machine can sporadically produce an unexpected warning about\nduplicate histogram entries:\r\n\r\n $ while true; do\n     echo hist:key=id.syscall:val=hitcount > \\\n       /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/raw_syscalls/sys_enter/trigger\n     cat /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/raw_syscalls/sys_enter/hist\n     sleep 0.001\n   done\n $ stress-ng --sysbadaddr $(nproc)\r\n\r\nThe warning looks as follows:\r\n\r\n[ 2911.172474] ------------[ cut here ]------------\n[ 2911.173111] Duplicates detected: 1\n[ 2911.173574] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 12247 at kernel/trace/tracing_map.c:983 tracing_map_sort_entries+0x3e0/0x408\n[ 2911.174702] Modules linked in: iscsi_ibft(E) iscsi_boot_sysfs(E) rfkill(E) af_packet(E) nls_iso8859_1(E) nls_cp437(E) vfat(E) fat(E) ena(E) tiny_power_button(E) qemu_fw_cfg(E) button(E) fuse(E) efi_pstore(E) ip_tables(E) x_tables(E) xfs(E) libcrc32c(E) aes_ce_blk(E) aes_ce_cipher(E) crct10dif_ce(E) polyval_ce(E) polyval_generic(E) ghash_ce(E) gf128mul(E) sm4_ce_gcm(E) sm4_ce_ccm(E) sm4_ce(E) sm4_ce_cipher(E) sm4(E) sm3_ce(E) sm3(E) sha3_ce(E) sha512_ce(E) sha512_arm64(E) sha2_ce(E) sha256_arm64(E) nvme(E) sha1_ce(E) nvme_core(E) nvme_auth(E) t10_pi(E) sg(E) scsi_mod(E) scsi_common(E) efivarfs(E)\n[ 2911.174738] Unloaded tainted modules: cppc_cpufreq(E):1\n[ 2911.180985] CPU: 2 PID: 12247 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded Tainted: G            E      6.7.0-default #2 1b58bbb22c97e4399dc09f92d309344f69c44a01\n[ 2911.182398] Hardware name: Amazon EC2 c7g.8xlarge/, BIOS 1.0 11/1/2018\n[ 2911.183208] pstate: 61400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)\n[ 2911.184038] pc : tracing_map_sort_entries+0x3e0/0x408\n[ 2911.184667] lr : tracing_map_sort_entries+0x3e0/0x408\n[ 2911.185310] sp : ffff8000a1513900\n[ 2911.185750] x29: ffff8000a1513900 x28: ffff0003f272fe80 x27: 0000000000000001\n[ 2911.186600] x26: ffff0003f272fe80 x25: 0000000000000030 x24: 0000000000000008\n[ 2911.187458] x23: ffff0003c5788000 x22: ffff0003c16710c8 x21: ffff80008017f180\n[ 2911.188310] x20: ffff80008017f000 x19: ffff80008017f180 x18: ffffffffffffffff\n[ 2911.189160] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: ffff8000a15134b8\n[ 2911.190015] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 205d373432323154 x12: 5b5d313131333731\n[ 2911.190844] x11: 00000000fffeffff x10: 00000000fffeffff x9 : ffffd1b78274a13c\n[ 2911.191716] x8 : 000000000017ffe8 x7 : c0000000fffeffff x6 : 000000000057ffa8\n[ 2911.192554] x5 : ffff0012f6c24ec0 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : ffff2e5b72b5d000\n[ 2911.193404] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff0003ff254480\n[ 2911.194259] Call trace:\n[ 2911.194626]  tracing_map_sort_entries+0x3e0/0x408\n[ 2911.195220]  hist_show+0x124/0x800\n[ 2911.195692]  seq_read_iter+0x1d4/0x4e8\n[ 2911.196193]  seq_read+0xe8/0x138\n[ 2911.196638]  vfs_read+0xc8/0x300\n[ 2911.197078]  ksys_read+0x70/0x108\n[ 2911.197534]  __arm64_sys_read+0x24/0x38\n[ 2911.198046]  invoke_syscall+0x78/0x108\n[ 2911.198553]  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xd0/0xf8\n[ 2911.199157]  do_el0_svc+0x28/0x40\n[ 2911.199613]  el0_svc+0x40/0x178\n[ 2911.200048]  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x13c/0x158\n[ 2911.200621]  el0t_64_sync+0x1a8/0x1b0\n[ 2911.201115] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---\r\n\r\nThe problem appears to be caused by CPU reordering of writes issued from\n__tracing_map_insert().\r\n\r\nThe check for the presence of an element with a given key in this\nfunction is:\r\n\r\n val = READ_ONCE(entry->val);\n if (val && keys_match(key, val->key, map->key_size)) ...\r\n\r\nThe write of a new entry is:\r\n\r\n elt = get_free_elt(map);\n memcpy(elt->key, key, map->key_size);\n entry->val = elt;\r\n\r\nThe \"memcpy(elt->key, key, map->key_size);\" and \"entry->val = elt;\"\nstores may become visible in the reversed order on another CPU. This\nsecond CPU might then incorrectly determine that a new key doesn't match\nan already present val->key and subse\n---truncated---(CVE-2024-26645)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ndrm/amd/display: Add NULL test for 'timing generator' in 'dcn21_set_pipe()'\r\n\r\nIn \"u32 otg_inst = pipe_ctx->stream_res.tg->inst;\"\npipe_ctx->stream_res.tg could be NULL, it is relying on the caller to\nensure the tg is not NULL.(CVE-2024-26661)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ntunnels: fix out of bounds access when building IPv6 PMTU error\r\n\r\nIf the ICMPv6 error is built from a non-linear skb we get the following\nsplat,\r\n\r\n  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in do_csum+0x220/0x240\n  Read of size 4 at addr ffff88811d402c80 by task netperf/820\n  CPU: 0 PID: 820 Comm: netperf Not tainted 6.8.0-rc1+ #543\n  ...\n   kasan_report+0xd8/0x110\n   do_csum+0x220/0x240\n   csum_partial+0xc/0x20\n   skb_tunnel_check_pmtu+0xeb9/0x3280\n   vxlan_xmit_one+0x14c2/0x4080\n   vxlan_xmit+0xf61/0x5c00\n   dev_hard_start_xmit+0xfb/0x510\n   __dev_queue_xmit+0x7cd/0x32a0\n   br_dev_queue_push_xmit+0x39d/0x6a0\r\n\r\nUse skb_checksum instead of csum_partial who cannot deal with non-linear\nSKBs.(CVE-2024-26665)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnetfilter: nft_limit: reject configurations that cause integer overflow\r\n\r\nReject bogus configs where internal token counter wraps around.\nThis only occurs with very very large requests, such as 17gbyte/s.\r\n\r\nIts better to reject this rather than having incorrect ratelimit.(CVE-2024-26668)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnet/sched: flower: Fix chain template offload\r\n\r\nWhen a qdisc is deleted from a net device the stack instructs the\nunderlying driver to remove its flow offload callback from the\nassociated filter block using the 'FLOW_BLOCK_UNBIND' command. The stack\nthen continues to replay the removal of the filters in the block for\nthis driver by iterating over the chains in the block and invoking the\n'reoffload' operation of the classifier being used. In turn, the\nclassifier in its 'reoffload' operation prepares and emits a\n'FLOW_CLS_DESTROY' command for each filter.\r\n\r\nHowever, the stack does not do the same for chain templates and the\nunderlying driver never receives a 'FLOW_CLS_TMPLT_DESTROY' command when\na qdisc is deleted. This results in a memory leak [1] which can be\nreproduced using [2].\r\n\r\nFix by introducing a 'tmplt_reoffload' operation and have the stack\ninvoke it with the appropriate arguments as part of the replay.\nImplement the operation in the sole classifier that supports chain\ntemplates (flower) by emitting the 'FLOW_CLS_TMPLT_{CREATE,DESTROY}'\ncommand based on whether a flow offload callback is being bound to a\nfilter block or being unbound from one.\r\n\r\nAs far as I can tell, the issue happens since cited commit which\nreordered tcf_block_offload_unbind() before tcf_block_flush_all_chains()\nin __tcf_block_put(). The order cannot be reversed as the filter block\nis expected to be freed after flushing all the chains.\r\n\r\n[1]\nunreferenced object 0xffff888107e28800 (size 2048):\n  comm \"tc\", pid 1079, jiffies 4294958525 (age 3074.287s)\n  hex dump (first 32 bytes):\n    b1 a6 7c 11 81 88 ff ff e0 5b b3 10 81 88 ff ff  ..|......[......\n    01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 e0 aa b0 84 ff ff ff ff  ................\n  backtrace:\n    [<ffffffff81c06a68>] __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1e8/0x320\n    [<ffffffff81ab374e>] __kmalloc+0x4e/0x90\n    [<ffffffff832aec6d>] mlxsw_sp_acl_ruleset_get+0x34d/0x7a0\n    [<ffffffff832bc195>] mlxsw_sp_flower_tmplt_create+0x145/0x180\n    [<ffffffff832b2e1a>] mlxsw_sp_flow_block_cb+0x1ea/0x280\n    [<ffffffff83a10613>] tc_setup_cb_call+0x183/0x340\n    [<ffffffff83a9f85a>] fl_tmplt_create+0x3da/0x4c0\n    [<ffffffff83a22435>] tc_ctl_chain+0xa15/0x1170\n    [<ffffffff838a863c>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x3cc/0xed0\n    [<ffffffff83ac87f0>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x170/0x440\n    [<ffffffff83ac6270>] netlink_unicast+0x540/0x820\n    [<ffffffff83ac6e28>] netlink_sendmsg+0x8d8/0xda0\n    [<ffffffff83793def>] ____sys_sendmsg+0x30f/0xa80\n    [<ffffffff8379d29a>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x13a/0x1e0\n    [<ffffffff8379d50c>] __sys_sendmsg+0x11c/0x1f0\n    [<ffffffff843b9ce0>] do_syscall_64+0x40/0xe0\nunreferenced object 0xffff88816d2c0400 (size 1024):\n  comm \"tc\", pid 1079, jiffies 4294958525 (age 3074.287s)\n  hex dump (first 32 bytes):\n    40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 57 f6 38 be 00 00 00 00  @.......W.8.....\n    10 04 2c 6d 81 88 ff ff 10 04 2c 6d 81 88 ff ff  ..,m......,m....\n  backtrace:\n    [<ffffffff81c06a68>] __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1e8/0x320\n    [<ffffffff81ab36c1>] __kmalloc_node+0x51/0x90\n    [<ffffffff81a8ed96>] kvmalloc_node+0xa6/0x1f0\n    [<ffffffff82827d03>] bucket_table_alloc.isra.0+0x83/0x460\n    [<ffffffff82828d2b>] rhashtable_init+0x43b/0x7c0\n    [<ffffffff832aed48>] mlxsw_sp_acl_ruleset_get+0x428/0x7a0\n    [<ffffffff832bc195>] mlxsw_sp_flower_tmplt_create+0x145/0x180\n    [<ffffffff832b2e1a>] mlxsw_sp_flow_block_cb+0x1ea/0x280\n    [<ffffffff83a10613>] tc_setup_cb_call+0x183/0x340\n    [<ffffffff83a9f85a>] fl_tmplt_create+0x3da/0x4c0\n    [<ffffffff83a22435>] tc_ctl_chain+0xa15/0x1170\n    [<ffffffff838a863c>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x3cc/0xed0\n    [<ffffffff83ac87f0>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x170/0x440\n    [<ffffffff83ac6270>] netlink_unicast+0x540/0x820\n    [<ffffffff83ac6e28>] netlink_sendmsg+0x8d8/0xda0\n    [<ffffffff83793def>] ____sys_sendmsg+0x30f/0xa80\r\n\r\n[2]\n # tc qdisc add dev swp1 clsact\n # tc chain add dev swp1 ingress proto ip chain 1 flower dst_ip 0.0.0.0/32\n # tc qdisc del dev\n---truncated---(CVE-2024-26669)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nppp_async: limit MRU to 64K\r\n\r\nsyzbot triggered a warning [1] in __alloc_pages():\r\n\r\nWARN_ON_ONCE_GFP(order > MAX_PAGE_ORDER, gfp)\r\n\r\nWillem fixed a similar issue in commit c0a2a1b0d631 (\"ppp: limit MRU to 64K\")\r\n\r\nAdopt the same sanity check for ppp_async_ioctl(PPPIOCSMRU)\r\n\r\n[1]:\r\n\r\n WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 11 at mm/page_alloc.c:4543 __alloc_pages+0x308/0x698 mm/page_alloc.c:4543\nModules linked in:\nCPU: 1 PID: 11 Comm: kworker/u4:0 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc2-syzkaller-g41bccc98fb79 #0\nHardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/17/2023\nWorkqueue: events_unbound flush_to_ldisc\npstate: 204000c5 (nzCv daIF +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)\n pc : __alloc_pages+0x308/0x698 mm/page_alloc.c:4543\n lr : __alloc_pages+0xc8/0x698 mm/page_alloc.c:4537\nsp : ffff800093967580\nx29: ffff800093967660 x28: ffff8000939675a0 x27: dfff800000000000\nx26: ffff70001272ceb4 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff8000939675c0\nx23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000060820 x21: 1ffff0001272ceb8\nx20: ffff8000939675e0 x19: 0000000000000010 x18: ffff800093967120\nx17: ffff800083bded5c x16: ffff80008ac97500 x15: 0000000000000005\nx14: 1ffff0001272cebc x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000\nx11: ffff70001272cec1 x10: 1ffff0001272cec0 x9 : 0000000000000001\nx8 : ffff800091c91000 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 000000000000003f\nx5 : 00000000ffffffff x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000020\nx2 : 0000000000000008 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff8000939675e0\nCall trace:\n  __alloc_pages+0x308/0x698 mm/page_alloc.c:4543\n  __alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:238 [inline]\n  alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:261 [inline]\n  __kmalloc_large_node+0xbc/0x1fc mm/slub.c:3926\n  __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:3969 [inline]\n  __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x418/0x620 mm/slub.c:4001\n  kmalloc_reserve+0x17c/0x23c net/core/skbuff.c:590\n  __alloc_skb+0x1c8/0x3d8 net/core/skbuff.c:651\n  __netdev_alloc_skb+0xb8/0x3e8 net/core/skbuff.c:715\n  netdev_alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:3235 [inline]\n  dev_alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:3248 [inline]\n  ppp_async_input drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:863 [inline]\n  ppp_asynctty_receive+0x588/0x186c drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:341\n  tty_ldisc_receive_buf+0x12c/0x15c drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c:390\n  tty_port_default_receive_buf+0x74/0xac drivers/tty/tty_port.c:37\n  receive_buf drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c:444 [inline]\n  flush_to_ldisc+0x284/0x6e4 drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c:494\n  process_one_work+0x694/0x1204 kernel/workqueue.c:2633\n  process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:2706 [inline]\n  worker_thread+0x938/0xef4 kernel/workqueue.c:2787\n  kthread+0x288/0x310 kernel/kthread.c:388\n  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:860(CVE-2024-26675)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ninet: read sk->sk_family once in inet_recv_error()\r\n\r\ninet_recv_error() is called without holding the socket lock.\r\n\r\nIPv6 socket could mutate to IPv4 with IPV6_ADDRFORM\nsocket option and trigger a KCSAN warning.(CVE-2024-26679)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnet: atlantic: Fix DMA mapping for PTP hwts ring\r\n\r\nFunction aq_ring_hwts_rx_alloc() maps extra AQ_CFG_RXDS_DEF bytes\nfor PTP HWTS ring but then generic aq_ring_free() does not take this\ninto account.\nCreate and use a specific function to free HWTS ring to fix this\nissue.\r\n\r\nTrace:\n[  215.351607] ------------[ cut here ]------------\n[  215.351612] DMA-API: atlantic 0000:4b:00.0: device driver frees DMA memory with different size [device address=0x00000000fbdd0000] [map size=34816 bytes] [unmap size=32768 bytes]\n[  215.351635] WARNING: CPU: 33 PID: 10759 at kernel/dma/debug.c:988 check_unmap+0xa6f/0x2360\n...\n[  215.581176] Call Trace:\n[  215.583632]  <TASK>\n[  215.585745]  ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df\n[  215.590114]  ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df\n[  215.594497]  ? debug_dma_free_coherent+0x196/0x210\n[  215.599305]  ? check_unmap+0xa6f/0x2360\n[  215.603147]  ? __warn+0xca/0x1d0\n[  215.606391]  ? check_unmap+0xa6f/0x2360\n[  215.610237]  ? report_bug+0x1ef/0x370\n[  215.613921]  ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70\n[  215.617423]  ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x50\n[  215.621269]  ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20\n[  215.625480]  ? check_unmap+0xa6f/0x2360\n[  215.629331]  ? mark_lock.part.0+0xca/0xa40\n[  215.633445]  debug_dma_free_coherent+0x196/0x210\n[  215.638079]  ? __pfx_debug_dma_free_coherent+0x10/0x10\n[  215.643242]  ? slab_free_freelist_hook+0x11d/0x1d0\n[  215.648060]  dma_free_attrs+0x6d/0x130\n[  215.651834]  aq_ring_free+0x193/0x290 [atlantic]\n[  215.656487]  aq_ptp_ring_free+0x67/0x110 [atlantic]\n...\n[  216.127540] ---[ end trace 6467e5964dd2640b ]---\n[  216.132160] DMA-API: Mapped at:\n[  216.132162]  debug_dma_alloc_coherent+0x66/0x2f0\n[  216.132165]  dma_alloc_attrs+0xf5/0x1b0\n[  216.132168]  aq_ring_hwts_rx_alloc+0x150/0x1f0 [atlantic]\n[  216.132193]  aq_ptp_ring_alloc+0x1bb/0x540 [atlantic]\n[  216.132213]  aq_nic_init+0x4a1/0x760 [atlantic](CVE-2024-26680)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnet: stmmac: xgmac: fix handling of DPP safety error for DMA channels\r\n\r\nCommit 56e58d6c8a56 (\"net: stmmac: Implement Safety Features in\nXGMAC core\") checks and reports safety errors, but leaves the\nData Path Parity Errors for each channel in DMA unhandled at all, lead to\na storm of interrupt.\nFix it by checking and clearing the DMA_DPP_Interrupt_Status register.(CVE-2024-26684)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnilfs2: fix potential bug in end_buffer_async_write\r\n\r\nAccording to a syzbot report, end_buffer_async_write(), which handles the\ncompletion of block device writes, may detect abnormal condition of the\nbuffer async_write flag and cause a BUG_ON failure when using nilfs2.\r\n\r\nNilfs2 itself does not use end_buffer_async_write().  But, the async_write\nflag is now used as a marker by commit 7f42ec394156 (\"nilfs2: fix issue\nwith race condition of competition between segments for dirty blocks\") as\na means of resolving double list insertion of dirty blocks in\nnilfs_lookup_dirty_data_buffers() and nilfs_lookup_node_buffers() and the\nresulting crash.\r\n\r\nThis modification is safe as long as it is used for file data and b-tree\nnode blocks where the page caches are independent.  However, it was\nirrelevant and redundant to also introduce async_write for segment summary\nand super root blocks that share buffers with the backing device.  This\nled to the possibility that the BUG_ON check in end_buffer_async_write\nwould fail as described above, if independent writebacks of the backing\ndevice occurred in parallel.\r\n\r\nThe use of async_write for segment summary buffers has already been\nremoved in a previous change.\r\n\r\nFix this issue by removing the manipulation of the async_write flag for\nthe remaining super root block buffer.(CVE-2024-26685)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nfs/proc: do_task_stat: use sig->stats_lock to gather the threads/children stats\r\n\r\nlock_task_sighand() can trigger a hard lockup.  If NR_CPUS threads call\ndo_task_stat() at the same time and the process has NR_THREADS, it will\nspin with irqs disabled O(NR_CPUS * NR_THREADS) time.\r\n\r\nChange do_task_stat() to use sig->stats_lock to gather the statistics\noutside of ->siglock protected section, in the likely case this code will\nrun lockless.(CVE-2024-26686)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nceph: prevent use-after-free in encode_cap_msg()\r\n\r\nIn fs/ceph/caps.c, in encode_cap_msg(), \"use after free\" error was\ncaught by KASAN at this line - 'ceph_buffer_get(arg->xattr_buf);'. This\nimplies before the refcount could be increment here, it was freed.\r\n\r\nIn same file, in \"handle_cap_grant()\" refcount is decremented by this\nline - 'ceph_buffer_put(ci->i_xattrs.blob);'. It appears that a race\noccurred and resource was freed by the latter line before the former\nline could increment it.\r\n\r\nencode_cap_msg() is called by __send_cap() and __send_cap() is called by\nceph_check_caps() after calling __prep_cap(). __prep_cap() is where\narg->xattr_buf is assigned to ci->i_xattrs.blob. This is the spot where\nthe refcount must be increased to prevent \"use after free\" error.(CVE-2024-26689)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnilfs2: fix data corruption in dsync block recovery for small block sizes\r\n\r\nThe helper function nilfs_recovery_copy_block() of\nnilfs_recovery_dsync_blocks(), which recovers data from logs created by\ndata sync writes during a mount after an unclean shutdown, incorrectly\ncalculates the on-page offset when copying repair data to the file's page\ncache.  In environments where the block size is smaller than the page\nsize, this flaw can cause data corruption and leak uninitialized memory\nbytes during the recovery process.\r\n\r\nFix these issues by correcting this byte offset calculation on the page.(CVE-2024-26697)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\niio: magnetometer: rm3100: add boundary check for the value read from RM3100_REG_TMRC\r\n\r\nRecently, we encounter kernel crash in function rm3100_common_probe\ncaused by out of bound access of array rm3100_samp_rates (because of\nunderlying hardware failures). Add boundary check to prevent out of\nbound access.(CVE-2024-26702)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nparisc: Fix random data corruption from exception handler\r\n\r\nThe current exception handler implementation, which assists when accessing\nuser space memory, may exhibit random data corruption if the compiler decides\nto use a different register than the specified register %r29 (defined in\nASM_EXCEPTIONTABLE_REG) for the error code. If the compiler choose another\nregister, the fault handler will nevertheless store -EFAULT into %r29 and thus\ntrash whatever this register is used for.\nLooking at the assembly I found that this happens sometimes in emulate_ldd().\r\n\r\nTo solve the issue, the easiest solution would be if it somehow is\npossible to tell the fault handler which register is used to hold the error\ncode. Using %0 or %1 in the inline assembly is not posssible as it will show\nup as e.g. %r29 (with the \"%r\" prefix), which the GNU assembler can not\nconvert to an integer.\r\n\r\nThis patch takes another, better and more flexible approach:\nWe extend the __ex_table (which is out of the execution path) by one 32-word.\nIn this word we tell the compiler to insert the assembler instruction\n\"or %r0,%r0,%reg\", where %reg references the register which the compiler\nchoosed for the error return code.\nIn case of an access failure, the fault handler finds the __ex_table entry and\ncan examine the opcode. The used register is encoded in the lowest 5 bits, and\nthe fault handler can then store -EFAULT into this register.\r\n\r\nSince we extend the __ex_table to 3 words we can't use the BUILDTIME_TABLE_SORT\nconfig option any longer.(CVE-2024-26706)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnet: hsr: remove WARN_ONCE() in send_hsr_supervision_frame()\r\n\r\nSyzkaller reported [1] hitting a warning after failing to allocate\nresources for skb in hsr_init_skb(). Since a WARN_ONCE() call will\nnot help much in this case, it might be prudent to switch to\nnetdev_warn_once(). At the very least it will suppress syzkaller\nreports such as [1].\r\n\r\nJust in case, use netdev_warn_once() in send_prp_supervision_frame()\nfor similar reasons.\r\n\r\n[1]\nHSR: Could not send supervision frame\nWARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 85 at net/hsr/hsr_device.c:294 send_hsr_supervision_frame+0x60a/0x810 net/hsr/hsr_device.c:294\nRIP: 0010:send_hsr_supervision_frame+0x60a/0x810 net/hsr/hsr_device.c:294\n...\nCall Trace:\n <IRQ>\n hsr_announce+0x114/0x370 net/hsr/hsr_device.c:382\n call_timer_fn+0x193/0x590 kernel/time/timer.c:1700\n expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1751 [inline]\n __run_timers+0x764/0xb20 kernel/time/timer.c:2022\n run_timer_softirq+0x58/0xd0 kernel/time/timer.c:2035\n __do_softirq+0x21a/0x8de kernel/softirq.c:553\n invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:427 [inline]\n __irq_exit_rcu kernel/softirq.c:632 [inline]\n irq_exit_rcu+0xb7/0x120 kernel/softirq.c:644\n sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x95/0xb0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1076\n </IRQ>\n <TASK>\n asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:649\n...\r\n\r\nThis issue is also found in older kernels (at least up to 5.10).(CVE-2024-26707)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\npowerpc/kasan: Fix addr error caused by page alignment\r\n\r\nIn kasan_init_region, when k_start is not page aligned, at the begin of\nfor loop, k_cur = k_start & PAGE_MASK is less than k_start, and then\n`va = block + k_cur - k_start` is less than block, the addr va is invalid,\nbecause the memory address space from va to block is not alloced by\nmemblock_alloc, which will not be reserved by memblock_reserve later, it\nwill be used by other places.\r\n\r\nAs a result, memory overwriting occurs.\r\n\r\nfor example:\nint __init __weak kasan_init_region(void *start, size_t size)\n{\n[...]\n\t/* if say block(dcd97000) k_start(feef7400) k_end(feeff3fe) */\n\tblock = memblock_alloc(k_end - k_start, PAGE_SIZE);\n\t[...]\n\tfor (k_cur = k_start & PAGE_MASK; k_cur < k_end; k_cur += PAGE_SIZE) {\n\t\t/* at the begin of for loop\n\t\t * block(dcd97000) va(dcd96c00) k_cur(feef7000) k_start(feef7400)\n\t\t * va(dcd96c00) is less than block(dcd97000), va is invalid\n\t\t */\n\t\tvoid *va = block + k_cur - k_start;\n\t\t[...]\n\t}\n[...]\n}\r\n\r\nTherefore, page alignment is performed on k_start before\nmemblock_alloc() to ensure the validity of the VA address.(CVE-2024-26712)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nmm/writeback: fix possible divide-by-zero in wb_dirty_limits(), again\r\n\r\n(struct dirty_throttle_control *)->thresh is an unsigned long, but is\npassed as the u32 divisor argument to div_u64().  On architectures where\nunsigned long is 64 bytes, the argument will be implicitly truncated.\r\n\r\nUse div64_u64() instead of div_u64() so that the value used in the \"is\nthis a safe division\" check is the same as the divisor.\r\n\r\nAlso, remove redundant cast of the numerator to u64, as that should happen\nimplicitly.\r\n\r\nThis would be difficult to exploit in memcg domain, given the ratio-based\narithmetic domain_drity_limits() uses, but is much easier in global\nwriteback domain with a BDI_CAP_STRICTLIMIT-backing device, using e.g. \nvm.dirty_bytes=(1<<32)*PAGE_SIZE so that dtc->thresh == (1<<32)(CVE-2024-26720)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nbtrfs: don't drop extent_map for free space inode on write error\r\n\r\nWhile running the CI for an unrelated change I hit the following panic\nwith generic/648 on btrfs_holes_spacecache.\r\n\r\nassertion failed: block_start != EXTENT_MAP_HOLE, in fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:1385\n------------[ cut here ]------------\nkernel BUG at fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:1385!\ninvalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI\nCPU: 1 PID: 2695096 Comm: fsstress Kdump: loaded Tainted: G        W          6.8.0-rc2+ #1\nRIP: 0010:__extent_writepage_io.constprop.0+0x4c1/0x5c0\nCall Trace:\n <TASK>\n extent_write_cache_pages+0x2ac/0x8f0\n extent_writepages+0x87/0x110\n do_writepages+0xd5/0x1f0\n filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x63/0x90\n __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x5c/0x80\n btrfs_fdatawrite_range+0x1f/0x50\n btrfs_write_out_cache+0x507/0x560\n btrfs_write_dirty_block_groups+0x32a/0x420\n commit_cowonly_roots+0x21b/0x290\n btrfs_commit_transaction+0x813/0x1360\n btrfs_sync_file+0x51a/0x640\n __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x52/0x90\n do_syscall_64+0x9c/0x190\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76\r\n\r\nThis happens because we fail to write out the free space cache in one\ninstance, come back around and attempt to write it again.  However on\nthe second pass through we go to call btrfs_get_extent() on the inode to\nget the extent mapping.  Because this is a new block group, and with the\nfree space inode we always search the commit root to avoid deadlocking\nwith the tree, we find nothing and return a EXTENT_MAP_HOLE for the\nrequested range.\r\n\r\nThis happens because the first time we try to write the space cache out\nwe hit an error, and on an error we drop the extent mapping.  This is\nnormal for normal files, but the free space cache inode is special.  We\nalways expect the extent map to be correct.  Thus the second time\nthrough we end up with a bogus extent map.\r\n\r\nSince we're deprecating this feature, the most straightforward way to\nfix this is to simply skip dropping the extent map range for this failed\nrange.\r\n\r\nI shortened the test by using error injection to stress the area to make\nit easier to reproduce.  With this patch in place we no longer panic\nwith my error injection test.(CVE-2024-26726)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\narp: Prevent overflow in arp_req_get().\r\n\r\nsyzkaller reported an overflown write in arp_req_get(). [0]\r\n\r\nWhen ioctl(SIOCGARP) is issued, arp_req_get() looks up an neighbour\nentry and copies neigh->ha to struct arpreq.arp_ha.sa_data.\r\n\r\nThe arp_ha here is struct sockaddr, not struct sockaddr_storage, so\nthe sa_data buffer is just 14 bytes.\r\n\r\nIn the splat below, 2 bytes are overflown to the next int field,\narp_flags.  We initialise the field just after the memcpy(), so it's\nnot a problem.\r\n\r\nHowever, when dev->addr_len is greater than 22 (e.g. MAX_ADDR_LEN),\narp_netmask is overwritten, which could be set as htonl(0xFFFFFFFFUL)\nin arp_ioctl() before calling arp_req_get().\r\n\r\nTo avoid the overflow, let's limit the max length of memcpy().\r\n\r\nNote that commit b5f0de6df6dc (\"net: dev: Convert sa_data to flexible\narray in struct sockaddr\") just silenced syzkaller.\r\n\r\n[0]:\nmemcpy: detected field-spanning write (size 16) of single field \"r->arp_ha.sa_data\" at net/ipv4/arp.c:1128 (size 14)\nWARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 144638 at net/ipv4/arp.c:1128 arp_req_get+0x411/0x4a0 net/ipv4/arp.c:1128\nModules linked in:\nCPU: 0 PID: 144638 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 6.1.74 #31\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-debian-1.16.0-5 04/01/2014\nRIP: 0010:arp_req_get+0x411/0x4a0 net/ipv4/arp.c:1128\nCode: fd ff ff e8 41 42 de fb b9 0e 00 00 00 4c 89 fe 48 c7 c2 20 6d ab 87 48 c7 c7 80 6d ab 87 c6 05 25 af 72 04 01 e8 5f 8d ad fb <0f> 0b e9 6c fd ff ff e8 13 42 de fb be 03 00 00 00 4c 89 e7 e8 a6\nRSP: 0018:ffffc900050b7998 EFLAGS: 00010286\nRAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88803a815000 RCX: 0000000000000000\nRDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8641a44a RDI: 0000000000000001\nRBP: ffffc900050b7a98 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000\nR10: 0000000000000000 R11: 203a7970636d656d R12: ffff888039c54000\nR13: 1ffff92000a16f37 R14: ffff88803a815084 R15: 0000000000000010\nFS:  00007f172bf306c0(0000) GS:ffff88805aa00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\nCS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\nCR2: 00007f172b3569f0 CR3: 0000000057f12005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0\nDR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000\nDR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400\nPKRU: 55555554\nCall Trace:\n <TASK>\n arp_ioctl+0x33f/0x4b0 net/ipv4/arp.c:1261\n inet_ioctl+0x314/0x3a0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:981\n sock_do_ioctl+0xdf/0x260 net/socket.c:1204\n sock_ioctl+0x3ef/0x650 net/socket.c:1321\n vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]\n __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:870 [inline]\n __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:856 [inline]\n __x64_sys_ioctl+0x18e/0x220 fs/ioctl.c:856\n do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]\n do_syscall_64+0x37/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x64/0xce\nRIP: 0033:0x7f172b262b8d\nCode: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48\nRSP: 002b:00007f172bf300b8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010\nRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f172b3abf80 RCX: 00007f172b262b8d\nRDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000000000008954 RDI: 0000000000000003\nRBP: 00007f172b2d3493 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000\nR10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000\nR13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007f172b3abf80 R15: 00007f172bf10000\n </TASK>(CVE-2024-26733)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ndevlink: fix possible use-after-free and memory leaks in devlink_init()\r\n\r\nThe pernet operations structure for the subsystem must be registered\nbefore registering the generic netlink family.\r\n\r\nMake an unregister in case of unsuccessful registration.(CVE-2024-26734)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nipv6: sr: fix possible use-after-free and null-ptr-deref\r\n\r\nThe pernet operations structure for the subsystem must be registered\nbefore registering the generic netlink family.(CVE-2024-26735)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnet/sched: act_mirred: use the backlog for mirred ingress\r\n\r\nThe test Davide added in commit ca22da2fbd69 (\"act_mirred: use the backlog\nfor nested calls to mirred ingress\") hangs our testing VMs every 10 or so\nruns, with the familiar tcp_v4_rcv -> tcp_v4_rcv deadlock reported by\nlockdep.\r\n\r\nThe problem as previously described by Davide (see Link) is that\nif we reverse flow of traffic with the redirect (egress -> ingress)\nwe may reach the same socket which generated the packet. And we may\nstill be holding its socket lock. The common solution to such deadlocks\nis to put the packet in the Rx backlog, rather than run the Rx path\ninline. Do that for all egress -> ingress reversals, not just once\nwe started to nest mirred calls.\r\n\r\nIn the past there was a concern that the backlog indirection will\nlead to loss of error reporting / less accurate stats. But the current\nworkaround does not seem to address the issue.(CVE-2024-26740)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nRDMA/qedr: Fix qedr_create_user_qp error flow\r\n\r\nAvoid the following warning by making sure to free the allocated\nresources in case that qedr_init_user_queue() fail.\r\n\r\n-----------[ cut here ]-----------\nWARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 143192 at drivers/infiniband/core/rdma_core.c:874 uverbs_destroy_ufile_hw+0xcf/0xf0 [ib_uverbs]\nModules linked in: tls target_core_user uio target_core_pscsi target_core_file target_core_iblock ib_srpt ib_srp scsi_transport_srp nfsd nfs_acl rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs lockd grace fscache netfs 8021q garp mrp stp llc ext4 mbcache jbd2 opa_vnic ib_umad ib_ipoib sunrpc rdma_ucm ib_isert iscsi_target_mod target_core_mod ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm hfi1 intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common mgag200 qedr sb_edac drm_shmem_helper rdmavt x86_pkg_temp_thermal drm_kms_helper intel_powerclamp ib_uverbs coretemp i2c_algo_bit kvm_intel dell_wmi_descriptor ipmi_ssif sparse_keymap kvm ib_core rfkill syscopyarea sysfillrect video sysimgblt irqbypass ipmi_si ipmi_devintf fb_sys_fops rapl iTCO_wdt mxm_wmi iTCO_vendor_support intel_cstate pcspkr dcdbas intel_uncore ipmi_msghandler lpc_ich acpi_power_meter mei_me mei fuse drm xfs libcrc32c qede sd_mod ahci libahci t10_pi sg crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel qed libata tg3\nghash_clmulni_intel megaraid_sas crc8 wmi [last unloaded: ib_srpt]\nCPU: 0 PID: 143192 Comm: fi_rdm_tagged_p Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.14.0-408.el9.x86_64 #1\nHardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R430/03XKDV, BIOS 2.14.0 01/25/2022\nRIP: 0010:uverbs_destroy_ufile_hw+0xcf/0xf0 [ib_uverbs]\nCode: 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e e9 0f 26 1b dd 48 89 df e8 67 6a ff ff 49 8b 86 10 01 00 00 48 85 c0 74 9c 4c 89 e7 e8 83 c0 cb dd eb 92 <0f> 0b eb be 0f 0b be 04 00 00 00 48 89 df e8 8e f5 ff ff e9 6d ff\nRSP: 0018:ffffb7c6cadfbc60 EFLAGS: 00010286\nRAX: ffff8f0889ee3f60 RBX: ffff8f088c1a5200 RCX: 00000000802a0016\nRDX: 00000000802a0017 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8f0880042600\nRBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000\nR10: ffff8f11fffd5000 R11: 0000000000039000 R12: ffff8f0d5b36cd80\nR13: ffff8f088c1a5250 R14: ffff8f1206d91000 R15: 0000000000000000\nFS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8f11d7c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\nCS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\nCR2: 0000147069200e20 CR3: 00000001c7210002 CR4: 00000000001706f0\nCall Trace:\n<TASK>\n? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df\n? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df\n? ib_uverbs_close+0x1f/0xb0 [ib_uverbs]\n? uverbs_destroy_ufile_hw+0xcf/0xf0 [ib_uverbs]\n? __warn+0x81/0x110\n? uverbs_destroy_ufile_hw+0xcf/0xf0 [ib_uverbs]\n? report_bug+0x10a/0x140\n? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70\n? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70\n? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20\n? uverbs_destroy_ufile_hw+0xcf/0xf0 [ib_uverbs]\nib_uverbs_close+0x1f/0xb0 [ib_uverbs]\n__fput+0x94/0x250\ntask_work_run+0x5c/0x90\ndo_exit+0x270/0x4a0\ndo_group_exit+0x2d/0x90\nget_signal+0x87c/0x8c0\narch_do_signal_or_restart+0x25/0x100\n? ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xc2/0x110 [ib_uverbs]\nexit_to_user_mode_loop+0x9c/0x130\nexit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xb6/0x100\nsyscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x12/0x40\ndo_syscall_64+0x69/0x90\n? syscall_exit_work+0x103/0x130\n? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x22/0x40\n? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90\n? syscall_exit_work+0x103/0x130\n? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x22/0x40\n? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90\n? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90\n? common_interrupt+0x43/0xa0\nentry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc\nRIP: 0033:0x1470abe3ec6b\nCode: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0x1470abe3ec41.\nRSP: 002b:00007fff13ce9108 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010\nRAX: fffffffffffffffc RBX: 00007fff13ce9218 RCX: 00001470abe3ec6b\nRDX: 00007fff13ce9200 RSI: 00000000c0181b01 RDI: 0000000000000004\nRBP: 00007fff13ce91e0 R08: 0000558d9655da10 R09: 0000558d9655dd00\nR10: 00007fff13ce95c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fff13ce9358\nR13: 0000000000000013 R14: 0000558d9655db50 R15: 00007fff13ce9470\n</TASK>\n--[ end trace 888a9b92e04c5c97 ]--(CVE-2024-26743)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nRDMA/srpt: Support specifying the srpt_service_guid parameter\r\n\r\nMake loading ib_srpt with this parameter set work. The current behavior is\nthat setting that parameter while loading the ib_srpt kernel module\ntriggers the following kernel crash:\r\n\r\nBUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000\nCall Trace:\n <TASK>\n parse_one+0x18c/0x1d0\n parse_args+0xe1/0x230\n load_module+0x8de/0xa60\n init_module_from_file+0x8b/0xd0\n idempotent_init_module+0x181/0x240\n __x64_sys_finit_module+0x5a/0xb0\n do_syscall_64+0x5f/0xe0\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76(CVE-2024-26744)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ngtp: fix use-after-free and null-ptr-deref in gtp_genl_dump_pdp()\r\n\r\nThe gtp_net_ops pernet operations structure for the subsystem must be\nregistered before registering the generic netlink family.\r\n\r\nSyzkaller hit 'general protection fault in gtp_genl_dump_pdp' bug:\r\n\r\ngeneral protection fault, probably for non-canonical address\n0xdffffc0000000002: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI\nKASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000010-0x0000000000000017]\nCPU: 1 PID: 5826 Comm: gtp Not tainted 6.8.0-rc3-std-def-alt1 #1\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.0-alt1 04/01/2014\nRIP: 0010:gtp_genl_dump_pdp+0x1be/0x800 [gtp]\nCode: c6 89 c6 e8 64 e9 86 df 58 45 85 f6 0f 85 4e 04 00 00 e8 c5 ee 86\n      df 48 8b 54 24 18 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 <80>\n      3c 02 00 0f 85 de 05 00 00 48 8b 44 24 18 4c 8b 30 4c 39 f0 74\nRSP: 0018:ffff888014107220 EFLAGS: 00010202\nRAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000\nRDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000\nRBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000\nR10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000\nR13: ffff88800fcda588 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000\nFS:  00007f1be4eb05c0(0000) GS:ffff88806ce80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\nCS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\nCR2: 00007f1be4e766cf CR3: 000000000c33e000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0\nPKRU: 55555554\nCall Trace:\n <TASK>\n ? show_regs+0x90/0xa0\n ? die_addr+0x50/0xd0\n ? exc_general_protection+0x148/0x220\n ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x22/0x30\n ? gtp_genl_dump_pdp+0x1be/0x800 [gtp]\n ? __alloc_skb+0x1dd/0x350\n ? __pfx___alloc_skb+0x10/0x10\n genl_dumpit+0x11d/0x230\n netlink_dump+0x5b9/0xce0\n ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x253/0x430\n ? __pfx_netlink_dump+0x10/0x10\n ? kasan_save_track+0x10/0x40\n ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x9b/0xa0\n ? genl_start+0x675/0x970\n __netlink_dump_start+0x6fc/0x9f0\n genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit+0x1bb/0x2d0\n ? __pfx_genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit+0x10/0x10\n ? genl_op_from_small+0x2a/0x440\n ? cap_capable+0x1d0/0x240\n ? __pfx_genl_start+0x10/0x10\n ? __pfx_genl_dumpit+0x10/0x10\n ? __pfx_genl_done+0x10/0x10\n ? security_capable+0x9d/0xe0(CVE-2024-26754)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ndm-crypt: don't modify the data when using authenticated encryption\r\n\r\nIt was said that authenticated encryption could produce invalid tag when\nthe data that is being encrypted is modified [1]. So, fix this problem by\ncopying the data into the clone bio first and then encrypt them inside the\nclone bio.\r\n\r\nThis may reduce performance, but it is needed to prevent the user from\ncorrupting the device by writing data with O_DIRECT and modifying them at\nthe same time.\r\n\r\n[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240207004723.GA35324@sol.localdomain/T/(CVE-2024-26763)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nspi: hisi-sfc-v3xx: Return IRQ_NONE if no interrupts were detected\r\n\r\nReturn IRQ_NONE from the interrupt handler when no interrupt was\ndetected. Because an empty interrupt will cause a null pointer error:\r\n\r\n    Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual\n  address 0000000000000008\n    Call trace:\n        complete+0x54/0x100\n        hisi_sfc_v3xx_isr+0x2c/0x40 [spi_hisi_sfc_v3xx]\n        __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x64/0x1e0\n        handle_irq_event+0x7c/0x1cc(CVE-2024-26776)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nmptcp: fix double-free on socket dismantle\r\n\r\nwhen MPTCP server accepts an incoming connection, it clones its listener\nsocket. However, the pointer to 'inet_opt' for the new socket has the same\nvalue as the original one: as a consequence, on program exit it's possible\nto observe the following splat:\r\n\r\n  BUG: KASAN: double-free in inet_sock_destruct+0x54f/0x8b0\n  Free of addr ffff888485950880 by task swapper/25/0\r\n\r\n  CPU: 25 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/25 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.8.0-rc1+ #609\n  Hardware name: Supermicro SYS-6027R-72RF/X9DRH-7TF/7F/iTF/iF, BIOS 3.0  07/26/2013\n  Call Trace:\n   <IRQ>\n   dump_stack_lvl+0x32/0x50\n   print_report+0xca/0x620\n   kasan_report_invalid_free+0x64/0x90\n   __kasan_slab_free+0x1aa/0x1f0\n   kfree+0xed/0x2e0\n   inet_sock_destruct+0x54f/0x8b0\n   __sk_destruct+0x48/0x5b0\n   rcu_do_batch+0x34e/0xd90\n   rcu_core+0x559/0xac0\n   __do_softirq+0x183/0x5a4\n   irq_exit_rcu+0x12d/0x170\n   sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6b/0x80\n   </IRQ>\n   <TASK>\n   asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20\n  RIP: 0010:cpuidle_enter_state+0x175/0x300\n  Code: 30 00 0f 84 1f 01 00 00 83 e8 01 83 f8 ff 75 e5 48 83 c4 18 44 89 e8 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 cc cc cc cc fb 45 85 ed <0f> 89 60 ff ff ff 48 c1 e5 06 48 c7 43 18 00 00 00 00 48 83 44 2b\n  RSP: 0018:ffff888481cf7d90 EFLAGS: 00000202\n  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88887facddc8 RCX: 0000000000000000\n  RDX: 1ffff1110ff588b1 RSI: 0000000000000019 RDI: ffff88887fac4588\n  RBP: 0000000000000004 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000043080\n  R10: 0009b02ea273363f R11: ffff88887fabf42b R12: ffffffff932592e0\n  R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000022c880ec80\n   cpuidle_enter+0x4a/0xa0\n   do_idle+0x310/0x410\n   cpu_startup_entry+0x51/0x60\n   start_secondary+0x211/0x270\n   secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0x184/0x18b\n   </TASK>\r\n\r\n  Allocated by task 6853:\n   kasan_save_stack+0x1c/0x40\n   kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30\n   __kasan_kmalloc+0xa6/0xb0\n   __kmalloc+0x1eb/0x450\n   cipso_v4_sock_setattr+0x96/0x360\n   netlbl_sock_setattr+0x132/0x1f0\n   selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create+0x6c/0x110\n   selinux_socket_post_create+0x37b/0x7f0\n   security_socket_post_create+0x63/0xb0\n   __sock_create+0x305/0x450\n   __sys_socket_create.part.23+0xbd/0x130\n   __sys_socket+0x37/0xb0\n   __x64_sys_socket+0x6f/0xb0\n   do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160\n   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76\r\n\r\n  Freed by task 6858:\n   kasan_save_stack+0x1c/0x40\n   kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30\n   kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60\n   __kasan_slab_free+0x12c/0x1f0\n   kfree+0xed/0x2e0\n   inet_sock_destruct+0x54f/0x8b0\n   __sk_destruct+0x48/0x5b0\n   subflow_ulp_release+0x1f0/0x250\n   tcp_cleanup_ulp+0x6e/0x110\n   tcp_v4_destroy_sock+0x5a/0x3a0\n   inet_csk_destroy_sock+0x135/0x390\n   tcp_fin+0x416/0x5c0\n   tcp_data_queue+0x1bc8/0x4310\n   tcp_rcv_state_process+0x15a3/0x47b0\n   tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x2c1/0x990\n   tcp_v4_rcv+0x41fb/0x5ed0\n   ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x6d/0x9f0\n   ip_local_deliver_finish+0x278/0x360\n   ip_local_deliver+0x182/0x2c0\n   ip_rcv+0xb5/0x1c0\n   __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x16e/0x1b0\n   process_backlog+0x1e3/0x650\n   __napi_poll+0xa6/0x500\n   net_rx_action+0x740/0xbb0\n   __do_softirq+0x183/0x5a4\r\n\r\n  The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888485950880\n   which belongs to the cache kmalloc-64 of size 64\n  The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of\n   64-byte region [ffff888485950880, ffff8884859508c0)\r\n\r\n  The buggy address belongs to the physical page:\n  page:0000000056d1e95e refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888485950700 pfn:0x485950\n  flags: 0x57ffffc0000800(slab|node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)\n  page_type: 0xffffffff()\n  raw: 0057ffffc0000800 ffff88810004c640 ffffea00121b8ac0 dead000000000006\n  raw: ffff888485950700 0000000000200019 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000\n  page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected\r\n\r\n  Memory state around the buggy address:\n   ffff888485950780: fa fb fb\n---truncated---(CVE-2024-26782)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nmmc: mmci: stm32: fix DMA API overlapping mappings warning\r\n\r\nTurning on CONFIG_DMA_API_DEBUG_SG results in the following warning:\r\n\r\nDMA-API: mmci-pl18x 48220000.mmc: cacheline tracking EEXIST,\noverlapping mappings aren't supported\nWARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 51 at kernel/dma/debug.c:568\nadd_dma_entry+0x234/0x2f4\nModules linked in:\nCPU: 1 PID: 51 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted 6.1.28 #1\nHardware name: STMicroelectronics STM32MP257F-EV1 Evaluation Board (DT)\nWorkqueue: events_freezable mmc_rescan\nCall trace:\nadd_dma_entry+0x234/0x2f4\ndebug_dma_map_sg+0x198/0x350\n__dma_map_sg_attrs+0xa0/0x110\ndma_map_sg_attrs+0x10/0x2c\nsdmmc_idma_prep_data+0x80/0xc0\nmmci_prep_data+0x38/0x84\nmmci_start_data+0x108/0x2dc\nmmci_request+0xe4/0x190\n__mmc_start_request+0x68/0x140\nmmc_start_request+0x94/0xc0\nmmc_wait_for_req+0x70/0x100\nmmc_send_tuning+0x108/0x1ac\nsdmmc_execute_tuning+0x14c/0x210\nmmc_execute_tuning+0x48/0xec\nmmc_sd_init_uhs_card.part.0+0x208/0x464\nmmc_sd_init_card+0x318/0x89c\nmmc_attach_sd+0xe4/0x180\nmmc_rescan+0x244/0x320\r\n\r\nDMA API debug brings to light leaking dma-mappings as dma_map_sg and\ndma_unmap_sg are not correctly balanced.\r\n\r\nIf an error occurs in mmci_cmd_irq function, only mmci_dma_error\nfunction is called and as this API is not managed on stm32 variant,\ndma_unmap_sg is never called in this error path.(CVE-2024-26787)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nbtrfs: dev-replace: properly validate device names\r\n\r\nThere's a syzbot report that device name buffers passed to device\nreplace are not properly checked for string termination which could lead\nto a read out of bounds in getname_kernel().\r\n\r\nAdd a helper that validates both source and target device name buffers.\nFor devid as the source initialize the buffer to empty string in case\nsomething tries to read it later.\r\n\r\nThis was originally analyzed and fixed in a different way by Edward Adam\nDavis (see links).(CVE-2024-26791)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nBluetooth: Avoid potential use-after-free in hci_error_reset\r\n\r\nWhile handling the HCI_EV_HARDWARE_ERROR event, if the underlying\nBT controller is not responding, the GPIO reset mechanism would\nfree the hci_dev and lead to a use-after-free in hci_error_reset.\r\n\r\nHere's the call trace observed on a ChromeOS device with Intel AX201:\n   queue_work_on+0x3e/0x6c\n   __hci_cmd_sync_sk+0x2ee/0x4c0 [bluetooth <HASH:3b4a6>]\n   ? init_wait_entry+0x31/0x31\n   __hci_cmd_sync+0x16/0x20 [bluetooth <HASH:3b4a 6>]\n   hci_error_reset+0x4f/0xa4 [bluetooth <HASH:3b4a 6>]\n   process_one_work+0x1d8/0x33f\n   worker_thread+0x21b/0x373\n   kthread+0x13a/0x152\n   ? pr_cont_work+0x54/0x54\n   ? kthread_blkcg+0x31/0x31\n    ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30\r\n\r\nThis patch holds the reference count on the hci_dev while processing\na HCI_EV_HARDWARE_ERROR event to avoid potential crash.(CVE-2024-26801)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnetlink: Fix kernel-infoleak-after-free in __skb_datagram_iter\r\n\r\nsyzbot reported the following uninit-value access issue [1]:\r\n\r\nnetlink_to_full_skb() creates a new `skb` and puts the `skb->data`\npassed as a 1st arg of netlink_to_full_skb() onto new `skb`. The data\nsize is specified as `len` and passed to skb_put_data(). This `len`\nis based on `skb->end` that is not data offset but buffer offset. The\n`skb->end` contains data and tailroom. Since the tailroom is not\ninitialized when the new `skb` created, KMSAN detects uninitialized\nmemory area when copying the data.\r\n\r\nThis patch resolved this issue by correct the len from `skb->end` to\n`skb->len`, which is the actual data offset.\r\n\r\nBUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak-after-free in instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:114 [inline]\nBUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak-after-free in copy_to_user_iter lib/iov_iter.c:24 [inline]\nBUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak-after-free in iterate_ubuf include/linux/iov_iter.h:29 [inline]\nBUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak-after-free in iterate_and_advance2 include/linux/iov_iter.h:245 [inline]\nBUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak-after-free in iterate_and_advance include/linux/iov_iter.h:271 [inline]\nBUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak-after-free in _copy_to_iter+0x364/0x2520 lib/iov_iter.c:186\n instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:114 [inline]\n copy_to_user_iter lib/iov_iter.c:24 [inline]\n iterate_ubuf include/linux/iov_iter.h:29 [inline]\n iterate_and_advance2 include/linux/iov_iter.h:245 [inline]\n iterate_and_advance include/linux/iov_iter.h:271 [inline]\n _copy_to_iter+0x364/0x2520 lib/iov_iter.c:186\n copy_to_iter include/linux/uio.h:197 [inline]\n simple_copy_to_iter+0x68/0xa0 net/core/datagram.c:532\n __skb_datagram_iter+0x123/0xdc0 net/core/datagram.c:420\n skb_copy_datagram_iter+0x5c/0x200 net/core/datagram.c:546\n skb_copy_datagram_msg include/linux/skbuff.h:3960 [inline]\n packet_recvmsg+0xd9c/0x2000 net/packet/af_packet.c:3482\n sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1044 [inline]\n sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:1066 [inline]\n sock_read_iter+0x467/0x580 net/socket.c:1136\n call_read_iter include/linux/fs.h:2014 [inline]\n new_sync_read fs/read_write.c:389 [inline]\n vfs_read+0x8f6/0xe00 fs/read_write.c:470\n ksys_read+0x20f/0x4c0 fs/read_write.c:613\n __do_sys_read fs/read_write.c:623 [inline]\n __se_sys_read fs/read_write.c:621 [inline]\n __x64_sys_read+0x93/0xd0 fs/read_write.c:621\n do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]\n do_syscall_64+0x44/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b\r\n\r\nUninit was stored to memory at:\n skb_put_data include/linux/skbuff.h:2622 [inline]\n netlink_to_full_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:181 [inline]\n __netlink_deliver_tap_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:298 [inline]\n __netlink_deliver_tap+0x5be/0xc90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:325\n netlink_deliver_tap net/netlink/af_netlink.c:338 [inline]\n netlink_deliver_tap_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:347 [inline]\n netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1341 [inline]\n netlink_unicast+0x10f1/0x1250 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1368\n netlink_sendmsg+0x1238/0x13d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1910\n sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]\n __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]\n ____sys_sendmsg+0x9c2/0xd60 net/socket.c:2584\n ___sys_sendmsg+0x28d/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2638\n __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2667 [inline]\n __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2676 [inline]\n __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline]\n __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x490 net/socket.c:2674\n do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]\n do_syscall_64+0x44/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b\r\n\r\nUninit was created at:\n free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1087 [inline]\n free_unref_page_prepare+0xb0/0xa40 mm/page_alloc.c:2347\n free_unref_page_list+0xeb/0x1100 mm/page_alloc.c:2533\n release_pages+0x23d3/0x2410 mm/swap.c:1042\n free_pages_and_swap_cache+0xd9/0xf0 mm/swap_state.c:316\n tlb_batch_pages\n---truncated---(CVE-2024-26805)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnetfilter: nft_chain_filter: handle NETDEV_UNREGISTER for inet/ingress basechain\r\n\r\nRemove netdevice from inet/ingress basechain in case NETDEV_UNREGISTER\nevent is reported, otherwise a stale reference to netdevice remains in\nthe hook list.(CVE-2024-26808)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnetfilter: nft_set_pipapo: release elements in clone only from destroy path\r\n\r\nClone already always provides a current view of the lookup table, use it\nto destroy the set, otherwise it is possible to destroy elements twice.\r\n\r\nThis fix requires:\r\n\r\n 212ed75dc5fb (\"netfilter: nf_tables: integrate pipapo into commit protocol\")\r\n\r\nwhich came after:\r\n\r\n 9827a0e6e23b (\"netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: release elements in clone from abort path\").(CVE-2024-26809)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nksmbd: validate payload size in ipc response\r\n\r\nIf installing malicious ksmbd-tools, ksmbd.mountd can return invalid ipc\nresponse to ksmbd kernel server. ksmbd should validate payload size of\nipc response from ksmbd.mountd to avoid memory overrun or\nslab-out-of-bounds. This patch validate 3 ipc response that has payload.(CVE-2024-26811)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nvfio/pci: Create persistent INTx handler\r\n\r\nA vulnerability exists where the eventfd for INTx signaling can be\ndeconfigured, which unregisters the IRQ handler but still allows\neventfds to be signaled with a NULL context through the SET_IRQS ioctl\nor through unmask irqfd if the device interrupt is pending.\r\n\r\nIdeally this could be solved with some additional locking; the igate\nmutex serializes the ioctl and config space accesses, and the interrupt\nhandler is unregistered relative to the trigger, but the irqfd path\nruns asynchronous to those.  The igate mutex cannot be acquired from the\natomic context of the eventfd wake function.  Disabling the irqfd\nrelative to the eventfd registration is potentially incompatible with\nexisting userspace.\r\n\r\nAs a result, the solution implemented here moves configuration of the\nINTx interrupt handler to track the lifetime of the INTx context object\nand irq_type configuration, rather than registration of a particular\ntrigger eventfd.  Synchronization is added between the ioctl path and\neventfd_signal() wrapper such that the eventfd trigger can be\ndynamically updated relative to in-flight interrupts or irqfd callbacks.(CVE-2024-26812)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ncifs: fix underflow in parse_server_interfaces()\r\n\r\nIn this loop, we step through the buffer and after each item we check\nif the size_left is greater than the minimum size we need.  However,\nthe problem is that \"bytes_left\" is type ssize_t while sizeof() is type\nsize_t.  That means that because of type promotion, the comparison is\ndone as an unsigned and if we have negative bytes left the loop\ncontinues instead of ending.(CVE-2024-26828)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnetfilter: nf_conntrack_h323: Add protection for bmp length out of range\r\n\r\nUBSAN load reports an exception of BRK#5515 SHIFT_ISSUE:Bitwise shifts\nthat are out of bounds for their data type.\r\n\r\nvmlinux   get_bitmap(b=75) + 712\n<net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c:0>\nvmlinux   decode_seq(bs=0xFFFFFFD008037000, f=0xFFFFFFD008037018, level=134443100) + 1956\n<net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c:592>\nvmlinux   decode_choice(base=0xFFFFFFD0080370F0, level=23843636) + 1216\n<net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c:814>\nvmlinux   decode_seq(f=0xFFFFFFD0080371A8, level=134443500) + 812\n<net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c:576>\nvmlinux   decode_choice(base=0xFFFFFFD008037280, level=0) + 1216\n<net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c:814>\nvmlinux   DecodeRasMessage() + 304\n<net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c:833>\nvmlinux   ras_help() + 684\n<net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_main.c:1728>\nvmlinux   nf_confirm() + 188\n<net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto.c:137>\r\n\r\nDue to abnormal data in skb->data, the extension bitmap length\nexceeds 32 when decoding ras message then uses the length to make\na shift operation. It will change into negative after several loop.\nUBSAN load could detect a negative shift as an undefined behaviour\nand reports exception.\nSo we add the protection to avoid the length exceeding 32. Or else\nit will return out of range error and stop decoding.(CVE-2024-26851)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnet: hns3: fix kernel crash when 1588 is received on HIP08 devices\r\n\r\nThe HIP08 devices does not register the ptp devices, so the\nhdev->ptp is NULL, but the hardware can receive 1588 messages,\nand set the HNS3_RXD_TS_VLD_B bit, so, if match this case, the\naccess of hdev->ptp->flags will cause a kernel crash:\r\n\r\n[ 5888.946472] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000018\n[ 5888.946475] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000018\n...\n[ 5889.266118] pc : hclge_ptp_get_rx_hwts+0x40/0x170 [hclge]\n[ 5889.272612] lr : hclge_ptp_get_rx_hwts+0x34/0x170 [hclge]\n[ 5889.279101] sp : ffff800012c3bc50\n[ 5889.283516] x29: ffff800012c3bc50 x28: ffff2040002be040\n[ 5889.289927] x27: ffff800009116484 x26: 0000000080007500\n[ 5889.296333] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff204001c6f000\n[ 5889.302738] x23: ffff204144f53c00 x22: 0000000000000000\n[ 5889.309134] x21: 0000000000000000 x20: ffff204004220080\n[ 5889.315520] x19: ffff204144f53c00 x18: 0000000000000000\n[ 5889.321897] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000\n[ 5889.328263] x15: 0000004000140ec8 x14: 0000000000000000\n[ 5889.334617] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 00000000010011df\n[ 5889.340965] x11: bbfeff4d22000000 x10: 0000000000000000\n[ 5889.347303] x9 : ffff800009402124 x8 : 0200f78811dfbb4d\n[ 5889.353637] x7 : 2200000000191b01 x6 : ffff208002a7d480\n[ 5889.359959] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000\n[ 5889.366271] x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000000000000000\n[ 5889.372567] x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff20400095c080\n[ 5889.378857] Call trace:\n[ 5889.382285] hclge_ptp_get_rx_hwts+0x40/0x170 [hclge]\n[ 5889.388304] hns3_handle_bdinfo+0x324/0x410 [hns3]\n[ 5889.394055] hns3_handle_rx_bd+0x60/0x150 [hns3]\n[ 5889.399624] hns3_clean_rx_ring+0x84/0x170 [hns3]\n[ 5889.405270] hns3_nic_common_poll+0xa8/0x220 [hns3]\n[ 5889.411084] napi_poll+0xcc/0x264\n[ 5889.415329] net_rx_action+0xd4/0x21c\n[ 5889.419911] __do_softirq+0x130/0x358\n[ 5889.424484] irq_exit+0x134/0x154\n[ 5889.428700] __handle_domain_irq+0x88/0xf0\n[ 5889.433684] gic_handle_irq+0x78/0x2c0\n[ 5889.438319] el1_irq+0xb8/0x140\n[ 5889.442354] arch_cpu_idle+0x18/0x40\n[ 5889.446816] default_idle_call+0x5c/0x1c0\n[ 5889.451714] cpuidle_idle_call+0x174/0x1b0\n[ 5889.456692] do_idle+0xc8/0x160\n[ 5889.460717] cpu_startup_entry+0x30/0xfc\n[ 5889.465523] secondary_start_kernel+0x158/0x1ec\n[ 5889.470936] Code: 97ffab78 f9411c14 91408294 f9457284 (f9400c80)\n[ 5889.477950] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs\n[ 5890.514626] SMP: failed to stop secondary CPUs 0-69,71-95\n[ 5890.522951] Starting crashdump kernel...(CVE-2024-26881)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nmd: fix kmemleak of rdev->serial\r\n\r\nIf kobject_add() is fail in bind_rdev_to_array(), 'rdev->serial' will be\nalloc not be freed, and kmemleak occurs.\r\n\r\nunreferenced object 0xffff88815a350000 (size 49152):\n  comm \"mdadm\", pid 789, jiffies 4294716910\n  hex dump (first 32 bytes):\n    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................\n    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................\n  backtrace (crc f773277a):\n    [<0000000058b0a453>] kmemleak_alloc+0x61/0xe0\n    [<00000000366adf14>] __kmalloc_large_node+0x15e/0x270\n    [<000000002e82961b>] __kmalloc_node.cold+0x11/0x7f\n    [<00000000f206d60a>] kvmalloc_node+0x74/0x150\n    [<0000000034bf3363>] rdev_init_serial+0x67/0x170\n    [<0000000010e08fe9>] mddev_create_serial_pool+0x62/0x220\n    [<00000000c3837bf0>] bind_rdev_to_array+0x2af/0x630\n    [<0000000073c28560>] md_add_new_disk+0x400/0x9f0\n    [<00000000770e30ff>] md_ioctl+0x15bf/0x1c10\n    [<000000006cfab718>] blkdev_ioctl+0x191/0x3f0\n    [<0000000085086a11>] vfs_ioctl+0x22/0x60\n    [<0000000018b656fe>] __x64_sys_ioctl+0xba/0xe0\n    [<00000000e54e675e>] do_syscall_64+0x71/0x150\n    [<000000008b0ad622>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6c/0x74(CVE-2024-26900)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ndo_sys_name_to_handle(): use kzalloc() to fix kernel-infoleak\r\n\r\nsyzbot identified a kernel information leak vulnerability in\ndo_sys_name_to_handle() and issued the following report [1].\r\n\r\n[1]\n\"BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:114 [inline]\nBUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_user+0xbc/0x100 lib/usercopy.c:40\n instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:114 [inline]\n _copy_to_user+0xbc/0x100 lib/usercopy.c:40\n copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:191 [inline]\n do_sys_name_to_handle fs/fhandle.c:73 [inline]\n __do_sys_name_to_handle_at fs/fhandle.c:112 [inline]\n __se_sys_name_to_handle_at+0x949/0xb10 fs/fhandle.c:94\n __x64_sys_name_to_handle_at+0xe4/0x140 fs/fhandle.c:94\n ...\r\n\r\nUninit was created at:\n slab_post_alloc_hook+0x129/0xa70 mm/slab.h:768\n slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3478 [inline]\n __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x5c9/0x970 mm/slub.c:3517\n __do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:1006 [inline]\n __kmalloc+0x121/0x3c0 mm/slab_common.c:1020\n kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:604 [inline]\n do_sys_name_to_handle fs/fhandle.c:39 [inline]\n __do_sys_name_to_handle_at fs/fhandle.c:112 [inline]\n __se_sys_name_to_handle_at+0x441/0xb10 fs/fhandle.c:94\n __x64_sys_name_to_handle_at+0xe4/0x140 fs/fhandle.c:94\n ...\r\n\r\nBytes 18-19 of 20 are uninitialized\nMemory access of size 20 starts at ffff888128a46380\nData copied to user address 0000000020000240\"\r\n\r\nPer Chuck Lever's suggestion, use kzalloc() instead of kmalloc() to\nsolve the problem.(CVE-2024-26901)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nBluetooth: rfcomm: Fix null-ptr-deref in rfcomm_check_security\r\n\r\nDuring our fuzz testing of the connection and disconnection process at the\nRFCOMM layer, we discovered this bug. By comparing the packets from a\nnormal connection and disconnection process with the testcase that\ntriggered a KASAN report. We analyzed the cause of this bug as follows:\r\n\r\n1. In the packets captured during a normal connection, the host sends a\n`Read Encryption Key Size` type of `HCI_CMD` packet\n(Command Opcode: 0x1408) to the controller to inquire the length of\nencryption key.After receiving this packet, the controller immediately\nreplies with a Command Completepacket (Event Code: 0x0e) to return the\nEncryption Key Size.\r\n\r\n2. In our fuzz test case, the timing of the controller's response to this\npacket was delayed to an unexpected point: after the RFCOMM and L2CAP\nlayers had disconnected but before the HCI layer had disconnected.\r\n\r\n3. After receiving the Encryption Key Size Response at the time described\nin point 2, the host still called the rfcomm_check_security function.\nHowever, by this time `struct l2cap_conn *conn = l2cap_pi(sk)->chan->conn;`\nhad already been released, and when the function executed\n`return hci_conn_security(conn->hcon, d->sec_level, auth_type, d->out);`,\nspecifically when accessing `conn->hcon`, a null-ptr-deref error occurred.\r\n\r\nTo fix this bug, check if `sk->sk_state` is BT_CLOSED before calling\nrfcomm_recv_frame in rfcomm_process_rx.(CVE-2024-26903)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nRDMA/mlx5: Fix fortify source warning while accessing Eth segment\r\n\r\n ------------[ cut here ]------------\n memcpy: detected field-spanning write (size 56) of single field \"eseg->inline_hdr.start\" at /var/lib/dkms/mlnx-ofed-kernel/5.8/build/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/wr.c:131 (size 2)\n WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 293779 at /var/lib/dkms/mlnx-ofed-kernel/5.8/build/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/wr.c:131 mlx5_ib_post_send+0x191b/0x1a60 [mlx5_ib]\n Modules linked in: 8021q garp mrp stp llc rdma_ucm(OE) rdma_cm(OE) iw_cm(OE) ib_ipoib(OE) ib_cm(OE) ib_umad(OE) mlx5_ib(OE) ib_uverbs(OE) ib_core(OE) mlx5_core(OE) pci_hyperv_intf mlxdevm(OE) mlx_compat(OE) tls mlxfw(OE) psample nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip_set nf_tables libcrc32c nfnetlink mst_pciconf(OE) knem(OE) vfio_pci vfio_pci_core vfio_iommu_type1 vfio iommufd irqbypass cuse nfsv3 nfs fscache netfs xfrm_user xfrm_algo ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler binfmt_misc crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul polyval_clmulni polyval_generic ghash_clmulni_intel sha512_ssse3 snd_pcsp aesni_intel crypto_simd cryptd snd_pcm snd_timer joydev snd soundcore input_leds serio_raw evbug nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sch_fq_codel sunrpc drm efi_pstore ip_tables x_tables autofs4 psmouse virtio_net net_failover failover floppy\n  [last unloaded: mlx_compat(OE)]\n CPU: 0 PID: 293779 Comm: ssh Tainted: G           OE      6.2.0-32-generic #32~22.04.1-Ubuntu\n Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011\n RIP: 0010:mlx5_ib_post_send+0x191b/0x1a60 [mlx5_ib]\n Code: 0c 01 00 a8 01 75 25 48 8b 75 a0 b9 02 00 00 00 48 c7 c2 10 5b fd c0 48 c7 c7 80 5b fd c0 c6 05 57 0c 03 00 01 e8 95 4d 93 da <0f> 0b 44 8b 4d b0 4c 8b 45 c8 48 8b 4d c0 e9 49 fb ff ff 41 0f b7\n RSP: 0018:ffffb5b48478b570 EFLAGS: 00010046\n RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000\n RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000\n RBP: ffffb5b48478b628 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000\n R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffb5b48478b5e8\n R13: ffff963a3c609b5e R14: ffff9639c3fbd800 R15: ffffb5b480475a80\n FS:  00007fc03b444c80(0000) GS:ffff963a3dc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\n CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\n CR2: 0000556f46bdf000 CR3: 0000000006ac6003 CR4: 00000000003706f0\n DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000\n DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400\n Call Trace:\n  <TASK>\n  ? show_regs+0x72/0x90\n  ? mlx5_ib_post_send+0x191b/0x1a60 [mlx5_ib]\n  ? __warn+0x8d/0x160\n  ? mlx5_ib_post_send+0x191b/0x1a60 [mlx5_ib]\n  ? report_bug+0x1bb/0x1d0\n  ? handle_bug+0x46/0x90\n  ? exc_invalid_op+0x19/0x80\n  ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20\n  ? mlx5_ib_post_send+0x191b/0x1a60 [mlx5_ib]\n  mlx5_ib_post_send_nodrain+0xb/0x20 [mlx5_ib]\n  ipoib_send+0x2ec/0x770 [ib_ipoib]\n  ipoib_start_xmit+0x5a0/0x770 [ib_ipoib]\n  dev_hard_start_xmit+0x8e/0x1e0\n  ? validate_xmit_skb_list+0x4d/0x80\n  sch_direct_xmit+0x116/0x3a0\n  __dev_xmit_skb+0x1fd/0x580\n  __dev_queue_xmit+0x284/0x6b0\n  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0xe/0x50\n  ? __flush_work.isra.0+0x20d/0x370\n  ? push_pseudo_header+0x17/0x40 [ib_ipoib]\n  neigh_connected_output+0xcd/0x110\n  ip_finish_output2+0x179/0x480\n  ? __smp_call_single_queue+0x61/0xa0\n  __ip_finish_output+0xc3/0x190\n  ip_finish_output+0x2e/0xf0\n  ip_output+0x78/0x110\n  ? __pfx_ip_finish_output+0x10/0x10\n  ip_local_out+0x64/0x70\n  __ip_queue_xmit+0x18a/0x460\n  ip_queue_xmit+0x15/0x30\n  __tcp_transmit_skb+0x914/0x9c0\n  tcp_write_xmit+0x334/0x8d0\n  tcp_push_one+0x3c/0x60\n  tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x2e1/0xac0\n  tcp_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50\n  inet_sendmsg+0x43/0x90\n  sock_sendmsg+0x68/0x80\n  sock_write_iter+0x93/0x100\n  vfs_write+0x326/0x3c0\n  ksys_write+0xbd/0xf0\n  ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90\n  __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30\n  do_syscall_\n---truncated---(CVE-2024-26907)\r\n\r\nRejected reason: This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority.(CVE-2024-26908)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnet: openvswitch: Fix Use-After-Free in ovs_ct_exit\r\n\r\nSince kfree_rcu, which is called in the hlist_for_each_entry_rcu traversal\nof ovs_ct_limit_exit, is not part of the RCU read critical section, it\nis possible that the RCU grace period will pass during the traversal and\nthe key will be free.\r\n\r\nTo prevent this, it should be changed to hlist_for_each_entry_safe.(CVE-2024-27395)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnet: gtp: Fix Use-After-Free in gtp_dellink\r\n\r\nSince call_rcu, which is called in the hlist_for_each_entry_rcu traversal\nof gtp_dellink, is not part of the RCU read critical section, it\nis possible that the RCU grace period will pass during the traversal and\nthe key will be free.\r\n\r\nTo prevent this, it should be changed to hlist_for_each_entry_safe.(CVE-2024-27396)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ncpumap: Zero-initialise xdp_rxq_info struct before running XDP program\r\n\r\nWhen running an XDP program that is attached to a cpumap entry, we don't\ninitialise the xdp_rxq_info data structure being used in the xdp_buff\nthat backs the XDP program invocation. Tobias noticed that this leads to\nrandom values being returned as the xdp_md->rx_queue_index value for XDP\nprograms running in a cpumap.\r\n\r\nThis means we're basically returning the contents of the uninitialised\nmemory, which is bad. Fix this by zero-initialising the rxq data\nstructure before running the XDP program.(CVE-2024-27431)",
  "cves": [
    {
      "id": "CVE-2024-27431",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-27431",
      "severity": "Medium"
    }
  ]
}