cvrf2cusa/cvrf/2024/cvrf-openEuler-SA-2024-1860.xml
Jia Chao 0b34274085 git mv
Signed-off-by: Jia Chao <jiac13@chinaunicom.cn>
2024-07-25 09:57:37 +08:00

2398 lines
102 KiB
XML

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<cvrfdoc xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/cvrf/1.1" xmlns:cvrf="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/cvrf/1.1">
<DocumentTitle xml:lang="en">An update for kernel is now available for openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1</DocumentTitle>
<DocumentType>Security Advisory</DocumentType>
<DocumentPublisher Type="Vendor">
<ContactDetails>openeuler-security@openeuler.org</ContactDetails>
<IssuingAuthority>openEuler security committee</IssuingAuthority>
</DocumentPublisher>
<DocumentTracking>
<Identification>
<ID>openEuler-SA-2024-1860</ID>
</Identification>
<Status>Final</Status>
<Version>1.0</Version>
<RevisionHistory>
<Revision>
<Number>1.0</Number>
<Date>2024-07-19</Date>
<Description>Initial</Description>
</Revision>
</RevisionHistory>
<InitialReleaseDate>2024-07-19</InitialReleaseDate>
<CurrentReleaseDate>2024-07-19</CurrentReleaseDate>
<Generator>
<Engine>openEuler SA Tool V1.0</Engine>
<Date>2024-07-19</Date>
</Generator>
</DocumentTracking>
<DocumentNotes>
<Note Title="Synopsis" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">kernel security update</Note>
<Note Title="Summary" Type="General" Ordinal="2" xml:lang="en">An update for kernel is now available for openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1</Note>
<Note Title="Description" Type="General" Ordinal="3" xml:lang="en">The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.
Security Fix(es):
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/cma: Ensure rdma_addr_cancel() happens before issuing more requests
The FSM can run in a circle allowing rdma_resolve_ip() to be called twice
on the same id_priv. While this cannot happen without going through the
work, it violates the invariant that the same address resolution
background request cannot be active twice.
CPU 1 CPU 2
rdma_resolve_addr():
RDMA_CM_IDLE -&gt; RDMA_CM_ADDR_QUERY
rdma_resolve_ip(addr_handler) #1
process_one_req(): for #1
addr_handler():
RDMA_CM_ADDR_QUERY -&gt; RDMA_CM_ADDR_BOUND
mutex_unlock(&amp;id_priv-&gt;handler_mutex);
[.. handler still running ..]
rdma_resolve_addr():
RDMA_CM_ADDR_BOUND -&gt; RDMA_CM_ADDR_QUERY
rdma_resolve_ip(addr_handler)
!! two requests are now on the req_list
rdma_destroy_id():
destroy_id_handler_unlock():
_destroy_id():
cma_cancel_operation():
rdma_addr_cancel()
// process_one_req() self removes it
spin_lock_bh(&amp;lock);
cancel_delayed_work(&amp;req-&gt;work);
if (!list_empty(&amp;req-&gt;list)) == true
! rdma_addr_cancel() returns after process_on_req #1 is done
kfree(id_priv)
process_one_req(): for #2
addr_handler():
mutex_lock(&amp;id_priv-&gt;handler_mutex);
!! Use after free on id_priv
rdma_addr_cancel() expects there to be one req on the list and only
cancels the first one. The self-removal behavior of the work only happens
after the handler has returned. This yields a situations where the
req_list can have two reqs for the same &quot;handle&quot; but rdma_addr_cancel()
only cancels the first one.
The second req remains active beyond rdma_destroy_id() and will
use-after-free id_priv once it inevitably triggers.
Fix this by remembering if the id_priv has called rdma_resolve_ip() and
always cancel before calling it again. This ensures the req_list never
gets more than one item in it and doesn&apos;t cost anything in the normal flow
that never uses this strange error path.(CVE-2021-47391)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: Forward wakeup to smc socket waitqueue after fallback
When we replace TCP with SMC and a fallback occurs, there may be
some socket waitqueue entries remaining in smc socket-&gt;wq, such
as eppoll_entries inserted by userspace applications.
After the fallback, data flows over TCP/IP and only clcsocket-&gt;wq
will be woken up. Applications can&apos;t be notified by the entries
which were inserted in smc socket-&gt;wq before fallback. So we need
a mechanism to wake up smc socket-&gt;wq at the same time if some
entries remaining in it.
The current workaround is to transfer the entries from smc socket-&gt;wq
to clcsock-&gt;wq during the fallback. But this may cause a crash
like this:
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdead000000000100: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 5.16.0+ #107
RIP: 0010:__wake_up_common+0x65/0x170
Call Trace:
&lt;IRQ&gt;
__wake_up_common_lock+0x7a/0xc0
sock_def_readable+0x3c/0x70
tcp_data_queue+0x4a7/0xc40
tcp_rcv_established+0x32f/0x660
? sk_filter_trim_cap+0xcb/0x2e0
tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x10b/0x260
tcp_v4_rcv+0xd2a/0xde0
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x3b/0x1d0
ip_local_deliver_finish+0x54/0x60
ip_local_deliver+0x6a/0x110
? tcp_v4_early_demux+0xa2/0x140
? tcp_v4_early_demux+0x10d/0x140
ip_sublist_rcv_finish+0x49/0x60
ip_sublist_rcv+0x19d/0x230
ip_list_rcv+0x13e/0x170
__netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x1c2/0x240
netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x1e6/0x320
napi_complete_done+0x11d/0x190
mlx5e_napi_poll+0x163/0x6b0 [mlx5_core]
__napi_poll+0x3c/0x1b0
net_rx_action+0x27c/0x300
__do_softirq+0x114/0x2d2
irq_exit_rcu+0xb4/0xe0
common_interrupt+0xba/0xe0
&lt;/IRQ&gt;
&lt;TASK&gt;
The crash is caused by privately transferring waitqueue entries from
smc socket-&gt;wq to clcsock-&gt;wq. The owners of these entries, such as
epoll, have no idea that the entries have been transferred to a
different socket wait queue and still use original waitqueue spinlock
(smc socket-&gt;wq.wait.lock) to make the entries operation exclusive,
but it doesn&apos;t work. The operations to the entries, such as removing
from the waitqueue (now is clcsock-&gt;wq after fallback), may cause a
crash when clcsock waitqueue is being iterated over at the moment.
This patch tries to fix this by no longer transferring wait queue
entries privately, but introducing own implementations of clcsock&apos;s
callback functions in fallback situation. The callback functions will
forward the wakeup to smc socket-&gt;wq if clcsock-&gt;wq is actually woken
up and smc socket-&gt;wq has remaining entries.(CVE-2022-48721)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: Do not use WQ_MEM_RECLAIM flag for workqueue
When both ice and the irdma driver are loaded, a warning in
check_flush_dependency is being triggered. This is due to ice driver
workqueue being allocated with the WQ_MEM_RECLAIM flag and the irdma one
is not.
According to kernel documentation, this flag should be set if the
workqueue will be involved in the kernel&apos;s memory reclamation flow.
Since it is not, there is no need for the ice driver&apos;s WQ to have this
flag set so remove it.
Example trace:
[ +0.000004] workqueue: WQ_MEM_RECLAIM ice:ice_service_task [ice] is flushing !WQ_MEM_RECLAIM infiniband:0x0
[ +0.000139] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 728 at kernel/workqueue.c:2632 check_flush_dependency+0x178/0x1a0
[ +0.000011] Modules linked in: bonding tls xt_CHECKSUM xt_MASQUERADE xt_conntrack ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 nft_compat nft_cha
in_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_tables nfnetlink bridge stp llc rfkill vfat fat intel_rapl_msr intel
_rapl_common isst_if_common skx_edac nfit libnvdimm x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct1
0dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel rapl intel_cstate rpcrdma sunrpc rdma_ucm ib_srpt ib_isert iscsi_target_mod target_
core_mod ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support ipmi_ssif irdma mei_me ib_uverbs
ib_core intel_uncore joydev pcspkr i2c_i801 acpi_ipmi mei lpc_ich i2c_smbus intel_pch_thermal ioatdma ipmi_si acpi_power_meter
acpi_pad xfs libcrc32c sd_mod t10_pi crc64_rocksoft crc64 sg ahci ixgbe libahci ice i40e igb crc32c_intel mdio i2c_algo_bit liba
ta dca wmi dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler fuse
[ +0.000161] [last unloaded: bonding]
[ +0.000006] CPU: 0 PID: 728 Comm: kworker/0:2 Tainted: G S 6.2.0-rc2_next-queue-13jan-00458-gc20aabd57164 #1
[ +0.000006] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0010.010620200716 01/06/2020
[ +0.000003] Workqueue: ice ice_service_task [ice]
[ +0.000127] RIP: 0010:check_flush_dependency+0x178/0x1a0
[ +0.000005] Code: 89 8e 02 01 e8 49 3d 40 00 49 8b 55 18 48 8d 8d d0 00 00 00 48 8d b3 d0 00 00 00 4d 89 e0 48 c7 c7 e0 3b 08
9f e8 bb d3 07 01 &lt;0f&gt; 0b e9 be fe ff ff 80 3d 24 89 8e 02 00 0f 85 6b ff ff ff e9 06
[ +0.000004] RSP: 0018:ffff88810a39f990 EFLAGS: 00010282
[ +0.000005] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888141bc2400 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ +0.000004] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffffffffa1213a80
[ +0.000003] RBP: ffff888194bf3400 R08: ffffed117b306112 R09: ffffed117b306112
[ +0.000003] R10: ffff888bd983088b R11: ffffed117b306111 R12: 0000000000000000
[ +0.000003] R13: ffff888111f84d00 R14: ffff88810a3943ac R15: ffff888194bf3400
[ +0.000004] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888bd9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ +0.000003] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ +0.000003] CR2: 000056035b208b60 CR3: 000000017795e005 CR4: 00000000007706f0
[ +0.000003] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ +0.000003] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ +0.000002] PKRU: 55555554
[ +0.000003] Call Trace:
[ +0.000002] &lt;TASK&gt;
[ +0.000003] __flush_workqueue+0x203/0x840
[ +0.000006] ? mutex_unlock+0x84/0xd0
[ +0.000008] ? __pfx_mutex_unlock+0x10/0x10
[ +0.000004] ? __pfx___flush_workqueue+0x10/0x10
[ +0.000006] ? mutex_lock+0xa3/0xf0
[ +0.000005] ib_cache_cleanup_one+0x39/0x190 [ib_core]
[ +0.000174] __ib_unregister_device+0x84/0xf0 [ib_core]
[ +0.000094] ib_unregister_device+0x25/0x30 [ib_core]
[ +0.000093] irdma_ib_unregister_device+0x97/0xc0 [irdma]
[ +0.000064] ? __pfx_irdma_ib_unregister_device+0x10/0x10 [irdma]
[ +0.000059] ? up_write+0x5c/0x90
[ +0.000005] irdma_remove+0x36/0x90 [irdma]
[ +0.000062] auxiliary_bus_remove+0x32/0x50
[ +0.000007] device_r
---truncated---(CVE-2023-52743)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix slab out of bounds write in smb_inherit_dacl()
slab out-of-bounds write is caused by that offsets is bigger than pntsd
allocation size. This patch add the check to validate 3 offsets using
allocation size.(CVE-2023-52755)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btusb: Add date-&gt;evt_skb is NULL check
fix crash because of null pointers
[ 6104.969662] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000c8
[ 6104.969667] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 6104.969668] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 6104.969670] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 6104.969673] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[ 6104.969684] RIP: 0010:btusb_mtk_hci_wmt_sync+0x144/0x220 [btusb]
[ 6104.969688] RSP: 0018:ffffb8d681533d48 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 6104.969689] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8ad560bb2000 RCX: 0000000000000006
[ 6104.969691] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffb8d681533d08 RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 6104.969692] RBP: ffffb8d681533d70 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001
[ 6104.969694] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 00000000fa83b2da R12: ffff8ad461d1d7c0
[ 6104.969695] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8ad459618c18 R15: ffffb8d681533d90
[ 6104.969697] FS: 00007f5a1cab9d40(0000) GS:ffff8ad578200000(0000) knlGS:00000
[ 6104.969699] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 6104.969700] CR2: 00000000000000c8 CR3: 000000018620c001 CR4: 0000000000760ef0
[ 6104.969701] PKRU: 55555554
[ 6104.969702] Call Trace:
[ 6104.969708] btusb_mtk_shutdown+0x44/0x80 [btusb]
[ 6104.969732] hci_dev_do_close+0x470/0x5c0 [bluetooth]
[ 6104.969748] hci_rfkill_set_block+0x56/0xa0 [bluetooth]
[ 6104.969753] rfkill_set_block+0x92/0x160
[ 6104.969755] rfkill_fop_write+0x136/0x1e0
[ 6104.969759] __vfs_write+0x18/0x40
[ 6104.969761] vfs_write+0xdf/0x1c0
[ 6104.969763] ksys_write+0xb1/0xe0
[ 6104.969765] __x64_sys_write+0x1a/0x20
[ 6104.969769] do_syscall_64+0x51/0x180
[ 6104.969771] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 6104.969773] RIP: 0033:0x7f5a21f18fef
[ 6104.9] RSP: 002b:00007ffeefe39010 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
[ 6104.969780] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055c10a7560a0 RCX: 00007f5a21f18fef
[ 6104.969781] RDX: 0000000000000008 RSI: 00007ffeefe39060 RDI: 0000000000000012
[ 6104.969782] RBP: 00007ffeefe39060 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000017
[ 6104.969784] R10: 00007ffeefe38d97 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000002
[ 6104.969785] R13: 00007ffeefe39220 R14: 00007ffeefe391a0 R15: 000055c10a72acf0(CVE-2023-52833)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: compress: fix to cover {reserve,release}_compress_blocks() w/ cp_rwsem lock
It needs to cover {reserve,release}_compress_blocks() w/ cp_rwsem lock
to avoid racing with checkpoint, otherwise, filesystem metadata including
blkaddr in dnode, inode fields and .total_valid_block_count may be
corrupted after SPO case.(CVE-2024-34027)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
null_blk: fix null-ptr-dereference while configuring &apos;power&apos; and &apos;submit_queues&apos;
Writing &apos;power&apos; and &apos;submit_queues&apos; concurrently will trigger kernel
panic:
Test script:
modprobe null_blk nr_devices=0
mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/nullb/nullb0
while true; do echo 1 &gt; submit_queues; echo 4 &gt; submit_queues; done &amp;
while true; do echo 1 &gt; power; echo 0 &gt; power; done
Test result:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000148
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x41d/0x28f0
Call Trace:
&lt;TASK&gt;
lock_acquire+0x121/0x450
down_write+0x5f/0x1d0
simple_recursive_removal+0x12f/0x5c0
blk_mq_debugfs_unregister_hctxs+0x7c/0x100
blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues+0x4a3/0x720
nullb_update_nr_hw_queues+0x71/0xf0 [null_blk]
nullb_device_submit_queues_store+0x79/0xf0 [null_blk]
configfs_write_iter+0x119/0x1e0
vfs_write+0x326/0x730
ksys_write+0x74/0x150
This is because del_gendisk() can concurrent with
blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues():
nullb_device_power_store nullb_apply_submit_queues
null_del_dev
del_gendisk
nullb_update_nr_hw_queues
if (!dev-&gt;nullb)
// still set while gendisk is deleted
return 0
blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues
dev-&gt;nullb = NULL
Fix this problem by resuing the global mutex to protect
nullb_device_power_store() and nullb_update_nr_hw_queues() from configfs.(CVE-2024-36478)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bnxt_re: avoid shift undefined behavior in bnxt_qplib_alloc_init_hwq
Undefined behavior is triggered when bnxt_qplib_alloc_init_hwq is called
with hwq_attr-&gt;aux_depth != 0 and hwq_attr-&gt;aux_stride == 0.
In that case, &quot;roundup_pow_of_two(hwq_attr-&gt;aux_stride)&quot; gets called.
roundup_pow_of_two is documented as undefined for 0.
Fix it in the one caller that had this combination.
The undefined behavior was detected by UBSAN:
UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in ./include/linux/log2.h:57:13
shift exponent 64 is too large for 64-bit type &apos;long unsigned int&apos;
CPU: 24 PID: 1075 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 6.9.0-rc6+ #4
Hardware name: Abacus electric, s.r.o. - servis@abacus.cz Super Server/H12SSW-iN, BIOS 2.7 10/25/2023
Call Trace:
&lt;TASK&gt;
dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80
ubsan_epilogue+0x5/0x30
__ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold+0x61/0xec
__roundup_pow_of_two+0x25/0x35 [bnxt_re]
bnxt_qplib_alloc_init_hwq+0xa1/0x470 [bnxt_re]
bnxt_qplib_create_qp+0x19e/0x840 [bnxt_re]
bnxt_re_create_qp+0x9b1/0xcd0 [bnxt_re]
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __kmalloc+0x1b6/0x4f0
? create_qp.part.0+0x128/0x1c0 [ib_core]
? __pfx_bnxt_re_create_qp+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_re]
create_qp.part.0+0x128/0x1c0 [ib_core]
ib_create_qp_kernel+0x50/0xd0 [ib_core]
create_mad_qp+0x8e/0xe0 [ib_core]
? __pfx_qp_event_handler+0x10/0x10 [ib_core]
ib_mad_init_device+0x2be/0x680 [ib_core]
add_client_context+0x10d/0x1a0 [ib_core]
enable_device_and_get+0xe0/0x1d0 [ib_core]
ib_register_device+0x53c/0x630 [ib_core]
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
bnxt_re_probe+0xbd8/0xe50 [bnxt_re]
? __pfx_bnxt_re_probe+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_re]
auxiliary_bus_probe+0x49/0x80
? driver_sysfs_add+0x57/0xc0
really_probe+0xde/0x340
? pm_runtime_barrier+0x54/0x90
? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10
__driver_probe_device+0x78/0x110
driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xa0
__driver_attach+0xba/0x1c0
bus_for_each_dev+0x8f/0xe0
bus_add_driver+0x146/0x220
driver_register+0x72/0xd0
__auxiliary_driver_register+0x6e/0xd0
? __pfx_bnxt_re_mod_init+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_re]
bnxt_re_mod_init+0x3e/0xff0 [bnxt_re]
? __pfx_bnxt_re_mod_init+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_re]
do_one_initcall+0x5b/0x310
do_init_module+0x90/0x250
init_module_from_file+0x86/0xc0
idempotent_init_module+0x121/0x2b0
__x64_sys_finit_module+0x5e/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0x82/0x160
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? syscall_exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x149/0x170
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x75/0x230
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __count_memcg_events+0x69/0x100
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? count_memcg_events.constprop.0+0x1a/0x30
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? handle_mm_fault+0x1f0/0x300
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? do_user_addr_fault+0x34e/0x640
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7f4e5132821d
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 &lt;48&gt; 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d e3 db 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffca9c906a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000563ec8a8f130 RCX: 00007f4e5132821d
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f4e518fa07d RDI: 000000000000003b
RBP: 00007ffca9c90760 R08: 00007f4e513f6b20 R09: 00007ffca9c906f0
R10: 0000563ec8a8faa0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f4e518fa07d
R13: 0000000000020000 R14: 0000563ec8409e90 R15: 0000563ec8a8fa60
&lt;/TASK&gt;
---[ end trace ]---(CVE-2024-38540)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: openvswitch: fix overwriting ct original tuple for ICMPv6
OVS_PACKET_CMD_EXECUTE has 3 main attributes:
- OVS_PACKET_ATTR_KEY - Packet metadata in a netlink format.
- OVS_PACKET_ATTR_PACKET - Binary packet content.
- OVS_PACKET_ATTR_ACTIONS - Actions to execute on the packet.
OVS_PACKET_ATTR_KEY is parsed first to populate sw_flow_key structure
with the metadata like conntrack state, input port, recirculation id,
etc. Then the packet itself gets parsed to populate the rest of the
keys from the packet headers.
Whenever the packet parsing code starts parsing the ICMPv6 header, it
first zeroes out fields in the key corresponding to Neighbor Discovery
information even if it is not an ND packet.
It is an &apos;ipv6.nd&apos; field. However, the &apos;ipv6&apos; is a union that shares
the space between &apos;nd&apos; and &apos;ct_orig&apos; that holds the original tuple
conntrack metadata parsed from the OVS_PACKET_ATTR_KEY.
ND packets should not normally have conntrack state, so it&apos;s fine to
share the space, but normal ICMPv6 Echo packets or maybe other types of
ICMPv6 can have the state attached and it should not be overwritten.
The issue results in all but the last 4 bytes of the destination
address being wiped from the original conntrack tuple leading to
incorrect packet matching and potentially executing wrong actions
in case this packet recirculates within the datapath or goes back
to userspace.
ND fields should not be accessed in non-ND packets, so not clearing
them should be fine. Executing memset() only for actual ND packets to
avoid the issue.
Initializing the whole thing before parsing is needed because ND packet
may not contain all the options.
The issue only affects the OVS_PACKET_CMD_EXECUTE path and doesn&apos;t
affect packets entering OVS datapath from network interfaces, because
in this case CT metadata is populated from skb after the packet is
already parsed.(CVE-2024-38558)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gfs2: Fix potential glock use-after-free on unmount
When a DLM lockspace is released and there ares still locks in that
lockspace, DLM will unlock those locks automatically. Commit
fb6791d100d1b started exploiting this behavior to speed up filesystem
unmount: gfs2 would simply free glocks it didn&apos;t want to unlock and then
release the lockspace. This didn&apos;t take the bast callbacks for
asynchronous lock contention notifications into account, which remain
active until until a lock is unlocked or its lockspace is released.
To prevent those callbacks from accessing deallocated objects, put the
glocks that should not be unlocked on the sd_dead_glocks list, release
the lockspace, and only then free those glocks.
As an additional measure, ignore unexpected ast and bast callbacks if
the receiving glock is dead.(CVE-2024-38570)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
r8169: Fix possible ring buffer corruption on fragmented Tx packets.
An issue was found on the RTL8125b when transmitting small fragmented
packets, whereby invalid entries were inserted into the transmit ring
buffer, subsequently leading to calls to dma_unmap_single() with a null
address.
This was caused by rtl8169_start_xmit() not noticing changes to nr_frags
which may occur when small packets are padded (to work around hardware
quirks) in rtl8169_tso_csum_v2().
To fix this, postpone inspecting nr_frags until after any padding has been
applied.(CVE-2024-38586)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md: fix resync softlockup when bitmap size is less than array size
Is is reported that for dm-raid10, lvextend + lvchange --syncaction will
trigger following softlockup:
kernel:watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#3 stuck for 26s! [mdX_resync:6976]
CPU: 7 PID: 3588 Comm: mdX_resync Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.9.0-rc4-next-20240419 #1
RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x13/0x30
Call Trace:
&lt;TASK&gt;
md_bitmap_start_sync+0x6b/0xf0
raid10_sync_request+0x25c/0x1b40 [raid10]
md_do_sync+0x64b/0x1020
md_thread+0xa7/0x170
kthread+0xcf/0x100
ret_from_fork+0x30/0x50
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
And the detailed process is as follows:
md_do_sync
j = mddev-&gt;resync_min
while (j &lt; max_sectors)
sectors = raid10_sync_request(mddev, j, &amp;skipped)
if (!md_bitmap_start_sync(..., &amp;sync_blocks))
// md_bitmap_start_sync set sync_blocks to 0
return sync_blocks + sectors_skippe;
// sectors = 0;
j += sectors;
// j never change
Root cause is that commit 301867b1c168 (&quot;md/raid10: check
slab-out-of-bounds in md_bitmap_get_counter&quot;) return early from
md_bitmap_get_counter(), without setting returned blocks.
Fix this problem by always set returned blocks from
md_bitmap_get_counter&quot;(), as it used to be.
Noted that this patch just fix the softlockup problem in kernel, the
case that bitmap size doesn&apos;t match array size still need to be fixed.(CVE-2024-38598)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: core: Fix NULL module pointer assignment at card init
The commit 81033c6b584b (&quot;ALSA: core: Warn on empty module&quot;)
introduced a WARN_ON() for a NULL module pointer passed at snd_card
object creation, and it also wraps the code around it with &apos;#ifdef
MODULE&apos;. This works in most cases, but the devils are always in
details. &quot;MODULE&quot; is defined when the target code (i.e. the sound
core) is built as a module; but this doesn&apos;t mean that the caller is
also built-in or not. Namely, when only the sound core is built-in
(CONFIG_SND=y) while the driver is a module (CONFIG_SND_USB_AUDIO=m),
the passed module pointer is ignored even if it&apos;s non-NULL, and
card-&gt;module remains as NULL. This would result in the missing module
reference up/down at the device open/close, leading to a race with the
code execution after the module removal.
For addressing the bug, move the assignment of card-&gt;module again out
of ifdef. The WARN_ON() is still wrapped with ifdef because the
module can be really NULL when all sound drivers are built-in.
Note that we keep &apos;ifdef MODULE&apos; for WARN_ON(), otherwise it would
lead to a false-positive NULL module check. Admittedly it won&apos;t catch
perfectly, i.e. no check is performed when CONFIG_SND=y. But, it&apos;s no
real problem as it&apos;s only for debugging, and the condition is pretty
rare.(CVE-2024-38605)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cpufreq: exit() callback is optional
The exit() callback is optional and shouldn&apos;t be called without checking
a valid pointer first.
Also, we must clear freq_table pointer even if the exit() callback isn&apos;t
present.(CVE-2024-38615)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vfio/pci: fix potential memory leak in vfio_intx_enable()
If vfio_irq_ctx_alloc() failed will lead to &apos;name&apos; memory leak.(CVE-2024-38632)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
kdb: Fix buffer overflow during tab-complete
Currently, when the user attempts symbol completion with the Tab key, kdb
will use strncpy() to insert the completed symbol into the command buffer.
Unfortunately it passes the size of the source buffer rather than the
destination to strncpy() with predictably horrible results. Most obviously
if the command buffer is already full but cp, the cursor position, is in
the middle of the buffer, then we will write past the end of the supplied
buffer.
Fix this by replacing the dubious strncpy() calls with memmove()/memcpy()
calls plus explicit boundary checks to make sure we have enough space
before we start moving characters around.(CVE-2024-39480)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bonding: Fix out-of-bounds read in bond_option_arp_ip_targets_set()
In function bond_option_arp_ip_targets_set(), if newval-&gt;string is an
empty string, newval-&gt;string+1 will point to the byte after the
string, causing an out-of-bound read.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in strlen+0x7d/0xa0 lib/string.c:418
Read of size 1 at addr ffff8881119c4781 by task syz-executor665/8107
CPU: 1 PID: 8107 Comm: syz-executor665 Not tainted 6.7.0-rc7 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
&lt;TASK&gt;
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:364 [inline]
print_report+0xc1/0x5e0 mm/kasan/report.c:475
kasan_report+0xbe/0xf0 mm/kasan/report.c:588
strlen+0x7d/0xa0 lib/string.c:418
__fortify_strlen include/linux/fortify-string.h:210 [inline]
in4_pton+0xa3/0x3f0 net/core/utils.c:130
bond_option_arp_ip_targets_set+0xc2/0x910
drivers/net/bonding/bond_options.c:1201
__bond_opt_set+0x2a4/0x1030 drivers/net/bonding/bond_options.c:767
__bond_opt_set_notify+0x48/0x150 drivers/net/bonding/bond_options.c:792
bond_opt_tryset_rtnl+0xda/0x160 drivers/net/bonding/bond_options.c:817
bonding_sysfs_store_option+0xa1/0x120 drivers/net/bonding/bond_sysfs.c:156
dev_attr_store+0x54/0x80 drivers/base/core.c:2366
sysfs_kf_write+0x114/0x170 fs/sysfs/file.c:136
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x337/0x500 fs/kernfs/file.c:334
call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2020 [inline]
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:491 [inline]
vfs_write+0x96a/0xd80 fs/read_write.c:584
ksys_write+0x122/0x250 fs/read_write.c:637
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x40/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
---[ end trace ]---
Fix it by adding a check of string length before using it.(CVE-2024-39487)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: asm-bug: Add .align 2 to the end of __BUG_ENTRY
When CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE=n, we fail to add necessary padding bytes
to bug_table entries, and as a result the last entry in a bug table will
be ignored, potentially leading to an unexpected panic(). All prior
entries in the table will be handled correctly.
The arm64 ABI requires that struct fields of up to 8 bytes are
naturally-aligned, with padding added within a struct such that struct
are suitably aligned within arrays.
When CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERPOSE=y, the layout of a bug_entry is:
struct bug_entry {
signed int bug_addr_disp; // 4 bytes
signed int file_disp; // 4 bytes
unsigned short line; // 2 bytes
unsigned short flags; // 2 bytes
}
... with 12 bytes total, requiring 4-byte alignment.
When CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE=n, the layout of a bug_entry is:
struct bug_entry {
signed int bug_addr_disp; // 4 bytes
unsigned short flags; // 2 bytes
&lt; implicit padding &gt; // 2 bytes
}
... with 8 bytes total, with 6 bytes of data and 2 bytes of trailing
padding, requiring 4-byte alginment.
When we create a bug_entry in assembly, we align the start of the entry
to 4 bytes, which implicitly handles padding for any prior entries.
However, we do not align the end of the entry, and so when
CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE=n, the final entry lacks the trailing padding
bytes.
For the main kernel image this is not a problem as find_bug() doesn&apos;t
depend on the trailing padding bytes when searching for entries:
for (bug = __start___bug_table; bug &lt; __stop___bug_table; ++bug)
if (bugaddr == bug_addr(bug))
return bug;
However for modules, module_bug_finalize() depends on the trailing
bytes when calculating the number of entries:
mod-&gt;num_bugs = sechdrs[i].sh_size / sizeof(struct bug_entry);
... and as the last bug_entry lacks the necessary padding bytes, this entry
will not be counted, e.g. in the case of a single entry:
sechdrs[i].sh_size == 6
sizeof(struct bug_entry) == 8;
sechdrs[i].sh_size / sizeof(struct bug_entry) == 0;
Consequently module_find_bug() will miss the last bug_entry when it does:
for (i = 0; i &lt; mod-&gt;num_bugs; ++i, ++bug)
if (bugaddr == bug_addr(bug))
goto out;
... which can lead to a kenrel panic due to an unhandled bug.
This can be demonstrated with the following module:
static int __init buginit(void)
{
WARN(1, &quot;hello\n&quot;);
return 0;
}
static void __exit bugexit(void)
{
}
module_init(buginit);
module_exit(bugexit);
MODULE_LICENSE(&quot;GPL&quot;);
... which will trigger a kernel panic when loaded:
------------[ cut here ]------------
hello
Unexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1
Internal error: BRK handler: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in: hello(O+)
CPU: 0 PID: 50 Comm: insmod Tainted: G O 6.9.1 #8
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : buginit+0x18/0x1000 [hello]
lr : buginit+0x18/0x1000 [hello]
sp : ffff800080533ae0
x29: ffff800080533ae0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000
x26: ffffaba8c4e70510 x25: ffff800080533c30 x24: ffffaba8c4a28a58
x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff3947c0eab3c0
x20: ffffaba8c4e3f000 x19: ffffaba846464000 x18: 0000000000000006
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffaba8c2492834 x15: 0720072007200720
x14: 0720072007200720 x13: ffffaba8c49b27c8 x12: 0000000000000312
x11: 0000000000000106 x10: ffffaba8c4a0a7c8 x9 : ffffaba8c49b27c8
x8 : 00000000ffffefff x7 : ffffaba8c4a0a7c8 x6 : 80000000fffff000
x5 : 0000000000000107 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000
x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff3947c0eab3c0
Call trace:
buginit+0x18/0x1000 [hello]
do_one_initcall+0x80/0x1c8
do_init_module+0x60/0x218
load_module+0x1ba4/0x1d70
__do_sys_init_module+0x198/0x1d0
__arm64_sys_init_module+0x1c/0x28
invoke_syscall+0x48/0x114
el0_svc
---truncated---(CVE-2024-39488)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: sr: fix memleak in seg6_hmac_init_algo
seg6_hmac_init_algo returns without cleaning up the previous allocations
if one fails, so it&apos;s going to leak all that memory and the crypto tfms.
Update seg6_hmac_exit to only free the memory when allocated, so we can
reuse the code directly.(CVE-2024-39489)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sock_map: avoid race between sock_map_close and sk_psock_put
sk_psock_get will return NULL if the refcount of psock has gone to 0, which
will happen when the last call of sk_psock_put is done. However,
sk_psock_drop may not have finished yet, so the close callback will still
point to sock_map_close despite psock being NULL.
This can be reproduced with a thread deleting an element from the sock map,
while the second one creates a socket, adds it to the map and closes it.
That will trigger the WARN_ON_ONCE:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 7220 at net/core/sock_map.c:1701 sock_map_close+0x2a2/0x2d0 net/core/sock_map.c:1701
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 7220 Comm: syz-executor380 Not tainted 6.9.0-syzkaller-07726-g3c999d1ae3c7 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024
RIP: 0010:sock_map_close+0x2a2/0x2d0 net/core/sock_map.c:1701
Code: df e8 92 29 88 f8 48 8b 1b 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 20 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 79 29 88 f8 4c 8b 23 eb 89 e8 4f 15 23 f8 90 &lt;0f&gt; 0b 90 48 83 c4 08 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d e9 13 26 3d 02
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000441fda8 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: ffffffff89731ae1 RBX: ffffffff94b87540 RCX: ffff888029470000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8bcab5c0 RDI: ffffffff8c1faba0
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffffff92f9b61f R09: 1ffffffff25f36c3
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff25f36c4 R12: ffffffff89731840
R13: ffff88804b587000 R14: ffff88804b587000 R15: ffffffff89731870
FS: 000055555e080380(0000) GS:ffff8880b9500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000000207d4000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
Call Trace:
&lt;TASK&gt;
unix_release+0x87/0xc0 net/unix/af_unix.c:1048
__sock_release net/socket.c:659 [inline]
sock_close+0xbe/0x240 net/socket.c:1421
__fput+0x42b/0x8a0 fs/file_table.c:422
__do_sys_close fs/open.c:1556 [inline]
__se_sys_close fs/open.c:1541 [inline]
__x64_sys_close+0x7f/0x110 fs/open.c:1541
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fb37d618070
Code: 00 00 48 c7 c2 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb d4 e8 10 2c 00 00 80 3d 31 f0 07 00 00 74 17 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 &lt;48&gt; 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 48 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 83 ec 18 89 7c
RSP: 002b:00007ffcd4a525d8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: 00007fb37d618070
RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 00000000200001c0 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000100000000 R09: 0000000100000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
&lt;/TASK&gt;
Use sk_psock, which will only check that the pointer is not been set to
NULL yet, which should only happen after the callbacks are restored. If,
then, a reference can still be gotten, we may call sk_psock_stop and cancel
psock-&gt;work.
As suggested by Paolo Abeni, reorder the condition so the control flow is
less convoluted.
After that change, the reproducer does not trigger the WARN_ON_ONCE
anymore.(CVE-2024-39500)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: ensure snd_una is properly initialized on connect
This is strictly related to commit fb7a0d334894 (&quot;mptcp: ensure snd_nxt
is properly initialized on connect&quot;). It turns out that syzkaller can
trigger the retransmit after fallback and before processing any other
incoming packet - so that snd_una is still left uninitialized.
Address the issue explicitly initializing snd_una together with snd_nxt
and write_seq.(CVE-2024-40931)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: remove clear SB_INLINECRYPT flag in default_options
In f2fs_remount, SB_INLINECRYPT flag will be clear and re-set.
If create new file or open file during this gap, these files
will not use inlinecrypt. Worse case, it may lead to data
corruption if wrappedkey_v0 is enable.
Thread A: Thread B:
-f2fs_remount -f2fs_file_open or f2fs_new_inode
-default_options
&lt;- clear SB_INLINECRYPT flag
-fscrypt_select_encryption_impl
-parse_options
&lt;- set SB_INLINECRYPT again(CVE-2024-40971)</Note>
<Note Title="Topic" Type="General" Ordinal="4" xml:lang="en">An update for kernel is now available for openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1.
openEuler Security has rated this update as having a security impact of high. A Common Vunlnerability Scoring System(CVSS)base score,which gives a detailed severity rating, is available for each vulnerability from the CVElink(s) in the References section.</Note>
<Note Title="Severity" Type="General" Ordinal="5" xml:lang="en">High</Note>
<Note Title="Affected Component" Type="General" Ordinal="6" xml:lang="en">kernel</Note>
</DocumentNotes>
<DocumentReferences>
<Reference Type="Self">
<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1860</URL>
</Reference>
<Reference Type="openEuler CVE">
<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2021-47391</URL>
<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2022-48721</URL>
<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2023-52743</URL>
<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2023-52755</URL>
<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2023-52833</URL>
<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2024-34027</URL>
<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2024-36478</URL>
<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2024-38540</URL>
<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2024-38558</URL>
<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2024-38570</URL>
<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2024-38586</URL>
<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2024-38598</URL>
<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2024-38605</URL>
<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2024-38615</URL>
<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2024-38632</URL>
<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2024-39480</URL>
<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2024-39487</URL>
<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2024-39488</URL>
<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2024-39489</URL>
<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2024-39500</URL>
<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2024-40931</URL>
<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2024-40971</URL>
</Reference>
<Reference Type="Other">
<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-47391</URL>
<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-48721</URL>
<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-52743</URL>
<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-52755</URL>
<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-52833</URL>
<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-34027</URL>
<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-36478</URL>
<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38540</URL>
<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38558</URL>
<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38570</URL>
<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38586</URL>
<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38598</URL>
<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38605</URL>
<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38615</URL>
<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38632</URL>
<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39480</URL>
<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39487</URL>
<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39488</URL>
<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39489</URL>
<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39500</URL>
<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40931</URL>
<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40971</URL>
</Reference>
</DocumentReferences>
<ProductTree xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/prod/1.1">
<Branch Type="Product Name" Name="openEuler">
<FullProductName ProductID="openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP1">openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1</FullProductName>
</Branch>
<Branch Type="Package Arch" Name="aarch64">
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<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-debuginfo-5.10.0-136.85.0.166" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP1">kernel-debuginfo-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-debugsource-5.10.0-136.85.0.166" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP1">kernel-debugsource-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-devel-5.10.0-136.85.0.166" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP1">kernel-devel-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-headers-5.10.0-136.85.0.166" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP1">kernel-headers-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-source-5.10.0-136.85.0.166" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP1">kernel-source-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-tools-5.10.0-136.85.0.166" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP1">kernel-tools-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-tools-debuginfo-5.10.0-136.85.0.166" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP1">kernel-tools-debuginfo-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-tools-devel-5.10.0-136.85.0.166" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP1">kernel-tools-devel-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
<FullProductName ProductID="perf-5.10.0-136.85.0.166" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP1">perf-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
<FullProductName ProductID="perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-136.85.0.166" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP1">perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
<FullProductName ProductID="python3-perf-5.10.0-136.85.0.166" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP1">python3-perf-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
<FullProductName ProductID="python3-perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-136.85.0.166" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP1">python3-perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
</Branch>
<Branch Type="Package Arch" Name="src">
<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-5.10.0-136.85.0.166" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP1">kernel-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.src.rpm</FullProductName>
</Branch>
<Branch Type="Package Arch" Name="x86_64">
<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-5.10.0-136.85.0.166" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP1">kernel-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-debuginfo-5.10.0-136.85.0.166" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP1">kernel-debuginfo-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-debugsource-5.10.0-136.85.0.166" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP1">kernel-debugsource-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-devel-5.10.0-136.85.0.166" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP1">kernel-devel-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-headers-5.10.0-136.85.0.166" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP1">kernel-headers-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-source-5.10.0-136.85.0.166" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP1">kernel-source-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-tools-5.10.0-136.85.0.166" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP1">kernel-tools-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-tools-debuginfo-5.10.0-136.85.0.166" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP1">kernel-tools-debuginfo-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-tools-devel-5.10.0-136.85.0.166" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP1">kernel-tools-devel-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
<FullProductName ProductID="perf-5.10.0-136.85.0.166" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP1">perf-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
<FullProductName ProductID="perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-136.85.0.166" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP1">perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
<FullProductName ProductID="python3-perf-5.10.0-136.85.0.166" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP1">python3-perf-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
<FullProductName ProductID="python3-perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-136.85.0.166" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP1">python3-perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-136.85.0.166.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
</Branch>
</ProductTree>
<Vulnerability Ordinal="1" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
<Notes>
<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/cma: Ensure rdma_addr_cancel() happens before issuing more requests
The FSM can run in a circle allowing rdma_resolve_ip() to be called twice
on the same id_priv. While this cannot happen without going through the
work, it violates the invariant that the same address resolution
background request cannot be active twice.
CPU 1 CPU 2
rdma_resolve_addr():
RDMA_CM_IDLE -&gt; RDMA_CM_ADDR_QUERY
rdma_resolve_ip(addr_handler) #1
process_one_req(): for #1
addr_handler():
RDMA_CM_ADDR_QUERY -&gt; RDMA_CM_ADDR_BOUND
mutex_unlock(&amp;id_priv-&gt;handler_mutex);
[.. handler still running ..]
rdma_resolve_addr():
RDMA_CM_ADDR_BOUND -&gt; RDMA_CM_ADDR_QUERY
rdma_resolve_ip(addr_handler)
!! two requests are now on the req_list
rdma_destroy_id():
destroy_id_handler_unlock():
_destroy_id():
cma_cancel_operation():
rdma_addr_cancel()
// process_one_req() self removes it
spin_lock_bh(&amp;lock);
cancel_delayed_work(&amp;req-&gt;work);
if (!list_empty(&amp;req-&gt;list)) == true
! rdma_addr_cancel() returns after process_on_req #1 is done
kfree(id_priv)
process_one_req(): for #2
addr_handler():
mutex_lock(&amp;id_priv-&gt;handler_mutex);
!! Use after free on id_priv
rdma_addr_cancel() expects there to be one req on the list and only
cancels the first one. The self-removal behavior of the work only happens
after the handler has returned. This yields a situations where the
req_list can have two reqs for the same &quot;handle&quot; but rdma_addr_cancel()
only cancels the first one.
The second req remains active beyond rdma_destroy_id() and will
use-after-free id_priv once it inevitably triggers.
Fix this by remembering if the id_priv has called rdma_resolve_ip() and
always cancel before calling it again. This ensures the req_list never
gets more than one item in it and doesn&apos;t cost anything in the normal flow
that never uses this strange error path.</Note>
</Notes>
<ReleaseDate>2024-07-19</ReleaseDate>
<CVE>CVE-2021-47391</CVE>
<ProductStatuses>
<Status Type="Fixed">
<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1</ProductID>
</Status>
</ProductStatuses>
<Threats>
<Threat Type="Impact">
<Description>Low</Description>
</Threat>
</Threats>
<CVSSScoreSets>
<ScoreSet>
<BaseScore>3.9</BaseScore>
<Vector>AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L</Vector>
</ScoreSet>
</CVSSScoreSets>
<Remediations>
<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
<Description>kernel security update</Description>
<DATE>2024-07-19</DATE>
<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1860</URL>
</Remediation>
</Remediations>
</Vulnerability>
<Vulnerability Ordinal="2" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
<Notes>
<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: Forward wakeup to smc socket waitqueue after fallback
When we replace TCP with SMC and a fallback occurs, there may be
some socket waitqueue entries remaining in smc socket-&gt;wq, such
as eppoll_entries inserted by userspace applications.
After the fallback, data flows over TCP/IP and only clcsocket-&gt;wq
will be woken up. Applications can&apos;t be notified by the entries
which were inserted in smc socket-&gt;wq before fallback. So we need
a mechanism to wake up smc socket-&gt;wq at the same time if some
entries remaining in it.
The current workaround is to transfer the entries from smc socket-&gt;wq
to clcsock-&gt;wq during the fallback. But this may cause a crash
like this:
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdead000000000100: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 5.16.0+ #107
RIP: 0010:__wake_up_common+0x65/0x170
Call Trace:
&lt;IRQ&gt;
__wake_up_common_lock+0x7a/0xc0
sock_def_readable+0x3c/0x70
tcp_data_queue+0x4a7/0xc40
tcp_rcv_established+0x32f/0x660
? sk_filter_trim_cap+0xcb/0x2e0
tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x10b/0x260
tcp_v4_rcv+0xd2a/0xde0
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x3b/0x1d0
ip_local_deliver_finish+0x54/0x60
ip_local_deliver+0x6a/0x110
? tcp_v4_early_demux+0xa2/0x140
? tcp_v4_early_demux+0x10d/0x140
ip_sublist_rcv_finish+0x49/0x60
ip_sublist_rcv+0x19d/0x230
ip_list_rcv+0x13e/0x170
__netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x1c2/0x240
netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x1e6/0x320
napi_complete_done+0x11d/0x190
mlx5e_napi_poll+0x163/0x6b0 [mlx5_core]
__napi_poll+0x3c/0x1b0
net_rx_action+0x27c/0x300
__do_softirq+0x114/0x2d2
irq_exit_rcu+0xb4/0xe0
common_interrupt+0xba/0xe0
&lt;/IRQ&gt;
&lt;TASK&gt;
The crash is caused by privately transferring waitqueue entries from
smc socket-&gt;wq to clcsock-&gt;wq. The owners of these entries, such as
epoll, have no idea that the entries have been transferred to a
different socket wait queue and still use original waitqueue spinlock
(smc socket-&gt;wq.wait.lock) to make the entries operation exclusive,
but it doesn&apos;t work. The operations to the entries, such as removing
from the waitqueue (now is clcsock-&gt;wq after fallback), may cause a
crash when clcsock waitqueue is being iterated over at the moment.
This patch tries to fix this by no longer transferring wait queue
entries privately, but introducing own implementations of clcsock&apos;s
callback functions in fallback situation. The callback functions will
forward the wakeup to smc socket-&gt;wq if clcsock-&gt;wq is actually woken
up and smc socket-&gt;wq has remaining entries.</Note>
</Notes>
<ReleaseDate>2024-07-19</ReleaseDate>
<CVE>CVE-2022-48721</CVE>
<ProductStatuses>
<Status Type="Fixed">
<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1</ProductID>
</Status>
</ProductStatuses>
<Threats>
<Threat Type="Impact">
<Description>Medium</Description>
</Threat>
</Threats>
<CVSSScoreSets>
<ScoreSet>
<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
</ScoreSet>
</CVSSScoreSets>
<Remediations>
<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
<Description>kernel security update</Description>
<DATE>2024-07-19</DATE>
<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1860</URL>
</Remediation>
</Remediations>
</Vulnerability>
<Vulnerability Ordinal="3" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
<Notes>
<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: Do not use WQ_MEM_RECLAIM flag for workqueue
When both ice and the irdma driver are loaded, a warning in
check_flush_dependency is being triggered. This is due to ice driver
workqueue being allocated with the WQ_MEM_RECLAIM flag and the irdma one
is not.
According to kernel documentation, this flag should be set if the
workqueue will be involved in the kernel&apos;s memory reclamation flow.
Since it is not, there is no need for the ice driver&apos;s WQ to have this
flag set so remove it.
Example trace:
[ +0.000004] workqueue: WQ_MEM_RECLAIM ice:ice_service_task [ice] is flushing !WQ_MEM_RECLAIM infiniband:0x0
[ +0.000139] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 728 at kernel/workqueue.c:2632 check_flush_dependency+0x178/0x1a0
[ +0.000011] Modules linked in: bonding tls xt_CHECKSUM xt_MASQUERADE xt_conntrack ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 nft_compat nft_cha
in_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_tables nfnetlink bridge stp llc rfkill vfat fat intel_rapl_msr intel
_rapl_common isst_if_common skx_edac nfit libnvdimm x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct1
0dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel rapl intel_cstate rpcrdma sunrpc rdma_ucm ib_srpt ib_isert iscsi_target_mod target_
core_mod ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support ipmi_ssif irdma mei_me ib_uverbs
ib_core intel_uncore joydev pcspkr i2c_i801 acpi_ipmi mei lpc_ich i2c_smbus intel_pch_thermal ioatdma ipmi_si acpi_power_meter
acpi_pad xfs libcrc32c sd_mod t10_pi crc64_rocksoft crc64 sg ahci ixgbe libahci ice i40e igb crc32c_intel mdio i2c_algo_bit liba
ta dca wmi dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler fuse
[ +0.000161] [last unloaded: bonding]
[ +0.000006] CPU: 0 PID: 728 Comm: kworker/0:2 Tainted: G S 6.2.0-rc2_next-queue-13jan-00458-gc20aabd57164 #1
[ +0.000006] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0010.010620200716 01/06/2020
[ +0.000003] Workqueue: ice ice_service_task [ice]
[ +0.000127] RIP: 0010:check_flush_dependency+0x178/0x1a0
[ +0.000005] Code: 89 8e 02 01 e8 49 3d 40 00 49 8b 55 18 48 8d 8d d0 00 00 00 48 8d b3 d0 00 00 00 4d 89 e0 48 c7 c7 e0 3b 08
9f e8 bb d3 07 01 &lt;0f&gt; 0b e9 be fe ff ff 80 3d 24 89 8e 02 00 0f 85 6b ff ff ff e9 06
[ +0.000004] RSP: 0018:ffff88810a39f990 EFLAGS: 00010282
[ +0.000005] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888141bc2400 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ +0.000004] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffffffffa1213a80
[ +0.000003] RBP: ffff888194bf3400 R08: ffffed117b306112 R09: ffffed117b306112
[ +0.000003] R10: ffff888bd983088b R11: ffffed117b306111 R12: 0000000000000000
[ +0.000003] R13: ffff888111f84d00 R14: ffff88810a3943ac R15: ffff888194bf3400
[ +0.000004] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888bd9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ +0.000003] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ +0.000003] CR2: 000056035b208b60 CR3: 000000017795e005 CR4: 00000000007706f0
[ +0.000003] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ +0.000003] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ +0.000002] PKRU: 55555554
[ +0.000003] Call Trace:
[ +0.000002] &lt;TASK&gt;
[ +0.000003] __flush_workqueue+0x203/0x840
[ +0.000006] ? mutex_unlock+0x84/0xd0
[ +0.000008] ? __pfx_mutex_unlock+0x10/0x10
[ +0.000004] ? __pfx___flush_workqueue+0x10/0x10
[ +0.000006] ? mutex_lock+0xa3/0xf0
[ +0.000005] ib_cache_cleanup_one+0x39/0x190 [ib_core]
[ +0.000174] __ib_unregister_device+0x84/0xf0 [ib_core]
[ +0.000094] ib_unregister_device+0x25/0x30 [ib_core]
[ +0.000093] irdma_ib_unregister_device+0x97/0xc0 [irdma]
[ +0.000064] ? __pfx_irdma_ib_unregister_device+0x10/0x10 [irdma]
[ +0.000059] ? up_write+0x5c/0x90
[ +0.000005] irdma_remove+0x36/0x90 [irdma]
[ +0.000062] auxiliary_bus_remove+0x32/0x50
[ +0.000007] device_r
---truncated---</Note>
</Notes>
<ReleaseDate>2024-07-19</ReleaseDate>
<CVE>CVE-2023-52743</CVE>
<ProductStatuses>
<Status Type="Fixed">
<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1</ProductID>
</Status>
</ProductStatuses>
<Threats>
<Threat Type="Impact">
<Description>Medium</Description>
</Threat>
</Threats>
<CVSSScoreSets>
<ScoreSet>
<BaseScore>4.0</BaseScore>
<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L</Vector>
</ScoreSet>
</CVSSScoreSets>
<Remediations>
<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
<Description>kernel security update</Description>
<DATE>2024-07-19</DATE>
<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1860</URL>
</Remediation>
</Remediations>
</Vulnerability>
<Vulnerability Ordinal="4" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
<Notes>
<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix slab out of bounds write in smb_inherit_dacl()
slab out-of-bounds write is caused by that offsets is bigger than pntsd
allocation size. This patch add the check to validate 3 offsets using
allocation size.</Note>
</Notes>
<ReleaseDate>2024-07-19</ReleaseDate>
<CVE>CVE-2023-52755</CVE>
<ProductStatuses>
<Status Type="Fixed">
<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1</ProductID>
</Status>
</ProductStatuses>
<Threats>
<Threat Type="Impact">
<Description>High</Description>
</Threat>
</Threats>
<CVSSScoreSets>
<ScoreSet>
<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
</ScoreSet>
</CVSSScoreSets>
<Remediations>
<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
<Description>kernel security update</Description>
<DATE>2024-07-19</DATE>
<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1860</URL>
</Remediation>
</Remediations>
</Vulnerability>
<Vulnerability Ordinal="5" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
<Notes>
<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btusb: Add date-&gt;evt_skb is NULL check
fix crash because of null pointers
[ 6104.969662] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000c8
[ 6104.969667] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 6104.969668] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 6104.969670] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 6104.969673] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[ 6104.969684] RIP: 0010:btusb_mtk_hci_wmt_sync+0x144/0x220 [btusb]
[ 6104.969688] RSP: 0018:ffffb8d681533d48 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 6104.969689] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8ad560bb2000 RCX: 0000000000000006
[ 6104.969691] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffb8d681533d08 RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 6104.969692] RBP: ffffb8d681533d70 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001
[ 6104.969694] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 00000000fa83b2da R12: ffff8ad461d1d7c0
[ 6104.969695] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8ad459618c18 R15: ffffb8d681533d90
[ 6104.969697] FS: 00007f5a1cab9d40(0000) GS:ffff8ad578200000(0000) knlGS:00000
[ 6104.969699] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 6104.969700] CR2: 00000000000000c8 CR3: 000000018620c001 CR4: 0000000000760ef0
[ 6104.969701] PKRU: 55555554
[ 6104.969702] Call Trace:
[ 6104.969708] btusb_mtk_shutdown+0x44/0x80 [btusb]
[ 6104.969732] hci_dev_do_close+0x470/0x5c0 [bluetooth]
[ 6104.969748] hci_rfkill_set_block+0x56/0xa0 [bluetooth]
[ 6104.969753] rfkill_set_block+0x92/0x160
[ 6104.969755] rfkill_fop_write+0x136/0x1e0
[ 6104.969759] __vfs_write+0x18/0x40
[ 6104.969761] vfs_write+0xdf/0x1c0
[ 6104.969763] ksys_write+0xb1/0xe0
[ 6104.969765] __x64_sys_write+0x1a/0x20
[ 6104.969769] do_syscall_64+0x51/0x180
[ 6104.969771] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 6104.969773] RIP: 0033:0x7f5a21f18fef
[ 6104.9] RSP: 002b:00007ffeefe39010 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
[ 6104.969780] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055c10a7560a0 RCX: 00007f5a21f18fef
[ 6104.969781] RDX: 0000000000000008 RSI: 00007ffeefe39060 RDI: 0000000000000012
[ 6104.969782] RBP: 00007ffeefe39060 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000017
[ 6104.969784] R10: 00007ffeefe38d97 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000002
[ 6104.969785] R13: 00007ffeefe39220 R14: 00007ffeefe391a0 R15: 000055c10a72acf0</Note>
</Notes>
<ReleaseDate>2024-07-19</ReleaseDate>
<CVE>CVE-2023-52833</CVE>
<ProductStatuses>
<Status Type="Fixed">
<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1</ProductID>
</Status>
</ProductStatuses>
<Threats>
<Threat Type="Impact">
<Description>Medium</Description>
</Threat>
</Threats>
<CVSSScoreSets>
<ScoreSet>
<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
</ScoreSet>
</CVSSScoreSets>
<Remediations>
<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
<Description>kernel security update</Description>
<DATE>2024-07-19</DATE>
<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1860</URL>
</Remediation>
</Remediations>
</Vulnerability>
<Vulnerability Ordinal="6" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
<Notes>
<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: compress: fix to cover {reserve,release}_compress_blocks() w/ cp_rwsem lock
It needs to cover {reserve,release}_compress_blocks() w/ cp_rwsem lock
to avoid racing with checkpoint, otherwise, filesystem metadata including
blkaddr in dnode, inode fields and .total_valid_block_count may be
corrupted after SPO case.</Note>
</Notes>
<ReleaseDate>2024-07-19</ReleaseDate>
<CVE>CVE-2024-34027</CVE>
<ProductStatuses>
<Status Type="Fixed">
<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1</ProductID>
</Status>
</ProductStatuses>
<Threats>
<Threat Type="Impact">
<Description>Medium</Description>
</Threat>
</Threats>
<CVSSScoreSets>
<ScoreSet>
<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N</Vector>
</ScoreSet>
</CVSSScoreSets>
<Remediations>
<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
<Description>kernel security update</Description>
<DATE>2024-07-19</DATE>
<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1860</URL>
</Remediation>
</Remediations>
</Vulnerability>
<Vulnerability Ordinal="7" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
<Notes>
<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
null_blk: fix null-ptr-dereference while configuring &apos;power&apos; and &apos;submit_queues&apos;
Writing &apos;power&apos; and &apos;submit_queues&apos; concurrently will trigger kernel
panic:
Test script:
modprobe null_blk nr_devices=0
mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/nullb/nullb0
while true; do echo 1 &gt; submit_queues; echo 4 &gt; submit_queues; done &amp;
while true; do echo 1 &gt; power; echo 0 &gt; power; done
Test result:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000148
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x41d/0x28f0
Call Trace:
&lt;TASK&gt;
lock_acquire+0x121/0x450
down_write+0x5f/0x1d0
simple_recursive_removal+0x12f/0x5c0
blk_mq_debugfs_unregister_hctxs+0x7c/0x100
blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues+0x4a3/0x720
nullb_update_nr_hw_queues+0x71/0xf0 [null_blk]
nullb_device_submit_queues_store+0x79/0xf0 [null_blk]
configfs_write_iter+0x119/0x1e0
vfs_write+0x326/0x730
ksys_write+0x74/0x150
This is because del_gendisk() can concurrent with
blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues():
nullb_device_power_store nullb_apply_submit_queues
null_del_dev
del_gendisk
nullb_update_nr_hw_queues
if (!dev-&gt;nullb)
// still set while gendisk is deleted
return 0
blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues
dev-&gt;nullb = NULL
Fix this problem by resuing the global mutex to protect
nullb_device_power_store() and nullb_update_nr_hw_queues() from configfs.</Note>
</Notes>
<ReleaseDate>2024-07-19</ReleaseDate>
<CVE>CVE-2024-36478</CVE>
<ProductStatuses>
<Status Type="Fixed">
<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1</ProductID>
</Status>
</ProductStatuses>
<Threats>
<Threat Type="Impact">
<Description>Medium</Description>
</Threat>
</Threats>
<CVSSScoreSets>
<ScoreSet>
<BaseScore>4.1</BaseScore>
<Vector>AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
</ScoreSet>
</CVSSScoreSets>
<Remediations>
<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
<Description>kernel security update</Description>
<DATE>2024-07-19</DATE>
<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1860</URL>
</Remediation>
</Remediations>
</Vulnerability>
<Vulnerability Ordinal="8" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
<Notes>
<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bnxt_re: avoid shift undefined behavior in bnxt_qplib_alloc_init_hwq
Undefined behavior is triggered when bnxt_qplib_alloc_init_hwq is called
with hwq_attr-&gt;aux_depth != 0 and hwq_attr-&gt;aux_stride == 0.
In that case, &quot;roundup_pow_of_two(hwq_attr-&gt;aux_stride)&quot; gets called.
roundup_pow_of_two is documented as undefined for 0.
Fix it in the one caller that had this combination.
The undefined behavior was detected by UBSAN:
UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in ./include/linux/log2.h:57:13
shift exponent 64 is too large for 64-bit type &apos;long unsigned int&apos;
CPU: 24 PID: 1075 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 6.9.0-rc6+ #4
Hardware name: Abacus electric, s.r.o. - servis@abacus.cz Super Server/H12SSW-iN, BIOS 2.7 10/25/2023
Call Trace:
&lt;TASK&gt;
dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80
ubsan_epilogue+0x5/0x30
__ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold+0x61/0xec
__roundup_pow_of_two+0x25/0x35 [bnxt_re]
bnxt_qplib_alloc_init_hwq+0xa1/0x470 [bnxt_re]
bnxt_qplib_create_qp+0x19e/0x840 [bnxt_re]
bnxt_re_create_qp+0x9b1/0xcd0 [bnxt_re]
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __kmalloc+0x1b6/0x4f0
? create_qp.part.0+0x128/0x1c0 [ib_core]
? __pfx_bnxt_re_create_qp+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_re]
create_qp.part.0+0x128/0x1c0 [ib_core]
ib_create_qp_kernel+0x50/0xd0 [ib_core]
create_mad_qp+0x8e/0xe0 [ib_core]
? __pfx_qp_event_handler+0x10/0x10 [ib_core]
ib_mad_init_device+0x2be/0x680 [ib_core]
add_client_context+0x10d/0x1a0 [ib_core]
enable_device_and_get+0xe0/0x1d0 [ib_core]
ib_register_device+0x53c/0x630 [ib_core]
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
bnxt_re_probe+0xbd8/0xe50 [bnxt_re]
? __pfx_bnxt_re_probe+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_re]
auxiliary_bus_probe+0x49/0x80
? driver_sysfs_add+0x57/0xc0
really_probe+0xde/0x340
? pm_runtime_barrier+0x54/0x90
? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10
__driver_probe_device+0x78/0x110
driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xa0
__driver_attach+0xba/0x1c0
bus_for_each_dev+0x8f/0xe0
bus_add_driver+0x146/0x220
driver_register+0x72/0xd0
__auxiliary_driver_register+0x6e/0xd0
? __pfx_bnxt_re_mod_init+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_re]
bnxt_re_mod_init+0x3e/0xff0 [bnxt_re]
? __pfx_bnxt_re_mod_init+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_re]
do_one_initcall+0x5b/0x310
do_init_module+0x90/0x250
init_module_from_file+0x86/0xc0
idempotent_init_module+0x121/0x2b0
__x64_sys_finit_module+0x5e/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0x82/0x160
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? syscall_exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x149/0x170
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x75/0x230
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __count_memcg_events+0x69/0x100
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? count_memcg_events.constprop.0+0x1a/0x30
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? handle_mm_fault+0x1f0/0x300
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? do_user_addr_fault+0x34e/0x640
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7f4e5132821d
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 &lt;48&gt; 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d e3 db 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffca9c906a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000563ec8a8f130 RCX: 00007f4e5132821d
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f4e518fa07d RDI: 000000000000003b
RBP: 00007ffca9c90760 R08: 00007f4e513f6b20 R09: 00007ffca9c906f0
R10: 0000563ec8a8faa0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f4e518fa07d
R13: 0000000000020000 R14: 0000563ec8409e90 R15: 0000563ec8a8fa60
&lt;/TASK&gt;
---[ end trace ]---</Note>
</Notes>
<ReleaseDate>2024-07-19</ReleaseDate>
<CVE>CVE-2024-38540</CVE>
<ProductStatuses>
<Status Type="Fixed">
<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1</ProductID>
</Status>
</ProductStatuses>
<Threats>
<Threat Type="Impact">
<Description>Medium</Description>
</Threat>
</Threats>
<CVSSScoreSets>
<ScoreSet>
<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
</ScoreSet>
</CVSSScoreSets>
<Remediations>
<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
<Description>kernel security update</Description>
<DATE>2024-07-19</DATE>
<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1860</URL>
</Remediation>
</Remediations>
</Vulnerability>
<Vulnerability Ordinal="9" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
<Notes>
<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: openvswitch: fix overwriting ct original tuple for ICMPv6
OVS_PACKET_CMD_EXECUTE has 3 main attributes:
- OVS_PACKET_ATTR_KEY - Packet metadata in a netlink format.
- OVS_PACKET_ATTR_PACKET - Binary packet content.
- OVS_PACKET_ATTR_ACTIONS - Actions to execute on the packet.
OVS_PACKET_ATTR_KEY is parsed first to populate sw_flow_key structure
with the metadata like conntrack state, input port, recirculation id,
etc. Then the packet itself gets parsed to populate the rest of the
keys from the packet headers.
Whenever the packet parsing code starts parsing the ICMPv6 header, it
first zeroes out fields in the key corresponding to Neighbor Discovery
information even if it is not an ND packet.
It is an &apos;ipv6.nd&apos; field. However, the &apos;ipv6&apos; is a union that shares
the space between &apos;nd&apos; and &apos;ct_orig&apos; that holds the original tuple
conntrack metadata parsed from the OVS_PACKET_ATTR_KEY.
ND packets should not normally have conntrack state, so it&apos;s fine to
share the space, but normal ICMPv6 Echo packets or maybe other types of
ICMPv6 can have the state attached and it should not be overwritten.
The issue results in all but the last 4 bytes of the destination
address being wiped from the original conntrack tuple leading to
incorrect packet matching and potentially executing wrong actions
in case this packet recirculates within the datapath or goes back
to userspace.
ND fields should not be accessed in non-ND packets, so not clearing
them should be fine. Executing memset() only for actual ND packets to
avoid the issue.
Initializing the whole thing before parsing is needed because ND packet
may not contain all the options.
The issue only affects the OVS_PACKET_CMD_EXECUTE path and doesn&apos;t
affect packets entering OVS datapath from network interfaces, because
in this case CT metadata is populated from skb after the packet is
already parsed.</Note>
</Notes>
<ReleaseDate>2024-07-19</ReleaseDate>
<CVE>CVE-2024-38558</CVE>
<ProductStatuses>
<Status Type="Fixed">
<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1</ProductID>
</Status>
</ProductStatuses>
<Threats>
<Threat Type="Impact">
<Description>Medium</Description>
</Threat>
</Threats>
<CVSSScoreSets>
<ScoreSet>
<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
</ScoreSet>
</CVSSScoreSets>
<Remediations>
<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
<Description>kernel security update</Description>
<DATE>2024-07-19</DATE>
<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1860</URL>
</Remediation>
</Remediations>
</Vulnerability>
<Vulnerability Ordinal="10" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
<Notes>
<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gfs2: Fix potential glock use-after-free on unmount
When a DLM lockspace is released and there ares still locks in that
lockspace, DLM will unlock those locks automatically. Commit
fb6791d100d1b started exploiting this behavior to speed up filesystem
unmount: gfs2 would simply free glocks it didn&apos;t want to unlock and then
release the lockspace. This didn&apos;t take the bast callbacks for
asynchronous lock contention notifications into account, which remain
active until until a lock is unlocked or its lockspace is released.
To prevent those callbacks from accessing deallocated objects, put the
glocks that should not be unlocked on the sd_dead_glocks list, release
the lockspace, and only then free those glocks.
As an additional measure, ignore unexpected ast and bast callbacks if
the receiving glock is dead.</Note>
</Notes>
<ReleaseDate>2024-07-19</ReleaseDate>
<CVE>CVE-2024-38570</CVE>
<ProductStatuses>
<Status Type="Fixed">
<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1</ProductID>
</Status>
</ProductStatuses>
<Threats>
<Threat Type="Impact">
<Description>Medium</Description>
</Threat>
</Threats>
<CVSSScoreSets>
<ScoreSet>
<BaseScore>6.7</BaseScore>
<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
</ScoreSet>
</CVSSScoreSets>
<Remediations>
<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
<Description>kernel security update</Description>
<DATE>2024-07-19</DATE>
<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1860</URL>
</Remediation>
</Remediations>
</Vulnerability>
<Vulnerability Ordinal="11" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
<Notes>
<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
r8169: Fix possible ring buffer corruption on fragmented Tx packets.
An issue was found on the RTL8125b when transmitting small fragmented
packets, whereby invalid entries were inserted into the transmit ring
buffer, subsequently leading to calls to dma_unmap_single() with a null
address.
This was caused by rtl8169_start_xmit() not noticing changes to nr_frags
which may occur when small packets are padded (to work around hardware
quirks) in rtl8169_tso_csum_v2().
To fix this, postpone inspecting nr_frags until after any padding has been
applied.</Note>
</Notes>
<ReleaseDate>2024-07-19</ReleaseDate>
<CVE>CVE-2024-38586</CVE>
<ProductStatuses>
<Status Type="Fixed">
<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1</ProductID>
</Status>
</ProductStatuses>
<Threats>
<Threat Type="Impact">
<Description>Medium</Description>
</Threat>
</Threats>
<CVSSScoreSets>
<ScoreSet>
<BaseScore>4.7</BaseScore>
<Vector>AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
</ScoreSet>
</CVSSScoreSets>
<Remediations>
<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
<Description>kernel security update</Description>
<DATE>2024-07-19</DATE>
<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1860</URL>
</Remediation>
</Remediations>
</Vulnerability>
<Vulnerability Ordinal="12" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
<Notes>
<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md: fix resync softlockup when bitmap size is less than array size
Is is reported that for dm-raid10, lvextend + lvchange --syncaction will
trigger following softlockup:
kernel:watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#3 stuck for 26s! [mdX_resync:6976]
CPU: 7 PID: 3588 Comm: mdX_resync Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.9.0-rc4-next-20240419 #1
RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x13/0x30
Call Trace:
&lt;TASK&gt;
md_bitmap_start_sync+0x6b/0xf0
raid10_sync_request+0x25c/0x1b40 [raid10]
md_do_sync+0x64b/0x1020
md_thread+0xa7/0x170
kthread+0xcf/0x100
ret_from_fork+0x30/0x50
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
And the detailed process is as follows:
md_do_sync
j = mddev-&gt;resync_min
while (j &lt; max_sectors)
sectors = raid10_sync_request(mddev, j, &amp;skipped)
if (!md_bitmap_start_sync(..., &amp;sync_blocks))
// md_bitmap_start_sync set sync_blocks to 0
return sync_blocks + sectors_skippe;
// sectors = 0;
j += sectors;
// j never change
Root cause is that commit 301867b1c168 (&quot;md/raid10: check
slab-out-of-bounds in md_bitmap_get_counter&quot;) return early from
md_bitmap_get_counter(), without setting returned blocks.
Fix this problem by always set returned blocks from
md_bitmap_get_counter&quot;(), as it used to be.
Noted that this patch just fix the softlockup problem in kernel, the
case that bitmap size doesn&apos;t match array size still need to be fixed.</Note>
</Notes>
<ReleaseDate>2024-07-19</ReleaseDate>
<CVE>CVE-2024-38598</CVE>
<ProductStatuses>
<Status Type="Fixed">
<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1</ProductID>
</Status>
</ProductStatuses>
<Threats>
<Threat Type="Impact">
<Description>Medium</Description>
</Threat>
</Threats>
<CVSSScoreSets>
<ScoreSet>
<BaseScore>4.4</BaseScore>
<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
</ScoreSet>
</CVSSScoreSets>
<Remediations>
<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
<Description>kernel security update</Description>
<DATE>2024-07-19</DATE>
<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1860</URL>
</Remediation>
</Remediations>
</Vulnerability>
<Vulnerability Ordinal="13" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
<Notes>
<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: core: Fix NULL module pointer assignment at card init
The commit 81033c6b584b (&quot;ALSA: core: Warn on empty module&quot;)
introduced a WARN_ON() for a NULL module pointer passed at snd_card
object creation, and it also wraps the code around it with &apos;#ifdef
MODULE&apos;. This works in most cases, but the devils are always in
details. &quot;MODULE&quot; is defined when the target code (i.e. the sound
core) is built as a module; but this doesn&apos;t mean that the caller is
also built-in or not. Namely, when only the sound core is built-in
(CONFIG_SND=y) while the driver is a module (CONFIG_SND_USB_AUDIO=m),
the passed module pointer is ignored even if it&apos;s non-NULL, and
card-&gt;module remains as NULL. This would result in the missing module
reference up/down at the device open/close, leading to a race with the
code execution after the module removal.
For addressing the bug, move the assignment of card-&gt;module again out
of ifdef. The WARN_ON() is still wrapped with ifdef because the
module can be really NULL when all sound drivers are built-in.
Note that we keep &apos;ifdef MODULE&apos; for WARN_ON(), otherwise it would
lead to a false-positive NULL module check. Admittedly it won&apos;t catch
perfectly, i.e. no check is performed when CONFIG_SND=y. But, it&apos;s no
real problem as it&apos;s only for debugging, and the condition is pretty
rare.</Note>
</Notes>
<ReleaseDate>2024-07-19</ReleaseDate>
<CVE>CVE-2024-38605</CVE>
<ProductStatuses>
<Status Type="Fixed">
<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1</ProductID>
</Status>
</ProductStatuses>
<Threats>
<Threat Type="Impact">
<Description>Medium</Description>
</Threat>
</Threats>
<CVSSScoreSets>
<ScoreSet>
<BaseScore>4.4</BaseScore>
<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
</ScoreSet>
</CVSSScoreSets>
<Remediations>
<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
<Description>kernel security update</Description>
<DATE>2024-07-19</DATE>
<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1860</URL>
</Remediation>
</Remediations>
</Vulnerability>
<Vulnerability Ordinal="14" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
<Notes>
<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cpufreq: exit() callback is optional
The exit() callback is optional and shouldn&apos;t be called without checking
a valid pointer first.
Also, we must clear freq_table pointer even if the exit() callback isn&apos;t
present.</Note>
</Notes>
<ReleaseDate>2024-07-19</ReleaseDate>
<CVE>CVE-2024-38615</CVE>
<ProductStatuses>
<Status Type="Fixed">
<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1</ProductID>
</Status>
</ProductStatuses>
<Threats>
<Threat Type="Impact">
<Description>Medium</Description>
</Threat>
</Threats>
<CVSSScoreSets>
<ScoreSet>
<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
</ScoreSet>
</CVSSScoreSets>
<Remediations>
<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
<Description>kernel security update</Description>
<DATE>2024-07-19</DATE>
<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1860</URL>
</Remediation>
</Remediations>
</Vulnerability>
<Vulnerability Ordinal="15" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
<Notes>
<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vfio/pci: fix potential memory leak in vfio_intx_enable()
If vfio_irq_ctx_alloc() failed will lead to &apos;name&apos; memory leak.</Note>
</Notes>
<ReleaseDate>2024-07-19</ReleaseDate>
<CVE>CVE-2024-38632</CVE>
<ProductStatuses>
<Status Type="Fixed">
<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1</ProductID>
</Status>
</ProductStatuses>
<Threats>
<Threat Type="Impact">
<Description>Medium</Description>
</Threat>
</Threats>
<CVSSScoreSets>
<ScoreSet>
<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
</ScoreSet>
</CVSSScoreSets>
<Remediations>
<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
<Description>kernel security update</Description>
<DATE>2024-07-19</DATE>
<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1860</URL>
</Remediation>
</Remediations>
</Vulnerability>
<Vulnerability Ordinal="16" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
<Notes>
<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:kdb: Fix buffer overflow during tab-completeCurrently, when the user attempts symbol completion with the Tab key, kdbwill use strncpy() to insert the completed symbol into the command buffer.Unfortunately it passes the size of the source buffer rather than thedestination to strncpy() with predictably horrible results. Most obviouslyif the command buffer is already full but cp, the cursor position, is inthe middle of the buffer, then we will write past the end of the suppliedbuffer.Fix this by replacing the dubious strncpy() calls with memmove()/memcpy()calls plus explicit boundary checks to make sure we have enough spacebefore we start moving characters around.</Note>
</Notes>
<ReleaseDate>2024-07-19</ReleaseDate>
<CVE>CVE-2024-39480</CVE>
<ProductStatuses>
<Status Type="Fixed">
<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1</ProductID>
</Status>
</ProductStatuses>
<Threats>
<Threat Type="Impact">
<Description>Medium</Description>
</Threat>
</Threats>
<CVSSScoreSets>
<ScoreSet>
<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
</ScoreSet>
</CVSSScoreSets>
<Remediations>
<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
<Description>kernel security update</Description>
<DATE>2024-07-19</DATE>
<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1860</URL>
</Remediation>
</Remediations>
</Vulnerability>
<Vulnerability Ordinal="17" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
<Notes>
<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bonding: Fix out-of-bounds read in bond_option_arp_ip_targets_set()
In function bond_option_arp_ip_targets_set(), if newval-&gt;string is an
empty string, newval-&gt;string+1 will point to the byte after the
string, causing an out-of-bound read.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in strlen+0x7d/0xa0 lib/string.c:418
Read of size 1 at addr ffff8881119c4781 by task syz-executor665/8107
CPU: 1 PID: 8107 Comm: syz-executor665 Not tainted 6.7.0-rc7 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
&lt;TASK&gt;
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:364 [inline]
print_report+0xc1/0x5e0 mm/kasan/report.c:475
kasan_report+0xbe/0xf0 mm/kasan/report.c:588
strlen+0x7d/0xa0 lib/string.c:418
__fortify_strlen include/linux/fortify-string.h:210 [inline]
in4_pton+0xa3/0x3f0 net/core/utils.c:130
bond_option_arp_ip_targets_set+0xc2/0x910
drivers/net/bonding/bond_options.c:1201
__bond_opt_set+0x2a4/0x1030 drivers/net/bonding/bond_options.c:767
__bond_opt_set_notify+0x48/0x150 drivers/net/bonding/bond_options.c:792
bond_opt_tryset_rtnl+0xda/0x160 drivers/net/bonding/bond_options.c:817
bonding_sysfs_store_option+0xa1/0x120 drivers/net/bonding/bond_sysfs.c:156
dev_attr_store+0x54/0x80 drivers/base/core.c:2366
sysfs_kf_write+0x114/0x170 fs/sysfs/file.c:136
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x337/0x500 fs/kernfs/file.c:334
call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2020 [inline]
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:491 [inline]
vfs_write+0x96a/0xd80 fs/read_write.c:584
ksys_write+0x122/0x250 fs/read_write.c:637
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x40/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
---[ end trace ]---
Fix it by adding a check of string length before using it.</Note>
</Notes>
<ReleaseDate>2024-07-19</ReleaseDate>
<CVE>CVE-2024-39487</CVE>
<ProductStatuses>
<Status Type="Fixed">
<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1</ProductID>
</Status>
</ProductStatuses>
<Threats>
<Threat Type="Impact">
<Description>Medium</Description>
</Threat>
</Threats>
<CVSSScoreSets>
<ScoreSet>
<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
</ScoreSet>
</CVSSScoreSets>
<Remediations>
<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
<Description>kernel security update</Description>
<DATE>2024-07-19</DATE>
<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1860</URL>
</Remediation>
</Remediations>
</Vulnerability>
<Vulnerability Ordinal="18" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
<Notes>
<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: asm-bug: Add .align 2 to the end of __BUG_ENTRY
When CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE=n, we fail to add necessary padding bytes
to bug_table entries, and as a result the last entry in a bug table will
be ignored, potentially leading to an unexpected panic(). All prior
entries in the table will be handled correctly.
The arm64 ABI requires that struct fields of up to 8 bytes are
naturally-aligned, with padding added within a struct such that struct
are suitably aligned within arrays.
When CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERPOSE=y, the layout of a bug_entry is:
struct bug_entry {
signed int bug_addr_disp; // 4 bytes
signed int file_disp; // 4 bytes
unsigned short line; // 2 bytes
unsigned short flags; // 2 bytes
}
... with 12 bytes total, requiring 4-byte alignment.
When CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE=n, the layout of a bug_entry is:
struct bug_entry {
signed int bug_addr_disp; // 4 bytes
unsigned short flags; // 2 bytes
&lt; implicit padding &gt; // 2 bytes
}
... with 8 bytes total, with 6 bytes of data and 2 bytes of trailing
padding, requiring 4-byte alginment.
When we create a bug_entry in assembly, we align the start of the entry
to 4 bytes, which implicitly handles padding for any prior entries.
However, we do not align the end of the entry, and so when
CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE=n, the final entry lacks the trailing padding
bytes.
For the main kernel image this is not a problem as find_bug() doesn&apos;t
depend on the trailing padding bytes when searching for entries:
for (bug = __start___bug_table; bug &lt; __stop___bug_table; ++bug)
if (bugaddr == bug_addr(bug))
return bug;
However for modules, module_bug_finalize() depends on the trailing
bytes when calculating the number of entries:
mod-&gt;num_bugs = sechdrs[i].sh_size / sizeof(struct bug_entry);
... and as the last bug_entry lacks the necessary padding bytes, this entry
will not be counted, e.g. in the case of a single entry:
sechdrs[i].sh_size == 6
sizeof(struct bug_entry) == 8;
sechdrs[i].sh_size / sizeof(struct bug_entry) == 0;
Consequently module_find_bug() will miss the last bug_entry when it does:
for (i = 0; i &lt; mod-&gt;num_bugs; ++i, ++bug)
if (bugaddr == bug_addr(bug))
goto out;
... which can lead to a kenrel panic due to an unhandled bug.
This can be demonstrated with the following module:
static int __init buginit(void)
{
WARN(1, &quot;hello\n&quot;);
return 0;
}
static void __exit bugexit(void)
{
}
module_init(buginit);
module_exit(bugexit);
MODULE_LICENSE(&quot;GPL&quot;);
... which will trigger a kernel panic when loaded:
------------[ cut here ]------------
hello
Unexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1
Internal error: BRK handler: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in: hello(O+)
CPU: 0 PID: 50 Comm: insmod Tainted: G O 6.9.1 #8
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : buginit+0x18/0x1000 [hello]
lr : buginit+0x18/0x1000 [hello]
sp : ffff800080533ae0
x29: ffff800080533ae0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000
x26: ffffaba8c4e70510 x25: ffff800080533c30 x24: ffffaba8c4a28a58
x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff3947c0eab3c0
x20: ffffaba8c4e3f000 x19: ffffaba846464000 x18: 0000000000000006
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffaba8c2492834 x15: 0720072007200720
x14: 0720072007200720 x13: ffffaba8c49b27c8 x12: 0000000000000312
x11: 0000000000000106 x10: ffffaba8c4a0a7c8 x9 : ffffaba8c49b27c8
x8 : 00000000ffffefff x7 : ffffaba8c4a0a7c8 x6 : 80000000fffff000
x5 : 0000000000000107 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000
x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff3947c0eab3c0
Call trace:
buginit+0x18/0x1000 [hello]
do_one_initcall+0x80/0x1c8
do_init_module+0x60/0x218
load_module+0x1ba4/0x1d70
__do_sys_init_module+0x198/0x1d0
__arm64_sys_init_module+0x1c/0x28
invoke_syscall+0x48/0x114
el0_svc
---truncated---</Note>
</Notes>
<ReleaseDate>2024-07-19</ReleaseDate>
<CVE>CVE-2024-39488</CVE>
<ProductStatuses>
<Status Type="Fixed">
<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1</ProductID>
</Status>
</ProductStatuses>
<Threats>
<Threat Type="Impact">
<Description>Medium</Description>
</Threat>
</Threats>
<CVSSScoreSets>
<ScoreSet>
<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
</ScoreSet>
</CVSSScoreSets>
<Remediations>
<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
<Description>kernel security update</Description>
<DATE>2024-07-19</DATE>
<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1860</URL>
</Remediation>
</Remediations>
</Vulnerability>
<Vulnerability Ordinal="19" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
<Notes>
<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: sr: fix memleak in seg6_hmac_init_algo
seg6_hmac_init_algo returns without cleaning up the previous allocations
if one fails, so it&apos;s going to leak all that memory and the crypto tfms.
Update seg6_hmac_exit to only free the memory when allocated, so we can
reuse the code directly.</Note>
</Notes>
<ReleaseDate>2024-07-19</ReleaseDate>
<CVE>CVE-2024-39489</CVE>
<ProductStatuses>
<Status Type="Fixed">
<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1</ProductID>
</Status>
</ProductStatuses>
<Threats>
<Threat Type="Impact">
<Description>Low</Description>
</Threat>
</Threats>
<CVSSScoreSets>
<ScoreSet>
<BaseScore>3.3</BaseScore>
<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L</Vector>
</ScoreSet>
</CVSSScoreSets>
<Remediations>
<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
<Description>kernel security update</Description>
<DATE>2024-07-19</DATE>
<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1860</URL>
</Remediation>
</Remediations>
</Vulnerability>
<Vulnerability Ordinal="20" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
<Notes>
<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sock_map: avoid race between sock_map_close and sk_psock_put
sk_psock_get will return NULL if the refcount of psock has gone to 0, which
will happen when the last call of sk_psock_put is done. However,
sk_psock_drop may not have finished yet, so the close callback will still
point to sock_map_close despite psock being NULL.
This can be reproduced with a thread deleting an element from the sock map,
while the second one creates a socket, adds it to the map and closes it.
That will trigger the WARN_ON_ONCE:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 7220 at net/core/sock_map.c:1701 sock_map_close+0x2a2/0x2d0 net/core/sock_map.c:1701
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 7220 Comm: syz-executor380 Not tainted 6.9.0-syzkaller-07726-g3c999d1ae3c7 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024
RIP: 0010:sock_map_close+0x2a2/0x2d0 net/core/sock_map.c:1701
Code: df e8 92 29 88 f8 48 8b 1b 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 20 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 79 29 88 f8 4c 8b 23 eb 89 e8 4f 15 23 f8 90 &lt;0f&gt; 0b 90 48 83 c4 08 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d e9 13 26 3d 02
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000441fda8 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: ffffffff89731ae1 RBX: ffffffff94b87540 RCX: ffff888029470000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8bcab5c0 RDI: ffffffff8c1faba0
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffffff92f9b61f R09: 1ffffffff25f36c3
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff25f36c4 R12: ffffffff89731840
R13: ffff88804b587000 R14: ffff88804b587000 R15: ffffffff89731870
FS: 000055555e080380(0000) GS:ffff8880b9500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000000207d4000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
Call Trace:
&lt;TASK&gt;
unix_release+0x87/0xc0 net/unix/af_unix.c:1048
__sock_release net/socket.c:659 [inline]
sock_close+0xbe/0x240 net/socket.c:1421
__fput+0x42b/0x8a0 fs/file_table.c:422
__do_sys_close fs/open.c:1556 [inline]
__se_sys_close fs/open.c:1541 [inline]
__x64_sys_close+0x7f/0x110 fs/open.c:1541
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fb37d618070
Code: 00 00 48 c7 c2 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb d4 e8 10 2c 00 00 80 3d 31 f0 07 00 00 74 17 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 &lt;48&gt; 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 48 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 83 ec 18 89 7c
RSP: 002b:00007ffcd4a525d8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: 00007fb37d618070
RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 00000000200001c0 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000100000000 R09: 0000000100000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
&lt;/TASK&gt;
Use sk_psock, which will only check that the pointer is not been set to
NULL yet, which should only happen after the callbacks are restored. If,
then, a reference can still be gotten, we may call sk_psock_stop and cancel
psock-&gt;work.
As suggested by Paolo Abeni, reorder the condition so the control flow is
less convoluted.
After that change, the reproducer does not trigger the WARN_ON_ONCE
anymore.</Note>
</Notes>
<ReleaseDate>2024-07-19</ReleaseDate>
<CVE>CVE-2024-39500</CVE>
<ProductStatuses>
<Status Type="Fixed">
<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1</ProductID>
</Status>
</ProductStatuses>
<Threats>
<Threat Type="Impact">
<Description>Medium</Description>
</Threat>
</Threats>
<CVSSScoreSets>
<ScoreSet>
<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
</ScoreSet>
</CVSSScoreSets>
<Remediations>
<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
<Description>kernel security update</Description>
<DATE>2024-07-19</DATE>
<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1860</URL>
</Remediation>
</Remediations>
</Vulnerability>
<Vulnerability Ordinal="21" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
<Notes>
<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: ensure snd_una is properly initialized on connect
This is strictly related to commit fb7a0d334894 (&quot;mptcp: ensure snd_nxt
is properly initialized on connect&quot;). It turns out that syzkaller can
trigger the retransmit after fallback and before processing any other
incoming packet - so that snd_una is still left uninitialized.
Address the issue explicitly initializing snd_una together with snd_nxt
and write_seq.</Note>
</Notes>
<ReleaseDate>2024-07-19</ReleaseDate>
<CVE>CVE-2024-40931</CVE>
<ProductStatuses>
<Status Type="Fixed">
<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1</ProductID>
</Status>
</ProductStatuses>
<Threats>
<Threat Type="Impact">
<Description>Medium</Description>
</Threat>
</Threats>
<CVSSScoreSets>
<ScoreSet>
<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
</ScoreSet>
</CVSSScoreSets>
<Remediations>
<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
<Description>kernel security update</Description>
<DATE>2024-07-19</DATE>
<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1860</URL>
</Remediation>
</Remediations>
</Vulnerability>
<Vulnerability Ordinal="22" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
<Notes>
<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: remove clear SB_INLINECRYPT flag in default_options
In f2fs_remount, SB_INLINECRYPT flag will be clear and re-set.
If create new file or open file during this gap, these files
will not use inlinecrypt. Worse case, it may lead to data
corruption if wrappedkey_v0 is enable.
Thread A: Thread B:
-f2fs_remount -f2fs_file_open or f2fs_new_inode
-default_options
&lt;- clear SB_INLINECRYPT flag
-fscrypt_select_encryption_impl
-parse_options
&lt;- set SB_INLINECRYPT again</Note>
</Notes>
<ReleaseDate>2024-07-19</ReleaseDate>
<CVE>CVE-2024-40971</CVE>
<ProductStatuses>
<Status Type="Fixed">
<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1</ProductID>
</Status>
</ProductStatuses>
<Threats>
<Threat Type="Impact">
<Description>Medium</Description>
</Threat>
</Threats>
<CVSSScoreSets>
<ScoreSet>
<BaseScore>5.5</BaseScore>
<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H</Vector>
</ScoreSet>
</CVSSScoreSets>
<Remediations>
<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
<Description>kernel security update</Description>
<DATE>2024-07-19</DATE>
<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1860</URL>
</Remediation>
</Remediations>
</Vulnerability>
</cvrfdoc>